With US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran underway (resulting in the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and with Iran responding more than effectively, and with Pakistan carrying out its own airstrikes against Afghanistan in response to terrorist attacks inside Pakistan), the regional security environment has entered an exceptionally volatile phase. Multiple theatres of conflict have opened simultaneously, and their interaction will shape Pakistan’s strategic choices in the days and weeks ahead.

Pakistan shares a long and sensitive border with Iran, and any sustained bombing campaign there carries serious implications. Even if Pakistan is not directly involved in that theatre, the risks of spillover are real. Refugee flows, cross-border militant movement, sectarian tensions, and economic disruption in border regions such as Balochistan are all plausible consequences. Pakistan cannot assume insulation from events unfolding to its west. The destabilisation of Iran, even temporarily, would alter the strategic balance across Pakistan’s western flank and could create opportunities for hostile actors to exploit.

At the same time, Pakistan’s military actions against terrorist infrastructure inside Afghanistan have drawn tacit and explicit support from several key international actors. All of Pakistan’s Muslim allies, as well as the European Union and the United States, have backed Pakistan’s position that its actions are being conducted in self-defence. This support rests on a clear and widely understood reality: Pakistan has faced repeated terrorist attacks launched from Afghan territory, where militants have been provided haven, logistical support, and operational freedom by elements associated with the Afghan Taliban. These attacks have targeted both civilian and military installations, undermining Pakistan’s internal stability and economic recovery.

This diplomatic backing provides Pakistan with a critical window of opportunity. To prevent further attacks, Pakistan must use its air campaign not symbolically, but decisively. The objective must be to target and degrade all infrastructure used to train, house, arm, and support terrorists. This includes training camps, supply depots, command centres, and cross-border logistical networks. Terrorist groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan rely heavily on such infrastructure to sustain their operations. Destroying these facilities would significantly reduce their capacity to plan and execute attacks.

However, these operations must be conducted expeditiously. The opening of the Iranian theatre of war fundamentally alters the strategic timeline. As global attention and resources shift towards Iran, Pakistan’s window to act decisively may narrow. Prolonged operations risk becoming entangled in broader regional instability, while swift and decisive action would allow Pakistan to neutralise immediate threats and reposition itself strategically before the regional security environment deteriorates further.

Pakistan must remain prepared for potential developments along its eastern border. Even if India does not initiate direct military action, hybrid tactics such as cross-border firing, proxy activation, or political escalation remain possible

Pakistan must remain prepared for potential developments along its eastern border. Even if India does not initiate direct military action, hybrid tactics such as cross-border firing, proxy activation, or political escalation remain possible

Pakistan must also remain acutely aware of developments on its eastern border. Today’s airstrikes on Iran, including those undertaken by Israel, occurred just two to three days after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi concluded his visit to Israel on 25 February. While no public evidence has emerged linking the visit directly to subsequent military developments, the possibility that India may have had advance knowledge cannot be dismissed outright. Strategic partnerships often involve intelligence sharing, and India’s close defence relationship with Israel suggests that it would have at least been aware of heightened tensions.

This raises a serious and plausible concern: India could attempt to exploit the current regional instability by initiating its own military or quasi-military actions against Pakistan. Such a move would serve multiple purposes from India’s perspective. It would stretch Pakistan’s military resources across two fronts, create internal and external pressure, and potentially divert Pakistan’s focus away from developments in Afghanistan and Iran. More broadly, it would serve the strategic interests of Israel by complicating the security environment for a key Muslim-majority country situated near Iran.

Pakistan must therefore prepare for this contingency. Strategic prudence demands readiness not only for ongoing operations in the west but also for potential escalation in the east. Military preparedness, intelligence vigilance, and diplomatic engagement must all be strengthened simultaneously.

The imperatives for Pakistan at this critical juncture are clear.

First, Pakistan must continue targeting and degrading terrorist infrastructure inside Afghanistan to minimise the chances of further attacks. While such actions can significantly weaken terrorist networks, the threat cannot be eliminated in the short term. One tactic likely to be employed by militants is the use of suicide bombers, including individuals who may already have infiltrated Pakistani territory. Reports that militant leadership has issued instructions to activate such operatives underscore the urgency of enhancing vigilance.

Second, these operations must be conducted within the shortest feasible timeframe. Pakistan currently enjoys military dominance and air superiority in the operational theatre. This gives Pakistan the strategic advantage of choosing when and how to conclude its campaign. Prolonged engagement would only increase risks and expose Pakistan to external complications arising from the widening regional conflict.

Third, Pakistan must remain prepared for potential developments along its eastern border. Even if India does not initiate direct military action, hybrid tactics such as cross-border firing, proxy activation, or political escalation remain possible. Preparedness, deterrence, and clear signalling of resolve will be essential to prevent miscalculation.

Fourth, and perhaps most critically, Pakistan must strengthen its internal security apparatus in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. Military action across borders must be complemented by enhanced intelligence operations, improved law enforcement co-ordination, tighter border controls, and heightened urban security. Suicide attacks and asymmetric tactics remain the preferred tools of weakened militant networks, and preventing such attacks will require sustained internal vigilance.

Added to this is the security situation emerging from the tragic deaths of angry protesters at the hands of police and law enforcement personnel. This could have been avoided with a better security plan and deployment following Ayatollah Khamenei’s assassination. Furthermore, community elders and leaders need to be co-opted by the state to pass on the message to the mourners to remain peaceful at all costs, because if there is violence and destruction of public and private property, then only Pakistan and Pakistanis suffer.

Pakistan stands at a pivotal moment. It has both the capability and the diplomatic space to act decisively against terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. But it must do so with speed, clarity of purpose, and full awareness of the broader regional chessboard. The convergence of conflicts involving Iran, Afghanistan, and potentially India creates both risks and opportunities. Strategic clarity, swift action, and comprehensive internal preparedness will determine whether Pakistan emerges from this moment more secure or more vulnerable.

© The Friday Times