Open the newspapers in Israel, the United States, or almost any major outlet covering global affairs, and the pattern is the same: reports about military preparations, speculation about timing, and constant updates on escalation. Social media and WhatsApp groups add another layer, tracking ships and aircraft in real time, circulating satellite images from Iran, and spreading claims about defensive deployments in Israel.

This has created a climate of permanent suspense. Every new image or movement produces a new rumor. Some are serious enough that governments or security agencies feel compelled to deny them in order to prevent panic.

But amid all this noise, one basic question is being neglected: Why would the United States attack Iran now?

Not when. Not how. Not with what assets. Why.

The public conversation has become fixated on timelines and tactical signals. Is an attack imminent? Is it a bluff? Did President Trump’s latest remarks mean a strike is likely within days, or were they part of a negotiating tactic? This kind of reporting may be understandable, but it is not enough. It leaves out the central issue in any potential war: the political objective.

What is the United States trying to achieve?

If the answer is Iran’s nuclear program, then there is an obvious contradiction that deserves far more scrutiny than it is receiving. Both President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu previously described the results of the June war in sweeping terms, suggesting that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure had been devastated. If that is true, why is a new American attack now being discussed as if the problem remains unresolved? If it is not true, then the public deserves a clear explanation of what was actually achieved and what was not.

The same question applies to Iran’s missile program. Netanyahu has repeatedly argued that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were severely damaged. Yet Israeli strategic discussions continue to treat Iran’s missile production as a major and urgent threat. If that threat remains, then the earlier declarations of decisive success were at best incomplete and at worst misleading.

This matters because military escalation cannot be justified by rhetoric alone. A democratic public is entitled to know what objective force is meant to serve and whether that objective is realistic.

There is, of course, a clear strategic logic from Israel’s point of view. Israel has long sought a fundamental shift in the regional balance of power and sees Iran not only as a nuclear challenge but as the center of a broader military network that includes missile production, proxy forces, and regional influence. From that perspective, an American strike could do more than destroy targets; it could reshape the strategic map of the Middle East.

But Israel’s strategic objective is not automatically America’s.

That distinction is too often blurred in the current discussion. Much of the public debate proceeds as if “Iran is dangerous” is itself a sufficient answer to the question of war. It is not. Iran can be dangerous and still leave open multiple policy options: deterrence, coercive diplomacy, sanctions, limited military pressure, or full-scale confrontation. These are not interchangeable choices. Each carries different legal, political, and military consequences.

There is also a second issue that deserves greater attention: what Iran is signaling. In recent days, Iranian officials have publicly spoken of possible concessions and have suggested progress on core questions related to the nuclear file. This does not mean Tehran is negotiating in good faith, and no one should be naïve about the regime’s intentions. But it does mean that diplomacy is not obviously exhausted.

If so, then the military buildup raises an uncomfortable question. Is the purpose of escalation to improve the terms of an agreement, or is the pressure designed to make an agreement impossible and prepare the political ground for war?

That distinction is critical. One path uses military pressure to produce a diplomatic outcome. The other uses diplomacy as a temporary stage in a process that is already moving toward confrontation.

The current coverage, however, rarely forces that choice into the open. Instead, it treats the crisis like a rolling drama: tension rises, assets move, rumors spread, officials deny, markets react, and commentators speculate about the next 24 hours. It is a form of war reporting that rewards immediacy but discourages strategic thinking.

This is dangerous. Public debate becomes a countdown rather than an argument. Citizens are asked to follow developments, not evaluate policy. The result is a politics of suspense in which the most important questions — objective, legitimacy, and end state — remain unanswered.

If the United States is seriously considering military action against Iran, the administration should be required to state plainly what it is trying to achieve, why force is necessary now, and what success would look like. It should also explain how this objective differs, if at all, from Israel’s broader goal of changing the regional balance permanently.

This is also of utmost importance for Israel. Jerusalem should not find itself drawn into a war in which it does not define the objectives or the exit strategy—only to be cast as the “bad cop” in service of someone else’s security or foreign policy, while still failing to achieve its own strategic goals. That, according to the current rhetoric, may have already happened in June.

Many analysts argue that Netanyahu sees this as a historic opportunity—not necessarily only because the Iranian regime is at its weakest point, but because he understands that no other US president is likely to go to war with Iran with Israel as a central partner. But that is precisely the danger: Netanyahu becomes dependent on Trump, who has repeatedly shown that he acts according to his own interests. If Trump decides when a war begins, he can also decide when it ends. And if the objective, legitimacy, and end state are unclear for Washington, there is no guarantee that Israel’s goals—if they are clearly defined at all—will be achieved.

Without that clarity, the conversation will continue to drift between alarm and spectacle. And a decision as serious as war will be framed not as strategy, but as timing.

That is not enough. Not for the United States, not for Israel, and not for a region that has already paid the price of too many wars launched without a clear political end.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)