Cambodia-Thailand Relations, Not Myanmar, Will Define ASEAN’s Immediate Future
ASEAN Beat | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia
Cambodia-Thailand Relations, Not Myanmar, Will Define ASEAN’s Immediate Future
The ongoing conflict between the two member states is a direct challenge to the Southeast Asian bloc’s founding purpose.
The burnt-out structure of a 7-Eleven convenience store in Thailand’s Sisaket province that was struck by Cambodian rocket fire during fighting along the two nations’ shared border, Jul. 24, 2025.
Many analysts and scholars have argued that Myanmar, with a civil war now into its sixth year, is the biggest threat to the cohesion and effectiveness of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While important to the discussion on ASEAN’s relevance, centrality, and credibility, this analysis entirely overlooks ASEAN vulnerabilities and overemphasizes the importance of Myanmar.
The following article will advance the argument that the Cambodian-Thai border conflict is, in fact, the greatest current threat to ASEAN. The logic behind this argument is twofold and fundamental to understanding the Southeast Asian bloc. At its founding, ASEAN’s raison d’etre was to put an end to intramural conflict and to allow its members to develop according to their own national context and timelines. Last year’s Cambodia-Thailand border wars, which erupted due to a mix of contested colonial borders, transnational crime, and nationalism, pose direct threats to the bloc’s purposes.
ASEAN was established in 1967 for two primary reasons: to consolidate regional solidarity following Indonesia’s policy of konfrontasi towards newly independent Malaysia in 1963-1966, and to form a united front to confront against communism. This would allow the original five members space for national development while promoting regional security. The end to konfrontasi was essential as it cemented ASEAN’s core principle of non-interference in internal affairs, which was intended to ensure the sovereignty of Southeast Asia’s newly independent post-colonial states.
The argument that Myanmar poses a serious threat to ASEAN’s future is mistaken and ignores the region’s realities. Unlike the European Union, ASEAN was not founded on, nor is currently guided by, normative principles of governance. ASEAN’s domestic governance structures are heterogeneous. ASEAN currently includes liberal democracies, anocracies, single-party communist states, an absolute monarchy, and a military junta. While paying lip service to normative standards, the region’s leaders have no problem dealing with political heterogeneity and periodic disruptions. Case in point was the five years of military rule in Thailand after Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha overthrew the elected government in a military coup in May 2014.
ASEAN accepted Myanmar’s membership in 1997 while it was under the rule of a military dictatorship. This showed that ASEAN’s leaders are, if nothing else, extremely pragmatic. Myanmar was “constructively engaged” and urged to reform, which it nominally did beginning in 2011. Now that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has dipped himself in the “legitimizing” waters of electoral politics, emerging as an “elected president,” ASEAN will likely move to recognize and normalize its relations with Myanmar.
The protests of Singapore and Timor-Leste are sure to continue but are likely to soften over time. Singapore’s concern centers on legitimizing a brutal military-led government and the impact of the conflict on “ASEAN credibility.” In Timor-Leste’s case, this stems from a steadfast belief in supporting human rights as a legacy of its independence struggle
While ASEAN has not yet recognized the election result and accepted the military-backed government back into the “ASEAN family,” Thailand is trying to make the case for engagement. Bangkok, which will hold the ASEAN chairmanship in 2028, will seek to institutionalize a shift toward recognition of Naypyidaw. To secure this, Myanmar only has to demonstrate a patina of respect for and soften its stance towards the opposition. This has already begun with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from prison to house arrest.
Whether Myanmar’s government can solidify its “transition” and bring an end to the civil war remains to be seen. However, if the civil war does not increase markedly in intensity and spill over Myanmar’s borders, this will not threaten ASEAN’s push toward normalization. As was the case with the military junta of yesteryear, ASEAN is very likely to make amends and come to grips with its Myanmar issue through unfortunate but pragmatic engagement.
The same is not true of the inter-state conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. The two nations engaged in two bouts of open conflict last year, for five days in July and nearly three weeks in December. While the blame for the war is debated, the consequences of the conflict are clear. In the run-up to the........
