European leaders, including French president Emmanuel Macron, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, and Friedrich Merz, confer with President Donald Trump at the White House on August 18, 2025. European leaders are navigating toward an independent position in negotiations for ending the Ukraine War. (Shutterstock/Kaua209)

What European Strategic Autonomy Means for Ukraine Peace Negotiations

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If the United States pursues its own deal with Russia to end the Ukraine War, it cannot expect the Europeans to refrain from engaging with Russia on their own.

Many in Europe were—and possibly still are—terrified by the prospect of a deal reached between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Ukraine negotiated over their heads. Ironically, some in Moscow were eager for exactly such an arrangement: a deal would force both Ukrainians and Europeans to accept Washington’s terms. 

That scenario would have been plausible if the United States still assumed its Cold War role as Europe’s primary security guarantor. Yet the Trump administration’s demands that Europe spend more on defense, along with fundamental disagreements on key issues from trade to Greenland, have significantly reduced US leverage over Europe’s Ukraine policy. Even if Washington and Moscow were to strike a bilateral understanding, its implementation would depend heavily on European decisions on sanctions, reconstruction financing, force deployments, and arms transfers. Europe is not a secondary stakeholder in the Ukraine endgame but a structural constraint.

This simple reality has created a strategic dilemma for both Moscow and Washington, not only regarding Ukraine but also European security more broadly. While Moscow and the United States can be dismissive of European capabilities, they can no longer ignore European preferences in the short term or Europe’s increasing military capabilities over the medium to long term. 

Yet, engaging Europe presents challenges due to its fragmented decision-making structures and the dominance of hawkish positions on Russia among key European states. Both the United States and Russia fear that including Europeans would complicate already complex negotiations. Moreover, both capitals would prefer to deal with spoilers later rather than let them prevent a deal from emerging. 

With the increased European spending and the expected improvements in its deterrence, the solution to this dilemma is more European confidence in their capabilities and engagement in dialogue with Washington, first to reconcile views on Ukraine and post-war Europe, in parallel with Russia, on the parameters of post-war European security.

Why Europe Is Rethinking Its Russia Strategy 

Recent calls from French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to open direct communication with Russia signal a potential shift from the old assumption of Russia’s total defeat to a possible dual-track approach: assured deterrence combined with cautious dialogue. At the Munich Security Conference this month, Macron articulated this vision clearly: Europe must increase pressure on Russia, prepare for a post-war European security architecture, and establish direct contacts with Moscow to explore what is genuinely possible in the long term and manage escalation risks in the short term.

Meloni echoed this position in January 2026, stating, “I think the time has come for Europe to talk to Russia. Because if Europe decides to participate in this phase of the ongoing negotiations, talking with only one of the parties involved…the positive contribution it can make is limited.”

On the face of it, this sounds encouraging, and Moscow would likely welcome direct dialogue. At the same time, Washington would not object—particularly given Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby’s statements at Munich about Europe assuming “primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.” However, realizing the assumptions and objectives of this dual-track strategy requires acknowledging difficult realities.

Europeans understandably doubt Russian intentions. Russia is similarly alarmed by Western statements and by increases in Western capabilities over the medium term. Russia declared intentions to increase its military size to 1.5 million active personnel (a target set in December 2024 for completion by the end of 2026). Meanwhile, NATO has approximately 3.5 million total personnel across all member states, and 2.3 million without the US military. Each side views the other’s announcements with alarm. What one considers defensive, the other sees as provocative and offensive.

Despite NATO’s military superiority over Russia, Europeans and Americans disagree on the timeframe of a defense buildup, the likelihood of a resumed Russian aggression, and the best strategy for deterrence. Estimates range from six months for Russia to reconstitute forces for a quick Baltic attack to five or 10 years. Statements by European officials rarely substantiate the grounds for such assessments. US officials do not rule out the possibility but consider it remote and manageable by Europeans. 

A peace agreement on Ukraine will not stop these armament plans—both sides will continue building capabilities and deploy forces across borders. Yet it would be important to parallel any deployments or strategic capability development with dialogue to clarify intentions and possibly reach an understanding to avoid what would be perceived as unnecessarily provocative measures. Current intensive surveillance levels will likely continue to detect signs of threat. This extra vigilance should calm both sides in the context of a dialogue and concrete de-escalation measures. 

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Ukraine’s Stability Should Be the Priority

Before addressing post-war security, Ukraine must be stabilized through some form of arrangement, ranging from a minimal ceasefire to a comprehensive settlement. Any such arrangement requires a Russian-European understanding of its implications for broader post-war relations. Two issues are paramount:

First, the connection between violations of the armistice and the snapback that triggers the resumption of Western support must be clear. The war won’t be declared over simply because guns stop firing. Without clear mechanisms for identifying breaches, either party can resume military operations, including support from allies. Learning from the Minsk Agreements, there must be a mechanism that authoritatively identifies violations and violators of any future ceasefire. The credibility of any Western plans to support Ukraine in the event of renewed Russian aggression will depend on these mechanisms for identifying violations. This will serve as a guarantee for Ukraine, Russia, and Europe alike.

Second, the profiles of different Western military support for Ukraine should be clarified. While Ukraine and Russia will have to agree on zones and force concentrations within specified limits across borders, Europe’s supply of specific weapons systems to Ukraine requires clarification to avoid a wider European-Russia escalation. The challenge is that formal European written commitments to Russia not supplying certain systems seem politically impossible. 

However, understanding the logic behind Russian concerns and linking compliance to the implementation of the armistice is useful. This is where the Ukraine-armistice monitoring mechanisms and European-Russian agreements intersect. A safe option could be that NATO positions forces and systems within its borders and resumes Ukraine support when violations are recorded, and clear threats emerge.

