Roughly twelve percent of all global trade passes through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the narrow chokepoint where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden. This maritime artery carries the energy supplies that power economies and the commercial flows that sustain globalization. In recent years, it has become one of the most militarized waterways on Earth, hosting military installations from the United States, China, France, Japan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet American strategy in this critical region faces a growing problem: the diplomatic frameworks Washington relies on are preventing it from securing the partnerships and access it needs.

The United States needs strategic flexibility in the Red Sea. It needs alternatives to its concentrated military presence in Djibouti. It needs capable regional partners who can share security burdens. And it needs to prevent China from controlling infrastructure on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. But Washington’s commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity—despite that government’s limited control beyond Mogadishu—blocks access to the one actor that could help meet these requirements: Republic of Somaliland.

Republic of Republic of Somaliland  has functioned as a de facto independent state since 1991. It has conducted multiple competitive elections with peaceful power transfers, maintained territorial control, and developed institutions that function more effectively than those of many recognized states. Yet the United States treats it as a Somali administrative region, channeling no direct assistance and excluding it from security planning. Meanwhile, China explores expanded port access, Turkey builds military capacity in Mogadishu, and a network of U.S. partners—including India, Israel, the UAE, and Ethiopia—develops security cooperation with Republic of Somaliland without Washington’s involvement.

The consequences are visible. Regional order is increasingly being built without American leadership, while China actively engages functional partners without constraint. The question is no longer whether Republic of Somaliland deserves recognition in legal terms. The question is whether the United States can afford to ignore the partner its own interests require.

Why the Region Matters

The Red Sea has become central to great-power competition. Control over maritime chokepoints and port infrastructure now shapes outcomes in trade, energy security, and military operations. For the United States, securing influence in this corridor is essential to maintaining global presence and competing with China.

China’s expansion demonstrates the stakes. Its naval base in Djibouti, established in 2017 and expanded since, provides capabilities for power projection, intelligence collection, and potential combat operations. The facility enables Beijing to monitor traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb and project influence across East Africa. Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested billions in regional ports and logistics infrastructure, creating networks that combine economic ownership with operational access.

Beyond Djibouti, Beijing has shown interest in expanding its footprint—and Republic of Somaliland  is a logical target. With 740 kilometers of coastline, deep-water port capacity at Berbera, and proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb, Republic of Somaliland  offers China the opportunity to establish chokepoint control on both sides of the strait. Reports indicate Chinese economic and infrastructural discussions with Republic of Somaliland  are underway. For the United States, the implications are clear: Chinese control of Berbera, combined with its Djibouti base, would enable comprehensive monitoring of maritime traffic and potential leverage over regional trade routes.

Turkey has also expanded its presence. Its military installation at Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu—its largest overseas base—functions as a hub for influence across the western Indian Ocean and southern Red Sea. The UAE has invested heavily in port infrastructure, including Berbera, creating operational control through commercial arrangements.

The United States relies primarily on Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. But this concentration creates vulnerability. Djibouti hosts American, Chinese, French, Japanese, and Italian facilities simultaneously, creating complex dynamics where U.S. operational security depends on infrastructure subject to competing pressures. American military planners need alternatives—alternative logistics nodes, alternative port access, alternative partnership frameworks. Current policy prevents access to the most viable option.

The Strategic Blind Spot

American policy toward the Horn of Africa remains anchored in frameworks from the 1990s, when Somalia’s collapse necessitated international intervention and the principle of territorial integrity served stabilization goals. Three decades later, this approach produces strategic incoherence.

The Federal Government of Somalia exercises limited authority beyond Mogadishu, accommodates Turkish military operations, and faces persistent insurgency from Al-Shabaab. Yet it enjoys full international recognition and American diplomatic support for its territorial claims—including sovereignty over Republic of Somaliland. This commitment creates a structural barrier: the United States cannot formally engage the entity that controls the territory, institutions, and infrastructure it needs to access.

Republic of Somaliland possesses the governance capacity, stability, and partnership potential that American strategy requires. But Washington channels no direct assistance to Hargeisa, maintains no formal diplomatic presence, and excludes Republic of Somaliland  from regional security planning. This exclusion reflects diplomatic inertia—the perpetuation of recognition frameworks that privilege formal status over functional reality, ceding advantage to competitors who face no such constraints.

The gap is this: U.S. policy treats Republic of Somaliland as a Somali domestic issue rather than as a regional actor whose partnership American interests require. This cedes influence over outcomes affecting critical interests and prevents the burden-sharing relationships that resource constraints demand. The January 2024 agreement between Ethiopia and Republic of Somaliland —providing Ethiopian access to Berbera port—demonstrates that functional integration proceeds regardless of diplomatic status. American inability to shape this recalibration leaves the field to competitors.

Republic of Somaliland ‘s Strategic Value

Republic of Somaliland offers the United States four specific capabilities that its strategy requires.

First, operational redundancy. The port of Berbera—developed under UAE management since 2016 with significant investment—offers deep-water capacity for naval vessels, road connectivity to Ethiopia’s large market, and political stability absent elsewhere. For American military planners seeking to reduce concentration risk at Djibouti, Berbera provides the alternative logistics node that operational planning requires. Recognition would enable contingency planning, access agreements, and integration into security architectures.

