Professor Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University in China, who is known for being outspoken and controversial, did not disappoint us with his piece “Why China isn’t scared of Trump,” which was published in Foreign Affairs in December 2024. Yan contends that Chinese leaders are not dreading Trump’s return because of his uncertain loyalty to allies, political isolationism, economic protectionism and less ideological policies. Yan fails to see or explain why anti-China sentiment in the United States is strong and nonpartisan. Simultaneously, he does not appear to understand Trump’s political stance on Taiwan, or the South China Sea for that matter. Instead, he openly asserts Trump’s unwillingness to “shape China’s political system to conform to its Western counterparts, and he is therefore unlikely to be keen to intervene in China’s domestic affairs.” For one thing, Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act in 2018, paving the path for high-level conversations and visits between U.S. and Taiwanese officials. He is a typical Republican politician who sympathizes deeply with Taiwan's situation.

Yan argues that Trump’s second-term agenda may differ from his first. But not that much. It is for one simple reason: his term is insufficient to achieve “MAGA,” as it is stated. His constituents have given him a mandate to lead the country and achieve MAGA in four years. Trump does not have adequate time. As a result, he appointed his cabinet members as soon as he was elected, saving time on the transition committee. It is also for this reason that he wishes to stop the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of his inauguration. In November, Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin by phone, and in December, he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris. In December, in Arizona, he hinted at a possible meeting with Putin following the inauguration. At the same time, he believes that the Middle East situation is a pretty simple issue to settle. Reimposing economic restrictions on Iran will reduce financial assistance for Hamas and Hezbollah. Trump wants to resolve all of these issues at once for one reason: to focus on limiting China.

Bipartisan anti-China sentiment will persist in U.S. politics and society. Not for economic or geostrategic competition considerations. It will prevail as Beijing prepares for more effective influence operations, often known as unrestricted warfare. The results have been highly successful and widely known. China has advocated for the use of the warfare approach anytime a schism in American society emerges. Trump's harsh immigration policies, for example, will cause societal upheaval in America. It will naturally increase the authority of law enforcement.

Abuse of power and accidents are unavoidable, as proven by George Floyd’s death and the subsequent societal demonstrations such as the Black Lives Matter movement. And Beijing will not ignore concerns that could cause division. In his recently published book "Blood Money: Why the Powerful Turn a Blind Eye While China Kills Americans," Peter Schweizer used a case study to show how Beijing provided financial support to some protest organizations in order to prolong the demonstrations. He also cited LGBTQ+ festivals and other human rights challenges in America. As a result, Trump’s reelection may be making Chinese President Xi Jinping happy right now. He may be devising more complex cognitive warfare methods.

Trump is not as skeptical of the United States’ commitment to allies as Yan claims. Trump and his cabinet members, as well as Republican backers, recognize the strategic importance of alliances. Trump may appear dissatisfied with the sacrifices his fellow Americans must make to preserve and defend allies. He simply wants his partners to be more fiscally responsible. He wants to use coercion to extract more money from the allies, requiring them to bear a higher percentage of the expense. No more, no less. He may pressure the allies by renouncing U.S. commitments or withdrawing some U.S. forces, as South Korea has. However, he understands, like his predecessors, that the implications of the withdrawal of the military are far more harmful to U.S. strategic objectives.

The Trump 2.0 administration will be tough on China. Nonetheless, his leadership style will exacerbate America's already polarized society, exposing the country's vulnerability to Chinese unrestricted warfare. This American vulnerability will boost bipartisan support concerning China in American domestic politics. One of the most significant effects will not come directly from Trump, but via the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress. Yan was inaccurate in suggesting that Trump intends to “levy further tariffs on Chinese goods, impose more restrictions on U.S. investment in China and Chinese capital in the U.S. stock market, place more constraints on technology cooperation.” This has been an ongoing issue in the U.S. Congress since Trump's first term, only progressing during the Biden administration. We should expect many more executive orders from the White House, in addition to judicial acts by the U.S. Congress.

Korea will lack leadership until the impeachment decision is made. Since U.S.-China competition will rise, it may not be lost. Instead, we should reflect on our diplomacy during this power transfer. We were caught up in internal politics and couldn't do so. Our strategic value with the U.S. must be properly considered. We showed a lack of knowledge of what we need from the U.S. during the Nov. 7 phone call between President-elect Donald Trump and President Yoon Suk Yeol. Trump’s interest in working with our shipbuilding industry sparked a nationwide focus on improving relations.

This reaction was expected as most analysts had already identified shipbuilding as a key industry in their economic estimates earlier this year. As the government failed to proactively offer areas of cooperation to the Trump administration, the fact that this attention was driven entirely by a remark from the U.S. president-elect, highlights our lack of strategic thinking. The story is both telling and scary. It is time for Korea to consider its own “make Korea great again” strategy rather than waiting for apples to fall.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.

© The Korea Times