Governing KP From Islamabad
Pakistan’s decision to impose an emergency and Governor’s Rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is not simply an administrative response to terrorism. It is a consequential political intervention in a province governed by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), the principal opposition party at the federal level. The decision must be judged on three grounds: whether the constitutional conditions have been met, whether the intervention can improve security, and what it means for a federation already strained by conflicts over power, representation and provincial autonomy.
The security threat is real and cannot be dismissed as a political pretext. But the timing is equally difficult to ignore. The intervention came amid a deepening confrontation between the federal government and PTI, including preparations for a march on Islamabad demanding Khan’s release. Hundreds of PTI activists and members of Khan’s family have reportedly faced detention as the confrontation has escalated. On the day the proclamation was issued, PTI said Chief Minister Sohail Afridi, who was leading the march, and the party’s provincial president Junaid Akbar had been taken into custody. The government has not confirmed either arrest, though Minister of State for Interior Talal Chaudhry acknowledged that some people had been detained. Telecom services were suspended in Peshawar. The government denies that its decision is intended to suppress political opposition. Yet the circumstances inevitably raise questions about whether security and political objectives have become entangled.
Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi has said the federal government spent more than a month trying to secure cooperation from the KP administration and that counterterrorism requires a unified national approach. Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar cited Interior Ministry reports of a 196 per cent increase in terrorism and extremism incidents over the past two to two and a half years. Information Minister Attaullah Tarar has alleged that the PTI government in KP was ‘hand in glove with terrorists’ and that police stations in some districts had been ‘sublet to the Taliban’, and says ‘irrefutable proof and evidence’ is available. He cited Intelligence Bureau and law enforcement reports but made none of it public. These are serious claims. If the evidence is irrefutable, it should be placed before Parliament and subjected to independent scrutiny. A sharp increase in attacks establishes the gravity of the security crisis; it does not, by itself, prove that an elected government has ceased to function constitutionally.
The scale of the violence is alarming. Security assessments recorded militancy-related incidents across 24 to 27 of KP’s districts in 2025, depending on the database and its definitions. The TTP and allied groups have been particularly active in the former tribal districts and adjoining southern districts, including North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat and Dera Ismail Khan. Their operations have spread beyond their traditional strongholds. There have been reports of roadblocks, intimidation and militant movement in areas where the state’s presence is weak.
But a district in which attacks occur is not necessarily a district controlled by the TTP. Nor should the presence of armed groups be confused with the disappearance of all state authority. Precision matters because the government must explain what it means when it claims that the provincial administration has lost control. Which districts, institutions or functions have become ungovernable? What specific failures of cooperation have occurred? What will the federal intervention do differently?
The KP government has argued that Islamabad has excluded it from important security decisions and that counterterrorism policy cannot succeed without provincial consultation. The provincial assembly has previously called for consultation before major military operations, while local opposition to operations has reflected fears of civilian casualties, displacement and the economic destruction of communities already battered by years of conflict. The choice is not between doing nothing and suspending an elected government. Effective counterterrorism requires intelligence, policing,........
