Interviews | Security | South Asia

Counterterrorism Expert Ajmal Sohail on Pakistan’s ISI Targeting the Chinese in Afghanistan

“By undermining Chinese projects [in Afghanistan], the ISI seeks to remind Beijing that Pakistan remains a critical gatekeeper for regional connectivity, especially through CPEC.”

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan recently announced that on February 21, it had intercepted a consignment of weapons from Pakistan that was headed for the Wakhan Corridor, a sliver of strategic Afghan territory that borders Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. On the same day, the Pakistan Air Force launched a series of air strikes on alleged camps inside Afghanistan of not only the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but also the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), in retaliation for recent deadly attacks by these groups in Bajaur, Bannu, and Islamabad.

Pakistan’s relationship with various militant and jihadist groups in the region has been complex. Its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was the Taliban’s patron-in-chief for around 25 years, but the two are now at loggerheads. Particularly complex is the ISI’s relationship with ISKP. ISKP has targeted Pakistan several times, as it did with the deadly suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad on February 6. However, reports have also drawn attention to ISKP operating in Balochistan with the support of the ISI.

Afghan intelligence analyst and counterterrorism expert Ajmal Sohail, who is a co-founder and co-president of the Counter Narco-Terrorism Alliance Germany, shared his insights into the complex scenario. In an interview with The Diplomat’s South Asia editor Sudha Ramachandran, Sohail said that “while ISKP poses a threat to Pakistani security, its utility as a strategic asset has grown, enabling Pakistan to manipulate regional power balances and influence developments in Afghanistan.”

You have reported that Taliban intelligence intercepted a consignment of weapons from Pakistan on Feb 21 that was headed for the Wakhan Corridor. For whom was it meant and why?

On February 21 this year, Taliban intelligence intercepted a shipment of approximately 525 weapons and 27,000 rounds of ammunition at the Torkham border. The arms, concealed within trucks, were headed toward the Omari refugee camp and destined for the Wakhan Corridor, and represented a significant escalation in covert operations targeting the Taliban regime.

Intelligence reports attribute the operation to Pakistan’s ISI and Military Intelligence, which orchestrate the supply of arms to anti-Taliban groups and separatists in Afghanistan. Newly active organizations, such as the Afghanistan Independence Front, along with regional factions, ISKP, and other contracted armed groups, were given weapons to conduct attacks against Chinese mining companies and foreign investors, particularly in the Wakhan Corridor.

Additionally, a portion of the weapons was designated for the “Tajikistan Taliban,” a group led by Mahdi Arslan and Muhammad Sharipov, now operating from the Chitral mountain range with Pakistani intelligence support. Their activities target Chinese investors and Tajik border forces in Badakhshan province.

Why is the ISI targeting the Chinese in Badakhshan province?

Pakistan’s ISI has increasingly shifted towards targeting Chinese infrastructure and investment projects in Afghanistan. This strategy reflects Islamabad’s concern that Beijing’s growing direct engagement with Kabul, particularly through mining operations, foreign investment, and potential transit routes, could diminish Pakistan’s geopolitical leverage. By undermining Chinese projects, the ISI seeks to remind Beijing that Pakistan remains a critical gatekeeper for regional connectivity, especially through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Part of this doctrine involves encouraging guerrilla-style attacks on foreign tourists and investors, with Chinese nationals singled out as symbolic targets. The aim is to create insecurity around Chinese ventures and to complicate Beijing’s ability to operate independently in Afghanistan. A particular focus is the Wakhan Corridor, which could serve as an alternative trade route bypassing Pakistan. If China succeeds in building direct infrastructure links through Afghanistan, Pakistan’s role as a strategic intermediary weakens. The ISI’s intrigue, therefore, is designed to redirect Beijing’s reliance back toward Pakistan, preserving its geoeconomic relevance and ensuring that CPEC remains the primary artery for China’s regional ambitions.

The February 21 seizure of the weapons consignment exposed the ongoing proxy conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban, highlighting the role of intelligence agencies in shaping regional security. Pakistan’s use of extremist proxies to advance its strategic interests reflects a long-standing pattern, dating back to the Soviet era and continuing through the post-9/11 period. The incident underscores the risks posed by arms proliferation, cross-border militancy, and the manipulation of refugee populations for covert operations.