Second, burden-sharing partnership. The United States faces a mismatch between global commitments and available resources. Effective burden-sharing requires capable partners who can assume responsibilities without extensive American investment. Republic of Somaliland ‘s security forces have maintained border control, preventing Al-Shabaab penetration. Its institutions have enabled intelligence cooperation. These capabilities address American requirements without requiring American resources to build them. Recognition would institutionalize this partnership.

Third, democratic alignment. Republic of Somaliland has conducted competitive elections with peaceful power transfers and demonstrated adherence to rule of law. In a region where governance failures generate security threats, this stability represents strategic value. Recognition would signal that the United States privileges effective governance, reinforcing partnership with an actor whose internal stability reduces external burdens.

Fourth, geographic positioning. Republic of Somaliland ‘s coastline and proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb place it at the intersection of maritime chokepoints that American strategy must influence. The Ethiopia-Republic of Somaliland corridor links maritime control to continental influence, offering leverage over regional trade flows and alternatives to Chinese-dominated routes.

The Consequences of U.S. Inaction

Continued ambiguity generates costs across each domain where the United States has strategic requirements.

Chinese encirclement. Without American engagement, Republic of Somaliland ‘s infrastructure needs will attract Beijing’s attention. Chinese control of Berbera—complementing its Djibouti base—would enable comprehensive monitoring of Bab el-Mandeb traffic and leverage over Ethiopian trade. Each year of hesitation allows relationships to deepen, making future reversal more difficult.

Operational vulnerability. American forces remain concentrated at Camp Lemonnier without viable alternatives. In early 2026, a security alignment linking India, Israel, the UAE, Greece, Cyprus, Ethiopia, and Republic of Somaliland  proceeded without Washington consultation. Regional partners concluded that American diplomatic rigidities prevented coordination; they achieved objectives unilaterally, reducing future American leverage.

Alliance erosion. When the United States cannot acknowledge what partners have recognized or coordinate with what they have constructed, American leadership becomes peripheral. Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Republic of Somaliland  represented acknowledgment that functional cooperation required formal status; subsequent engagements deepened without Washington. This credibility gap reduces partners’ confidence in American reliability.

Security risks. Al-Shabaab exploits Somalia’s limited territorial control, threatening maritime security. American inability to partner with the entity that controls relevant territory—Republic of Somaliland —constrains counterterrorism options.

What the United States Should Do

The United States needs a phased approach that aligns diplomatic status with strategic necessity.

First, increase diplomatic engagement. Establish a formal liaison office in Hargeisa. Integrate Republic of Somaliland into Red Sea risk assessments, maritime security planning, and counterterrorism frameworks as a distinct operational actor. These steps signal interest and begin closing the gap between operational reality and bureaucratic practice.

Second, expand maritime security cooperation. Initiate joint planning for port security and infrastructure standards at Berbera that align with U.S. naval requirements. Conduct contingency planning incorporating Berbera as a logistics node, reducing dependence on concentrated Djibouti facilities.

Third, support infrastructure development. Deploy USAID and development resources for Berbera port modernization and governance capacity. Targeted assistance reduces fragility and creates counterweight to Chinese investment patterns.

Fourth, move toward recognition. Approach formal diplomatic recognition as the logical endpoint of structured engagement. Coordinate with Israel, the UAE, and other partners to manage regional implications. Frame recognition in terms of U.S. interests: preventing Chinese encirclement, securing operational redundancy, enabling burden-sharing, and maintaining alliance credibility.

The diplomatic costs of recognition—Somali protest, African Union criticism—are manageable. Republic of Somaliland ‘s case is distinctive: British colonial legacy, voluntary union with Somalia, subsequent dissolution, and three decades of demonstrated governance capacity distinguish it from typical secessionist claims. As regional actors increasingly engage Republic of Somaliland  regardless of formal status, American insistence on outdated frameworks constrains the strategic flexibility that competition demands.

The Strategic Conclusion

The United States has strategic requirements in the Red Sea that its current policy prevents it from meeting. It needs operational redundancy to reduce vulnerability. It needs burden-sharing partners to extend limited resources. It needs to prevent Chinese encirclement of critical chokepoints. It needs to maintain credibility with allies who are constructing regional order with or without American participation. And it needs access to the port, the territory, and the partnership that Republic of Somaliland offers.

The unrecognized state that American strategy requires is securing chokepoints that U.S. forces may need to access, constructing partnerships with American allies, and demonstrating that functional governance generates strategic value. Each year of hesitation strengthens competitor position and constrains future options.

The United States can continue defending a diplomatic fiction that serves neither Somali stability nor American security, ceding initiative to China and other competitors. Or it can recognize the strategic partner that geography, governance, and competitive necessity have already made indispensable.

The question is not whether Washington can afford to recognize Republic of Somaliland. It is whether it can afford the accumulating costs of failing to do so—costs measured in vulnerability to Chinese encirclement, operational concentration risk, eroding alliance cohesion, and strategic irrelevance. In geopolitics, absence is rarely neutral. It is advantage ceded, initiative surrendered, interests exposed. The United States cannot secure its interests in the Red Sea while ignoring the partner that its own strategy requires

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)