Lately, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has called for involving Europeans in the ongoing trilateral format (United States-Russia-Ukraine). Some creativity is required to incorporate European views and positions on the issues without complicating the structure of the existing negotiations. A European-Russian dialogue, whether formal or informal, could explore ideas for making an armistice sustainable. 

What Europe-Russia Dialogue Could Look Like 

It is important to remember that dialogue is not negotiation, and negotiation is not agreement. It will be a long way for Europeans and Russians to achieve tangible results before many rounds of dialogue and a willingness to take costly trust-building measures. Any agreements will likely be informal, contingent on strict monitoring, and reversible.

1. Crisis Stability in the Baltic and Red Sea. Initial discussions should focus on risk reduction measures in the Baltic and Red Sea—areas of immense commercial and security interest to both Russia and Europe. An experimental, often frustrating dynamic will initially dominate relations, but this is necessary to manage the plethora of technical and strategic issues.

2. De-escalation Measures in Europe. The second priority is hybrid activities in Europe, which Russia is expected to deny responsibility for. Russia will monitor European compliance with agreements on Ukraine, specifically military support for operations or attacks on Russian territory, and expect easing of economic measures before noticeably reducing hybrid activities. Recognizing this implicit connection and parties’ willingness to discuss it might signal maturity. Implementation will be messy given the informality and lack of verification, but hope lies in gradual, noticeable progress over time.

3. The Logic of Engagement. Eventually, discussion about engagement strategy becomes necessary: continued pressure and isolation versus hedging in a geopolitically dynamic world. Greater European-Russian tensions increase European vulnerability and dependence, given the US repositioning, while increasing Russian dependence on China. 

Despite the war, EU-Russia trade levels remain significant, though dramatically reduced. According to Eurostat data, EU exports to Russia declined 61 percent and imports fell 89 percent between 2022 and 2025. Russia’s share in extra-EU trade dropped from 3.2 percent to 1.1 percent for exports and 9.3 percent to 0.9 percent for imports. However, trade is not zero—it represents about 18 percent of pre-2022 levels. Neither side can reverse course quickly, but managed hedging serves both interests.

Some Europeans worry that the limited opening to Russia undermines unity. However, continued isolation brings other unity risks: increasing living costs, domestic political fractures, and vulnerability from over-diversification, creating riskier dependencies. A comparison of the long-term risks and benefits of both options is worth making.

The US Will Remain a Player in European Security within NATO

Establishing a parallel European-Russian relationship is essential, but will be limited without synchronization on post-war European security issues with the ongoing US-Russia track. Reaching a cohesive view within the West on all issues might be daunting. However, reducing the tensions between the US and European views of Russia and post-war Europe is essential. Not only do many European countries still demand a US presence, but Europe will also need time before it can deliver independently without the United States. Until then, NATO could provide a suitable platform for discussing and implementing future frameworks with Russia.

The recent US National Defense Strategy (NDS) noted a willingness to use force to support European self-defense efforts. Under Secretary Colby, at the Munich Security Conference, reaffirmed extended deterrence to European allies while also outlining the “NATO 3.0” model, in which Europe assumes primary responsibility for conventional defense and the United States remains a nuclear guarantor, shifting toward partnership and away from dependency.

These signals provide common ground for European-US dialogue on practical implications for future European-led deterrence postures. Without clarity on these issues between the United States and Europe, meaningful dialogue with Russia will remain dubious.

Who Speaks for Europe?

Many European countries either maintain talks with Russia (Hungary, Slovakia) or are considering them. Yet delivering objectives will matter more than mere access.  Macron meeting Putin might carry symbolic weight, but without broader European backing, it differs little from another Viktor Orbán summit with Putin.

This presents a structural dilemma: Who speaks for Europe? On what issues? What is expected from Russia? What guarantees can be secured? What does Europe provide in return?

If the European Commission maintains its position against talking to Russians, individual countries will inevitably lead. An iterative, gradual approach, by a few countries exploring progress areas, could convince others to join or at least not obstruct. Eventually, a body with authority on key European issues must be present or at least bless the process. French (and possibly Italian) bilateral (formal or informal) talks with Russians can help answer questions and convince others to support the approach. It will be up to Moscow to show seriousness about engaging or to prove the recalcitrant stereotype. 

Another challenge is substantive: managing diverse expectations and threat perceptions between Western Europe and front-line countries (the Nordic countries, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Ukraine). An honest, serious intra-Western discussion is long overdue on future European military doctrine, division of labor, and operational plans for threat scenarios, aligned with the progress of system acquisition and deployment. 

Bilateral choreography will not end the war; triangular balance might. Europe’s position has already altered the geometry of negotiations. The question is whether that position will be organized into a coherent strategy or dissipated through division. Washington must recognize that European security concerns cannot be managed from afar, and Moscow can no longer treat Europe as a passive arena for US-Russian bargaining. A sustainable order will require alignment among all three. If one corner of the triangle is missing, the structure will not hold.

About the Author: Abdulla Ibrahim

Abdulla Ibrahim is a senior researcher at the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Geneva Graduate Institute, where he leads the Future of Arms Control Project. Abdulla is researching international conflicts with over twelve years of expertise in multilateral dialogues and research processes. He was previously a nonresident fellow with the Stimson Center and an adjunct fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. 

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European leaders, including French president Emmanuel Macron, Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, and Friedrich Merz, confer with President Donald Trump at the White House on August 18, 2025. European leaders are navigating toward an independent position in negotiations for ending the Ukraine War. (Shutterstock/Kaua209)

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