Crossroads Asia | Economy | Central Asia

Kazakhstan at a Critical Minerals Crossroads: Tungsten and Middle Power Resource Sovereignty 

Kazakhstan finds itself at the intersection of two structural trends: the militarization of the global economy and the technological rivalry between the United States and China.

Amid the global race for critical minerals and rising defense spending, Kazakhstan is re-emerging as a significant player in the tungsten sector. Yet the importance of new projects goes far beyond mining. Tungsten is becoming part of a broader configuration shaped by the China-U.S. technological rivalry and the restructuring of global supply chains. 

The key question is whether Kazakhstan can use this moment to strengthen its industrial sovereignty – or whether it will once again limit itself to exporting raw materials.

As global defense spending reaches record levels and countries seek to modernize their military capabilities, diversification of strategic metal supplies has become part of defense planning. Tungsten is listed among the critical minerals essential for the resilience of defense and aerospace industries. It is particularly valued for producing wear-resistant components in jet engines, munitions, mining equipment, and high-precision industrial tools. Tungsten is used in armor-piercing ammunition, missile systems, aerospace alloys, cutting tools for semiconductor manufacturing, and equipment for nuclear and defense industries. 

Despite its importance, the global tungsten supply chain is among the most concentrated in the world. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, China accounts for approximately 83 percent of global tungsten production, with an even higher share in downstream processing.

Kazakhstan holds significant tungsten resources – approximately 2 million tons of forecasted resources, alongside substantial proven reserves – positioning the country as a potentially important player in the global market.

Despite its large resource base, tungsten production in Kazakhstan remained limited for many years after the Soviet period. This is now changing. Major investment projects are underway to construct mining and processing facilities for tungsten concentrate. New developments envision not only extraction and beneficiation, but also chemical processing and, in the longer term, the production of tungsten carbide.

The largest and most promising deposits are at Upper Kairakty and Northern Katpar (Verkhnekayraktinskoye and Severnoye Katparskoye) in the Karaganda region. Their combined reserves are estimated at roughly 1.3 million tons of tungsten. Bringing these deposits into full-scale production could significantly strengthen Kazakhstan’s position in the global reserve structure and make it one of the largest holders of tungsten resources outside China.

The reported interest of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in providing up to $700 million in financing for the Northern Katpar project underscores the strategic dimension of Kazakhstan’s tungsten sector. The involvement of U.S. financing instruments reflects broader efforts to diversify global supply chains.

Within the broader framework sometimes described as “Pax Silica” – the restructuring of global technology supply chains around semiconductors and AI – materials play a foundational role. Beyond its purely military applications, tungsten is also used in equipment for silicon wafer processing, high-temperature industrial components, and semiconductor manufacturing tools, linking defense industries with advanced electronics.

Washington’s growing interest in Central Asia’s strategic metals reflects intensifying competition with China and is visible in expanding bilateral contacts and financial support mechanisms for resource projects.

Kazakhstan thus finds itself at the intersection of two structural trends: the militarization of the global economy and the technological rivalry between the United States and China. Together, these dynamics are giving rise to a new form of international engagement: critical minerals diplomacy.

Kazakhstan positions itself as a middle power – not embedded in rigid bloc configurations, yet actively engaged in regional and global diplomacy. In an era of technological fragmentation, the role of middle powers acquires new significance. Kazakhstan seeks to avoid one-sided dependence by diversifying partnerships in processing and attracting investment from the United States, the European Union, and China, while attempting to build multi-layered supply chains.

However, balancing requires an active industrial policy. If Kazakhstan limits itself to exporting concentrate, its geopolitical balance will remain largely symbolic. The real value added and technological control would reside abroad. If, however, Kazakhstan develops a full processing cycle – from ore to high-temperature alloys and tungsten carbide – it could move beyond the role of raw material supplier and become a proactive participant in the global technological architecture.

Resource sovereignty for a middle power implies several principles including control over processing; diversification of technological partnerships; national development of engineering competencies, including specialized metallurgical expertise in strategic materials; and integration into multiple technological ecosystems without dependence on a single partner.

In the 21st century, sovereignty is measured not only by territory or military capability, but by the ability to control critical nodes of global value chains – technologies, data, energy, and strategic materials.

For a middle power lacking the scale of a superpower but endowed with substantial resources and strategic geography, a distinct model of statecraft emerges. It is neither bloc alignment nor classical neutrality. It is the active management of one’s resource position.

If Kazakhstan succeeds in embedding tungsten into its own industrial ecosystem, it would take a step toward a new foreign economic strategy – one based on resource sovereignty, where strategic materials become not instruments of dependency, but sources of negotiating leverage.

