The Strategy I Didn’t Want to Defend
In early April, I published an article criticizing Israel’s “Clear-Hold-Flatten” strategy. I argued that it risked locking Israel into an open-ended occupation with no clear political end state. I worried that flattening neighborhoods and holding territory would create new grievances faster than it created security. I believed there had to be a better path.
Four months is not a long time.
It is certainly not enough time for history to render its final verdict on a war whose consequences will be felt for decades.
But it has been long enough for me to recognize that one of the central assumptions behind my argument no longer survives contact with reality.
I did not change my mind because I suddenly became comfortable with military occupation. I haven’t.
I changed my mind because I no longer see a credible alternative.
That distinction matters.
My criticism of Clear-Hold-Flatten rested on an implicit belief that Israel could eventually transfer responsibility to another governing authority capable of preventing Gaza, southern Lebanon, or the West Bank from once again becoming launchpads for organized attacks.
Today, I have far less confidence that such an authority exists—or will exist anytime soon.
The strategic lesson of October 7 has become clearer to me over the past several months.
Before October 7, Israel believed deterrence could contain hostile organizations on its borders. Hamas could rule Gaza so long as it feared the consequences of crossing certain lines.
October 7 shattered that........
