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Invisible inputs, visible risks

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Empires were once forged in iron and fuelled by coal; today, they may fracture over elements most people cannot spell. In the circuitry of the modern economy, power no longer flows only through oil wells and steel plants, but through trace materials embedded deep within semiconductors, fibre optics, and defence systems. Among these quiet enablers, Germanium and Gallium occupy an outsized role. They are the backstage crew of the digital age, rarely seen, yet indispensable to the performance.

India’s industrial ambitions, from 5G expansion to semiconductor fabrication, are, in many ways, tethered to these “invisible inputs.” But herein lies the rub: what is invisible in discourse often becomes invisible in policy. Germanium is the unsung hero of fibre optics and infrared technologies; gallium is the beating heart of next-generation chips powering electric vehicles, radar systems, AI and high-speed communications. These are not mere commodities; they are foundational inputs into high-technology systems. Yet, unlike oil or coal, they do not arrive in volumes that command policy attention. They move quietly through global trade channels, often as by-products of zinc and bauxite processing.

Their supply chains are complex, and disruptions, though less visible, can have disproportionate consequences for sectors such as telecommunications, electronics, and defence manufacturing. The strategic concern is not just about resource availability, but about where processing takes place. China’s dominance in germanium and gallium extends beyond mining to refining and downstream processing. This concentration creates a structural asymmetry in global supply chains.

Recent export restrictions illustrate how control over processing can translate into geopolitical........

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