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Amid the global race for critical minerals and rising defense spending, Kazakhstan is re-emerging as a significant player in the tungsten sector. Yet the importance of new projects goes far beyond mining. Tungsten is becoming part of a broader configuration shaped by the China-U.S. technological rivalry and the restructuring of global supply chains. 

The key question is whether Kazakhstan can use this moment to strengthen its industrial sovereignty – or whether it will once again limit itself to exporting raw materials.

As global defense spending reaches record levels and countries seek to modernize their military capabilities, diversification of strategic metal supplies has become part of defense planning. Tungsten is listed among the critical minerals essential for the resilience of defense and aerospace industries. It is particularly valued for producing wear-resistant components in jet engines, munitions, mining equipment, and high-precision industrial tools. Tungsten is used in armor-piercing ammunition, missile systems, aerospace alloys, cutting tools for semiconductor manufacturing, and equipment for nuclear and defense industries. 

Despite its importance, the global tungsten supply chain is among the most concentrated in the world. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, China accounts for approximately 83 percent of global tungsten production, with an even higher share in downstream processing.

Kazakhstan holds significant tungsten resources – approximately 2 million tons of forecasted resources, alongside substantial proven reserves – positioning the country as a potentially important player in the global market.

Despite its large resource base, tungsten production in Kazakhstan remained limited for many years after the Soviet period. This is now changing. Major investment projects are underway to construct mining and processing facilities for tungsten concentrate. New developments envision not only extraction and beneficiation, but also chemical processing and, in the longer term, the production of tungsten carbide.

The largest and most promising deposits are at Upper Kairakty and Northern Katpar (Verkhnekayraktinskoye and Severnoye Katparskoye) in the Karaganda region. Their combined reserves are estimated at roughly 1.3 million tons of tungsten. Bringing these deposits into full-scale production could significantly strengthen Kazakhstan’s position in the global reserve structure and make it one of the largest holders of tungsten resources outside China.

The reported interest of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in providing up to $700 million in financing for the Northern Katpar project underscores the strategic dimension of Kazakhstan’s tungsten sector. The involvement of U.S. financing instruments reflects broader efforts to diversify global supply chains.

Within the broader framework sometimes described as “Pax Silica” – the restructuring of global technology supply chains around semiconductors and AI – materials play a foundational role. Beyond its purely military applications, tungsten is also used in equipment for silicon wafer processing, high-temperature industrial components, and semiconductor manufacturing tools, linking defense industries with advanced electronics.

Washington’s growing interest in Central Asia’s strategic metals reflects intensifying competition with China and is visible in expanding bilateral contacts and financial support mechanisms for resource projects.

Kazakhstan thus finds itself at the intersection of two structural trends: the militarization of the global economy and the technological rivalry between the United States and China. Together, these dynamics are giving rise to a new form of international engagement: critical minerals diplomacy.

Kazakhstan positions itself as a middle power – not embedded in rigid bloc configurations, yet actively engaged in regional and global diplomacy. In an era of technological fragmentation, the role of middle powers acquires new significance. Kazakhstan seeks to avoid one-sided dependence by diversifying partnerships in processing and attracting investment from the United States, the European Union, and China, while attempting to build multi-layered supply chains.

However, balancing requires an active industrial policy. If Kazakhstan limits itself to exporting concentrate, its geopolitical balance will remain largely symbolic. The real value added and technological control would reside abroad. If, however, Kazakhstan develops a full processing cycle – from ore to high-temperature alloys and tungsten carbide – it could move beyond the role of raw material supplier and become a proactive participant in the global technological architecture.

Resource sovereignty for a middle power implies several principles including control over processing; diversification of technological partnerships; national development of engineering competencies, including specialized metallurgical expertise in strategic materials; and integration into multiple technological ecosystems without dependence on a single partner.

In the 21st century, sovereignty is measured not only by territory or military capability, but by the ability to control critical nodes of global value chains – technologies, data, energy, and strategic materials.

For a middle power lacking the scale of a superpower but endowed with substantial resources and strategic geography, a distinct model of statecraft emerges. It is neither bloc alignment nor classical neutrality. It is the active management of one’s resource position.

If Kazakhstan succeeds in embedding tungsten into its own industrial ecosystem, it would take a step toward a new foreign economic strategy – one based on resource sovereignty, where strategic materials become not instruments of dependency, but sources of negotiating leverage.

Timur Serikuly is a senior editor of “Open World” Center for Analysis and Forecasting (Astana) and an expert in international conflict studies and geopolitics. He has diplomatic and peace-building experience in the Middle East.

Kazakhstan critical minerals

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