Roughly twelve percent of all global trade passes through the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the narrow chokepoint where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden. This maritime artery carries the energy supplies that power economies and the commercial flows that sustain globalization. In recent years, it has become one of the most militarized waterways on Earth, hosting military installations from the United States, China, France, Japan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet American strategy in this critical region faces a growing problem: the diplomatic frameworks Washington relies on are preventing it from securing the partnerships and access it needs.

The United States needs strategic flexibility in the Red Sea. It needs alternatives to its concentrated military presence in Djibouti. It needs capable regional partners who can share security burdens. And it needs to prevent China from controlling infrastructure on both sides of the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. But Washington’s commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity—despite that government’s limited control beyond Mogadishu—blocks access to the one actor that could help meet these requirements: Republic of Somaliland.

Republic of Republic of Somaliland  has functioned as a de facto independent state since 1991. It has conducted multiple competitive elections with peaceful power transfers, maintained territorial control, and developed institutions that function more effectively than those of many recognized states. Yet the United States treats it as a Somali administrative region, channeling no direct assistance and excluding it from security planning. Meanwhile, China explores expanded port access, Turkey builds military capacity in Mogadishu, and a network of U.S. partners—including India, Israel, the UAE, and Ethiopia—develops security cooperation with Republic of Somaliland without Washington’s involvement.

The consequences are visible. Regional order is increasingly being built without American leadership, while China actively engages functional partners without constraint. The question is no longer whether Republic of Somaliland deserves recognition in legal terms. The question is whether the United States can afford to ignore the partner its own interests require.

Why the Region Matters

The Red Sea has become central to great-power competition. Control over maritime chokepoints and port infrastructure now shapes outcomes in trade, energy security, and military operations. For the United States, securing influence in this corridor is essential to maintaining global presence and competing with China.

China’s expansion demonstrates the stakes. Its naval base in Djibouti, established in 2017 and expanded since, provides capabilities for power projection, intelligence collection, and potential combat operations. The facility enables Beijing to monitor traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb and project influence across East Africa. Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested billions in regional ports and logistics infrastructure, creating networks that combine economic ownership with operational access.

Beyond Djibouti, Beijing has shown interest in expanding its footprint—and Republic of Somaliland  is a logical target. With 740 kilometers of coastline, deep-water port capacity at Berbera, and proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb, Republic of Somaliland  offers China the opportunity to establish chokepoint control on both sides of the strait. Reports indicate Chinese........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)