It has become increasingly difficult to make sense of the current war in the Middle East and predict where events are heading. Beyond the debate over who is right or wrong, there are deeper questions about whether the conflict was inevitable, will it spiral out of control and how it might ultimately conclude.

To many Western‑oriented observers, the war launched by the United States and Israel may appear unnecessary or even reckless. I disagree. But understanding why this conflict was ultimately unavoidable, its timing being the only variable, requires a shift in political perspective. Paradigm shifts are never easy. Physics offers a useful analogy of the difficulty – the move from Newtonian mechanics to Einsteinian quantum theory. Classical mechanics provided a comforting, predictable universe, while quantum physics blurred once‑clear boundaries and replaced certainty with probabilities. A student trained only in classical mechanics would naturally resist a framework that overturns so many foundational assumptions.

The same dynamic applies to geopolitics. Accepting that this war was not a reckless choice demands a similar shift. Approaching today’s conflict with assumptions drawn from earlier European wars, where nations shared comparable worldviews and competed mainly for territory, influence, or economic advantage misses the core reality driving the present hostilities.

The rationale for the war with Iran is fundamentally different from past European wars. First, Iran’s motivations are ideological rather than conventionally imperial. Its aim is not merely to extend political control beyond its borders. Instead, after defeating its opponents, it seeks to impose a rigid, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, in its own rhetoric, on a global scale. It’s reference to the U.S. as being the “Greater Satan” and Israel as the lesser Satan are slogan versions of their ideology.

Second, traditional aggressors behave like bullies: they push until they meet resistance, and when the cost becomes too high, they pull back. Iran and its proxy Hezbollah do not follow this pattern. Driven by an ideological mission to destroy Israel and reshape the region, the IRGC Iranian regime along with Hezbollah are willing to absorb staggering losses of infrastructure, civilians, soldiers, and even senior leaders to pursue their ideological belligerent goals. These are not the behaviors of a conventional state seeking leverage. They are the behaviors of an ideological movement committed to its goals regardless of the cost to themselves.

Many Western observers refuse to grasp that Jihadist fundamentalists will go to any length prioritizing harming their enemies over protecting their own people or even preserving their leadership. Although the U.S. and Israel achieved spectacular early battlefield gains, Iran’s IRGC and Hezbollah have shown no willingness to yield or moderate their hard‑line ideology. This willingness to endure such devastation, challenges Western assumptions who believe all sides to a conflict ultimately seek compromise or material gain.

Viewed through the events of October 7, 2023, the U.S. and Israel should have recognized the hard truth: when dealing with Jihadists willing to pursue its goals at any cost, even spectacular military strikes will not act as a deterrent. Hamas and Hezbollah continued fighting after October 7 despite heavy losses. The successful beeper attack on Hezbollah operatives and the elimination of much of both groups’ senior leadership likewise failed to shift their behavior. The same conclusion became unmistakable after the November 27, 2024, ceasefire with Hezbollah and again following the twelve‑day war with Iran that ended on June 24, 2025, when both parties rearmed rather than disarmed. Tehran has since funded Hezbollah and upgraded its own munitions to include more destructive cluster bombs. In addition, Tehran remains intent on restoring its military nuclear capabilities whenever an opportunity will arise.

The only viable goal for the West is the need to facilitate regime change through military actions reinforced by political and financial isolation rather than diplomacy.

While Western audiences usually see the Middle East conflicts through high‑profile clashes involving Israel, the United States, Iran, and Hezbollah, the most pernicious damage is actually inflicted within the very societies these regimes reside.

Lebanon is a stark example. Once a flourishing, Christian‑majority nation, with its capital Beirut known as the “Paris of the Middle East” during its 1950s–1970s golden age, the country began to unravel during the civil war and demographic shifts of the 1970s in favor of Muslims. This change opened the door for Hezbollah, the Shia Islamist movement. Hezbollah now operates as a heavily armed “state within a state,” using force, not persuasion, along with political assassinations, including the 2005 killing of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Its fighters form a military force separate from, and stronger than the Lebanese army. Iran remains Hezbollah’s chief patron, reportedly providing about $1 billion annually, while Hezbollah supplements its income through the global trade of Captagon, a fentanyl analogue. This steady flow of money and weapons has enabled Hezbollah to both tempt and pressure impoverished Lebanese into cooperation. Sadly, even with the money influx from Iran, like most fundamentalist‑run states, Lebanon is now bankrupt. What emerges is not a sovereign state acting for its citizens, but a society reshaped by an ideological movement.

Iran’s trajectory is similar. Despite the Shah’s corruption and authoritarianism, the country experienced rapid modernization in the 1970s under his rule. He transformed the country into a secular, industrial power, leading to major gains in literacy, women’s rights, including suffrage and expanded access to education. Women entered universities in large numbers and took on increasingly visible roles in public life and the workforce.

In hindsight, many Iranians now recognize they underestimated the far greater repression that would follow. The Ayatollah revolution replaced an autocratic monarch with a theocratic regime far more ruthless and intrusive. Despite vast oil reserves and also ranking among the world’s top 15 mineral-rich countries, Iran today nevertheless suffers from a deeply impoverished economy and inflation hovering around 50 percent. The result is a nation with immense potential and resources, steadily depleted to sustain an ideological project whose burdens fall overwhelmingly on its own people.”

Regrettably, Western analysts mostly continue their Middle East coverage of the present war in a skewed manner.  First, when reporting on violence, they rarely place it in proper context by highlighting the incitement posed by Iran and its proxies toward the West, or the repression these regimes inflict on their own citizens. Second when casualties in the region are covered, the focus follows a familiar pattern: extensive attention to Arab and Muslim losses connected to Israeli operations, with far less acknowledgment of the greater brutal violence inflicted on Arabs and Muslims by their fellow Arabs and Muslims, often at the hands of their own regimes.

More concerning is that Western leaders and pundits continue to take a feeble Chamberlain like stance as if the Iranian regime poses no inevitable threat to them or to their future. It is too bad that they do not listen to the adage “Evil happens when good men hold their tongue”. Furthermore, they are mistaken and shortsighted if they believe that what has happened to societies within a fundamentalist regime cannot happen to them.  If Israel falls, it will incentivize Iran further to pursue implementing their radical Islamic ideology globally.  Infiltration of extremism is already occurring via vulnerable Muslim immigrants to Europe. While Western leaders are turning the other way, Jihadist fundamentalist groups who have articulated their aims clearly, continue advancing them.

If the IRCG regime falls, the present U.S.-Israeli initiative will be justified and worthwhile mostly for the benefit of future generations. Even if the regime does not fall, it is not unreasonable to presume that, at the least, and presuming that Iran is not surreptitiously rearming, that it will soon run out of offensive weapons, preventing the present hostilities from spiraling out of control and in parallel leading to a suspension in the fighting. However, if only a moratorium is achieved, the IRGC will likely continue to repress their people internally, rearm and continue with advancing their external global ideological agenda.

If military involvement is unpalatable for Western European countries, there are still non‑military steps they could take. One option is to follow the money trail and work to cut off financial channels supporting Iran and Hezbollah. This, though, would require preventing countries like Turkey from serving as transfer conduits. Another could be making a more serious effort to identify and detain Jihadist fundamentalist immigrants. Ultimately, the nature of Western Europe’s response will depend primarily on their political will.

In summary, viewing the present U.S. Israeli conflict with Iran and Hezbollah indulgently from a spectator’s perspective is not only inappropriate, but just as happened when the Ayatollahs took over Iran, has the potential of politically and culturally changing the landscape of the Middle East, Western Europe and beyond.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)