From Exporting the Revolution to Open War: The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Question of Survival Through Crisis

From the very first days of its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not emerge merely as a new state within the conventional framework of the international order. Rather, it defined itself as an ideological, revolutionary, and transnational project. From the outset, this system was focused not only on seizing power inside Iran, but also on reshaping the political and ideological balance of the region. For this reason, the behavior of the Islamic Republic cannot be understood without grasping its underlying logic: survival through crisis.

What has been observed over the past four and a half decades in the Islamic Republic’s domestic, regional, and global policies has not been a series of scattered or accidental actions, but rather the components of a continuous strategy: exporting the revolution, organizing ideological forces, building proxy arms, carrying out assassinations and intimidation beyond its borders, developing missile capabilities, advancing a nuclear program shrouded in ambiguity, and turning hostility toward the United States and Israel into a central element of the regime’s political identity.

The hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was the first major display of this logic. In that event, the Islamic Republic showed that it neither feared foreign crisis nor regarded it as an unwanted cost. On the contrary, it could turn such a crisis into a tool for internal cohesion, the elimination of rivals, and the legitimization of a newly formed structure of power. From that point onward, it became clear that this system defined security and diplomacy not on the basis of the classical rules of statecraft, but on the basis of revolutionary and ideological logic. Within such a framework, tension was not an exception but a necessity—a necessity that could both keep domestic society in a state of permanent mobilization and allow the regime to suppress any opposition by branding it as aligned with a foreign enemy.

In this context, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) became the most important institutional pillar of this project. The IRGC was never merely a military force. From the beginning, it was created to protect the revolution, control society, engineer domestic politics, and expand regional influence. Gradually, the IRGC came to dominate not only Iran’s security structure, but also its economy, politics, culture, media, and foreign policy.

From this perspective, the Islamic Republic cannot be understood without the IRGC, just as the real structure of power in Iran cannot be found merely in its ostensibly elected institutions. Presidents, parliamentary speakers, ministers, and other official figures may be more visible in the media, but on strategic matters, it is the IRGC and the hard core of power surrounding the Supreme Leader that determine the regime’s main direction. For this reason, the differences between figures such as Rouhani, Qalibaf, Raisi, or other regime actors are less substantive than tactical and cosmetic. What has remained constant is the dominance of the security-military structure over the entirety of Iran’s political system.

The principle of exporting the revolution has also been one of the most fundamental components of the Islamic Republic’s policy. This policy went far beyond rhetoric and, in practice, led to the creation and strengthening of a network of aligned forces and organizations across the region.........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)