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How the Iran War Makes a Taiwan Crisis More Likely

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30.04.2026

How the Iran War Makes a Taiwan Crisis More Likely

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The Hormuz crisis is showing Beijing how maritime pressure can weaken rivals, test deterrence, and exploit Taiwan’s acute energy dependence. 

For most Asian economies, the Strait of Hormuz disruption is a nightmare scenario impacting nine major commodities. For China, it helps serve as a stress test of an economic and industrial model built to absorb shocks better than its neighbors. An example is Beijing’s announcement that sulfuric acid exports would cease in May, putting even more pressure on various economies to source this critical industrial input.

While China is not immune to the pressures on the global oil market, they have remained muted in their public discourse during the first two months of the conflict. But, for the first time since the conflict began, President Xi Jinping made a brief statement: “The Strait of Hormuz should remain open to normal navigation, which is in the common interest of regional countries and the international community.” 

The Hormuz crisis reveals how Beijing may think about coercion closer to home, especially against Taiwan. If China concludes from this Hormuz crisis that maritime disruption can impose strategic pain without triggering full-scale war, then American deterrence is on the ropes, and Taiwan may be in greater danger than most realize.

Beijing’s Energy Fortress

On paper, China’s exposure to Hormuz looks bad. About 89 percent of crude transiting the strait is destined for Asia, with China receiving the most, with about 5.4 million barrels per day. However, Beijing has spent years methodically building buffers and stockpiles to weather any major crisis that might threaten its economy or military.

China’s combined state and commercial crude reserves could offset Hormuz imports for around seven months. Some analysts even estimate a total strategic reserve of up to two billion barrels. This was built by consistently accumulating surplus crude, averaging 1.13 million barrels per day throughout 2025, and increased to 1.24 million in January and........

© The National Interest