There is much talk about how Israel promoted the idea of regime change in Iran to the Trump administration. It’s been particularly primed by a New York Times piece by Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan (“How Trump Took the US to War With Iran,” April 7), based on interviews with participants. First, here’s a recap of that report.

On February 11, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made his case to Trump in the White House Situation Room. Haberman and Swan:

Mr. Netanyahu and his team outlined conditions they portrayed as pointing to near-certain victory: Iran’s ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks. The regime would be so weakened that it could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz, and the likelihood that Iran would land blows against US interests in neighboring countries was assessed as minimal. Besides, Mossad’s intelligence indicated that street protests inside Iran would begin again and—with the impetus of the Israeli spy agency helping to foment riots and rebellion—an intense bombing campaign could foster the conditions for the Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime.

Mr. Netanyahu and his team outlined conditions they portrayed as pointing to near-certain victory: Iran’s ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks. The regime would be so weakened that it could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz, and the likelihood that Iran would land blows against US interests in neighboring countries was assessed as minimal.

Besides, Mossad’s intelligence indicated that street protests inside Iran would begin again and—with the impetus of the Israeli spy agency helping to foment riots and rebellion—an intense bombing campaign could foster the conditions for the Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime.

According to the Times report, “Netanyahu delivered his presentation in a confident monotone. It seemed to land well with the most important person in the room, the American president.”

The next day, in a meeting with Trump, CIA Director John Ratcliffe called the Israeli regime-change scenarios “farcical”—a judgment Secretary of State Marco Rubio restated more bluntly as “bullshit.” But Trump signed off on the operation anyway, more drawn to decapitating and degrading the regime than to changing it.

Reading the Times report left me with an acute sense of déjà vu, as if I’d seen this exchange before. After a bit of digging, I found the reason: this conversation had already taken place. Specifically, on July 27, 2009, in Jerusalem, between Netanyahu and Robert Gates, then Secretary of Defense and former CIA director. The evidence is on the bookshelf: Gates’s memoir, Duty (published in 2014), and Netanyahu’s autobiography, Bibi: My Story (published in 2022). The parallels are uncanny.

In mid-2009, Iran had just experienced an aborted “Green Revolution,” which brought protesters into the streets and raised hopes for change. Barack Obama had been president since January, but Gates was not part of his original team. He had served as defense secretary under George W. Bush and was the first defense secretary retained by a president of the opposing party, carrying over into the Obama administration.

In his memoir, Gates called the July 2009 meeting with Netanyahu “our first no-punches-pulled discussion of Iran.” According to him,

Bibi was convinced the Iranian regime was extremely fragile and that a strike on their nuclear facilities very likely would trigger the regime’s overthrow by the Iranian people. I strongly disagreed, convinced that a foreign military attack would instead rally the Iranian people behind their government.

Bibi was convinced the Iranian regime was extremely fragile and that a strike on their nuclear facilities very likely would trigger the regime’s overthrow by the Iranian people. I strongly disagreed, convinced that a foreign military attack would instead rally the Iranian people behind their government.

“All the experts can be wrong”

Netanyahu, in his autobiography, gives a slightly more colorful version:

“Besides,” [Gates] said, “all the experts tell us that an American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would unite the Iranian public behind the regime. Can all the experts be wrong?” “Yes,” I said, “all the experts can be wrong. They often are. Most Iranians hate this tyranny. They just tried to rebel against it. They’ll cheer when you deliver a knockout punch to the regime. It would be a tremendous psychological blow to the mullahs’ image of invincibility!” I related to Gates what President Museveni of Uganda told me of the psychological effect of the [Israeli] raid in Entebbe [in 1976, to free hijacked passengers], that before the raid Ugandans had “believed Idi Amin was invincible” and after it they knew they could “bring him down.” “You have the power to achieve the same result with the Iranian regime,” I said to Gates. “You are Gulliver.”

“Besides,” [Gates] said, “all the experts tell us that an American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would unite the Iranian public behind the regime. Can all the experts be wrong?”

“Yes,” I said, “all the experts can be wrong. They often are. Most Iranians hate this tyranny. They just tried to rebel against it. They’ll cheer when you deliver a knockout punch to the regime. It would be a tremendous psychological blow to the mullahs’ image of invincibility!”

I related to Gates what President Museveni of Uganda told me of the psychological effect of the [Israeli] raid in Entebbe [in 1976, to free hijacked passengers], that before the raid Ugandans had “believed Idi Amin was invincible” and after it they knew they could “bring him down.”

“You have the power to achieve the same result with the Iranian regime,” I said to Gates. “You are Gulliver.”

The conversation shifted to how Iran might respond to an attack. Gates:

Netanyahu also believed Iranian retaliation after a strike would be pro forma, perhaps the launch of a few dozen missiles at Israel and some rocket salvos from Lebanese-based Hizballah. He argued that the Iranians were realists and would not want to provoke a larger military attack by the United States by going after American targets—especially our ships in the Gulf—or by attacking other countries’ oil facilities. Closing the Gulf to oil exports, he said, would cut the Iranians’ own economic throats. Again I disagreed, telling him he was misled by the lack of an Iraqi response to Israel’s destruction of their Osirak reactor in 1981 and the absence of any Syrian reaction to destruction of their reactor in 2007. I said the Iranians—the Persians—were very different from Iraqis and Syrians. He was assuming a lot in anticipating a mild Iranian reaction, and if he was wrong, an attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities would spark a war in the region, I said.

Netanyahu also believed Iranian retaliation after a strike would be pro forma, perhaps the launch of a few dozen missiles at Israel and some rocket salvos from Lebanese-based Hizballah. He argued that the Iranians were realists and would not want to provoke a larger military attack by the United States by going after American targets—especially our ships in the Gulf—or by attacking other countries’ oil facilities. Closing the Gulf to oil exports, he said, would cut the Iranians’ own economic throats. Again I disagreed, telling him he was misled by the lack of an Iraqi response to Israel’s destruction of their Osirak reactor in 1981 and the absence of any Syrian reaction to destruction of their reactor in 2007. I said the Iranians—the Persians—were very different from Iraqis and Syrians. He was assuming a lot in anticipating a mild Iranian reaction, and if he was wrong, an attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities would spark a war in the region, I said.

Netanyahu’s account of this exchange is brief in comparison and frames it more as a disagreement over whether Iran would rebuild its nuclear program after an attack:

Gates argued that the delaying effects of any Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear capabilities would be short-lived. I noted that the same thing was said of Israel’s strike on Saddam Hussein’s Osirak reactor, referring to our successful 1981 operation against a nuclear facility that never resumed operation. Gates countered that an Israeli strike would result in a full-scale war.

Gates argued that the delaying effects of any Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear capabilities would be short-lived. I noted that the same thing was said of Israel’s strike on Saddam Hussein’s Osirak reactor, referring to our successful 1981 operation against a nuclear facility that never resumed operation. Gates countered that an Israeli strike would result in a full-scale war.

To which Netanyahu added this aside: “Whether it would or not, I was willing to sustain a conventional war with Iran in order to avoid a war with a nuclear-armed Iran.”

For at least sixteen years, Netanyahu’s arguments—regime fragility, decisive action, and limited retaliation—failed to carry the day in Washington. They were countered by US objections: regime resilience, the rally effect, and the risk of escalation. At any point, Netanyahu might have left the political stage without achieving his prime objective. But he held on to power long enough for the churn of American politics to finally produce a president willing to take the leap.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)