Western Sahara: Policy or Propaganda?
When Propaganda Becomes Security Policy: Western Sahara and the Limits of US Analysis
In Washington, distant unresolved conflicts can easily become files on a national-security map. But when such conflicts are read only through the language of security, investment, alliances, and geopolitical competition, the risk is that political narrative replaces legal fact. Western Sahara is one such test: will U.S. policy approach the dispute as an unresolved question of self-determination, or will it allow certain circles to turn it into a security and economic pressure file serving the narrative of one party?
Western Sahara is not an ordinary border dispute. It remains listed by the United Nations as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO, was established in 1991 under Security Council Resolution 690 as part of a process linked to the ceasefire and self-determination. These are not historical details; they are the legal foundation that cannot be erased by changing the language of policy.
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112199?utm_source=['']&ln=en&v=pdf
The International Court of Justice’s 1975 advisory opinion did not grant Morocco sovereignty over the territory. Rather, the Court found that the materials before it did not establish territorial sovereignty ties between Morocco and Western Sahara. Any responsible reading of the dispute must therefore begin from this fact: at its legal core, this is a question of a people that has not yet fully exercised its right to self-determination. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/61?utm
Since the Trump administration’s December 10, 2020 proclamation recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and supporting autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, the file has entered a new American phase. That proclamation was an official act and cannot be ignored. But it does not erase the fact that, under international law and in the United Nations record, the dispute remains unresolved. Nor does it necessarily mean that this direction reflects a deep, long-term institutional assessment of U.S. interests. In some respects, it may also reflect the influence of lobbying networks, private interests, and policy actors close to Morocco’s preferred narrative. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-recognizing-sovereignty-kingdom-morocco-western-sahara/?utm
The criticism here is not directed at the United States as a country, nor at the American people, nor at the traditions of U.S. diplomacy when they operate through law and institutions. The concern is directed at a channel of influence in Washington that may confuse U.S. interests with the interests of an allied government. Morocco is an important U.S. partner, but partnership does not mean that Rabat’s narrative should become Washington’s only........
