Tackling Informal Economy With Artificial Intelligence—Part III
Pakistan cannot tackle its informal economy without first understanding what lies beneath that expression. For decades, policymakers have treated informality principally as a taxation problem. Their proposed remedies have included compulsory registration, higher withholding taxes, restrictions on banking transactions, documentation drives and increasingly intrusive powers for revenue officials. The results are visible: a narrow effective income-tax base, widespread distrust of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), and an enormous economic universe that remains largely beyond meaningful scrutiny.
The central failure is conceptual. Pakistan has two informal economies, not one. The first consists predominantly of lawful economic activities conducted outside formal institutional arrangements. It includes small traders, artisans, agricultural workers, home-based producers, transport operators, informal service providers and millions of self-employed persons. Some possess substantial taxable capacity; many survive on incomes insufficient to meet basic household needs.
The second comprises criminal economic activity: narcotics trafficking, smuggling, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, illicit arms trading, corruption, money laundering and organised financial crime. Its participants may operate through apparently legitimate businesses, acquire expensive properties and maintain connections within the formal financial and political systems. The International Labour Organization (ILO), in Recommendation No. 204 of 2015, makes precisely this distinction. Its definition of the informal economy excludes illicit activities such as drug trafficking, unlawful arms dealing, human trafficking and money laundering.[1]
The historical origins of Pakistan’s criminal economy deserve particular attention. Our earlier research, beginning with Pakistan: From Hash to Heroin and subsequently developed in Pakistan: From Drug-trap to Debt-trap, examined how the Afghan conflict, narcotics trafficking, weapons proliferation and underground financial transactions became intertwined with Pakistan’s political economy. The transformation accelerated during the Afghan war of the 1980s. Regional conflict created opportunities for trafficking networks, informal financial intermediaries and politically protected criminal enterprises. The circulation of narcotics proceeds and weapons contributed to a parallel economy whose influence extended beyond border regions. The consequences were not confined to criminal markets.
Illicit wealth could enter property, commerce, transport and other apparently respectable economic activities. Weak institutional accountability allowed sections of the criminal economy to interact with legitimate business and public authority. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has documented the sharp fall in Afghan opium cultivation following the prohibition introduced in 2022. The regional challenge, however, has not disappeared: trafficking networks can adjust through stockpiles, alternative routes and synthetic drugs.[2] Pakistan’s challenge is broader than detecting drug shipments. It must identify the financial structures through which criminal proceeds are transferred, concealed, invested and converted into seemingly legitimate........