For regional security, the episode raised concerns about the potential for escalation, retaliation, and the involvement of external actors such as China and Russia. The Taliban’s assertion of sovereignty through intelligence operations signals a shift in Afghanistan’s security posture, challenging Pakistan’s influence and complicating the calculus for neighboring states. Policymakers and analysts must consider the broader implications for stability, border management, and the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies.

Can you explain the reasons for Pakistan’s ongoing military strikes on Afghanistan?

Pakistan’s recent military actions against the Taliban regime stem from concerns about border security and a need to maintain regional influence. The strikes target cross-border militant activity, and urge Kabul to signal Pakistan’s continued centrality in both security and trade matters. Pakistan also blames the Afghan Taliban for harboring TTP militants responsible for attacks within Pakistan and uses military action to discourage such sanctuaries. Therefore, Islamabad seeks to reinforce its role as South Asia’s key security player, especially with China considering direct routes through Afghanistan.

Hence, the airstrikes aim to pressure the Taliban government to reconsider its support for anti-Pakistan militants like the TTP, as well as reaffirm Pakistan’s regional influence and sway over external actors like China, the U.S., and Gulf states. It aims at bolstering its negotiating power in future diplomatic talks.

The Pakistan military also wants to assure the Pakistani public of its commitment to national sovereignty following repeated militant attacks.

What is Pakistan’s relationship with ISKP, and how has it evolved over the years?

Since its emergence in 2015 under Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai, ISKP has evolved into a formidable actor in South Asian jihadism. ISKP originated from defectors of the TTP, adopting an openly antagonistic stance toward Pakistan and carrying out attacks within the country. Pakistani authorities have periodically targeted ISKP operatives, but the relationship remains complex and nuanced.

Recent intelligence assessments suggest that Pakistan’s ISI leverages ISKP as a counterweight to the Afghan Taliban and as a proxy against domestic adversaries, including the TTP and Baloch separatists. While ISKP poses a threat to Pakistani security, its utility as a strategic asset has grown, enabling Pakistan to manipulate regional power balances and influence developments in Afghanistan.

The proxy dynamics between ISKP and Pakistani intelligence reflect broader trends in South Asian security, where state actors employ militant groups to advance geopolitical objectives. This approach has contributed to instability, undermined counterterrorism efforts, and fueled cycles of violence. The evolving relationship between ISKP and ISI exemplifies the challenges of distinguishing between adversaries and assets in an environment marked by fluid alliances and shifting loyalties.

For domestic and regional stability, Pakistan’s engagement with ISKP raises questions about the effectiveness of its counterterrorism policies, the risks of blowback, and the impact on relations with neighboring states. The manipulation of jihadist groups for strategic gain remains a double-edged sword, with long-term repercussions for security and governance.

Several IS affiliates – Islamic State of Khorasan Province, Islamic State of Pakistan Province (ISPP), Islamic State of Hind Province (ISHP), etc – are operating in South Asia. What is their relationship with each other? And with the ISI?

The Islamic State’s regional branches – ISHP in India, ISPP in Pakistan, and ISKP in Afghanistan – operate under a loosely coordinated framework, guided by the central command of the Islamic State. While sharing the ideological goal of establishing a global caliphate, each branch adapts its operations to local conditions, recruiting members, disseminating propaganda, and conducting attacks as opportunities arise.

ISKP leads operations across South and Central Asia, serving as the organizational and operational hub for affiliated groups. ISPP and ISHP, formed in 2019, primarily focus on recruitment and propaganda targeting Pakistan and India, respectively. Their activities include online radicalization, dissemination of extremist content, and attempts to exploit local grievances related to religious and political tensions.

Operational coordination among the branches remains limited, with ISKP maintaining leadership and strategic direction. Allegations persist of ISI providing safe havens and access to former training facilities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, facilitating cross-border movement and joint training activities. Intelligence and financial backing play critical roles in sustaining these networks, enabling them to adapt to changing security environments and counterterrorism pressures.

The resilience of Islamic State affiliates in South Asia underscores the challenges faced by regional governments in disrupting recruitment, propaganda, and operational planning. The fragmentation of jihadist networks, combined with manipulation by intelligence services, complicates efforts to counter violent extremism and prevent the spread of transnational ideology.

There are reports that the ISI has brought ISKP and the Laskhar-e-Taiba together. What are its implications?

