Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

The Battle for Taiwan’s East: Taipei’s Western Pacific Strategy

The PLA has stepped up both the scale and intensity of its activities in the airspace and waters east of Taiwan. How can Taipei respond?

The Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces’ 2026 Tri-Service Joint Precision Missile Firing training, conducted from Sep. 16 to 18 in Jiupeng in Pingtung County, on Taiwan’s southeastern coast.

Since July, China has begun conducting more regularized coast guard patrols in waters east of Taiwan. These operations are, of course, partly connected to recent maritime developments involving Japan and the Philippines. Yet a broader trend is also becoming increasingly visible: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has stepped up both the scale and intensity of its activities in the airspace and waters east of Taiwan.

In addition to continuing its joint combat readiness patrols across the Taiwan Strait median line and into Taiwan’s southwestern airspace, the PLA has noticeably increased reconnaissance and surveillance operations to Taiwan’s east and southeast. On September 5, the PLA deployed J-11 fighters, Su-30s, H-6 bombers, Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft, KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, and other platforms, with some entering Taiwan’s southeastern airspace. During another joint combat readiness patrol on September 9, PLA aircraft operated in Taiwan’s northern, central, and eastern airspace, further demonstrating that Chinese military activity is no longer concentrated primarily west of the island.

According to data released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, PLA aircraft repeatedly operated east of Taiwan in September, including on September 5-6, September 9-10, September 14-16, and September 18-19. During the September 9 patrol, the PLA also deployed combat aircraft, support aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), with activities extending into Taiwan’s eastern airspace.

Compared with manned aircraft, UAVs offer longer endurance, lower operating costs, and greater suitability for sustained intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. The PLA’s growing use of drones east of Taiwan therefore serves not only as a form of military pressure, but also as a means of systematically collecting battlefield intelligence on Taiwan’s force posture.

Potential targets of such surveillance include air base activities in Hualien and Taitung, aircraft takeoffs, landings, and dispersal patterns, the operation of radar and air defense systems, movements of naval and air forces, and possible external reinforcement routes through waters and airspace east of Taiwan.

Cutting Taiwan’s Sea Lines of Communication

For Taiwan, the strategic importance of its eastern coastline becomes particularly apparent in a wartime scenario. In the event of a PLA attack, airports and ports along Taiwan’s western coast could be subjected to sustained strikes or interdiction by long-range rocket artillery and Dong Feng-series ballistic missiles. Eastern ports would therefore become critical rear-area logistics hubs and potential lifelines for sustaining Taiwan’s war effort.

This concept was reflected in Taiwan’s Han Kuang 42 live-fire exercise earlier this year. On August 13, Taiwan’s navy and coast guard jointly conducted blockade-breaking escort and strategic logistics transfer drills. A combined naval and coast guard formation escorted the ROCS Yushan, which was acting as a simulated merchant vessel, into Hualien Port. Civilian vehicle convoys were then used to transfer supplies inland. The exercise was intended to test Taiwan’s ability to break a maritime blockade and maintain strategic supply lines during wartime.

This is precisely the kind of contingency the PLA is likely seeking to counter.

Since July, China has used maritime law enforcement vessels to increase its presence in waters east of Taiwan. Even before that, PLA Navy warships had regularly conducted patrols and surveillance in the area. In the past, however, such activity was often reactive, particularly when Chinese vessels encountered Taiwanese surveillance ships operating in waters east of the island. Since June, Beijing appears to have increased the intensity of such patrols and begun integrating UAVs more systematically into operations east of Taiwan.

Expanding Intelligence Collection and Close-In Reconnaissance

The deeper significance of the PLA’s expanding presence east of Taiwan lies in........

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