Intelligence reports indicate that the ISI has facilitated connections between ISKP and Lashkar-e-Taiba, particularly in Balochistan. Former Taliban military training camps in Gulistan, Pishin, and Zhob have been repurposed for joint training activities since mid-2025, enabling the exchange of tactics, resources, and personnel between the groups.

This intelligence-backed collaboration is designed to target Baloch separatists and the TTP, curb Taliban influence within Pakistan, and increase instability in Balochistan. The implications extend to CPEC, with risks of disruption to infrastructure projects and heightened security challenges. The alignment also impacts Kashmir, where shared anti-India objectives drive operational planning and recruitment.

The collaboration between ISKP and the LeT highlights the risks of escalation, given ideological differences and competing agendas among proxy groups. While intelligence services seek to manipulate jihadist networks for strategic gain, the potential for unintended consequences remains high. The proliferation of joint training camps and the integration of operational capabilities amplify the threat to regional stability, complicating counterterrorism responses and increasing the likelihood of cross-border attacks.

For policymakers, the ISI-facilitated links between ISKP and LeT underscore the need for enhanced intelligence cooperation, robust border security, and targeted disruption of militant infrastructure. The evolving alliances among jihadist groups demand a comprehensive approach, balancing immediate security concerns with long-term efforts to address root causes and prevent radicalization.

What role is the ISKP playing in Balochistan?

ISKP has expanded its presence in Balochistan, targeting Baloch activists and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). Increased pressure from the Taliban in Afghanistan prompted ISKP to establish operational bases in districts such as Mastung, intensifying clashes with separatist groups and redefining the regional power balance.

In 2025, hostilities escalated following attacks on BLA camps, leading ISKP to declare open war against the group, which it labels as “secular infidels.” ISKP’s operations in Balochistan focus primarily on Baloch separatists, rather than Pakistani military or intelligence services, reflecting a strategic shift in targeting priorities and operational objectives.

The expansion of ISKP into Balochistan has implications for regional stability, exacerbating tensions between separatist movements and jihadist groups. The involvement of the ISI in facilitating ISKP’s activities complicates the security environment, raising questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and the risks of spillover into neighboring provinces.

For regional power balances, ISKP’s role in Baluchistan represents a challenge to both state and non-state actors, undermining efforts to resolve longstanding grievances and fueling cycles of violence. The proliferation of operational bases and the targeting of separatists highlight the intersection of ideology, strategy, and intelligence manipulation in shaping South Asia’s security landscape.

Has the Islamic State been able to make inroads in India?

The Islamic State’s India-focused branch, ISHP, has prioritized propaganda efforts, particularly in Kashmir, exploiting grievances related to perceived anti-Muslim policies. Online recruitment campaigns have resulted in several dozen arrests and the formation of small cells, mainly in southern India and Kashmir.

Despite these efforts, ISHP has not succeeded in launching large-scale attacks or establishing significant territorial or organizational bases comparable to Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed. Robust counterterrorism and social integration initiatives have limited ISHP’s operational capacity, with Indian authorities deploying intelligence resources to monitor recruitment, disrupt plots, and counter extremist messaging.

The limitations of ISHP reflect broader trends in India’s approach to counterterrorism, emphasizing community engagement, intelligence-led policing, and international cooperation. The fragmentation of jihadist networks and the resilience of local security structures have constrained the ability of transnational groups to gain traction, though the risk of lone-wolf attacks and online radicalization persists.

For security analysts and policymakers, the Islamic State’s penetration in India underscores the importance of addressing underlying grievances, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and promoting social cohesion to mitigate the threat of violent extremism.

How has India’s engagement with the Taliban regime impacted alignments and alliances in South Asia’s jihadist/terrorist landscape?

After the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, India confronted a strategic dilemma. Historically, India had opposed the Taliban due to its close ties with Pakistan’s ISI and its support for anti-India jihadist groups. The abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces and the Taliban’s ascendance forced India to reassess its approach, balancing security concerns with the need to protect economic interests and regional influence.

India opted for a pragmatic strategy of soft diplomacy, relying on humanitarian aid, trade, and limited diplomatic engagement. This approach included support for Afghan dry fruit traders, funding for infrastructure projects such as the Chabahar port, and discreet outreach to Taliban officials. India has withheld formal recognition of the Taliban regime, maintaining a cautious stance to avoid legitimizing a government with a history of supporting jihadist proxies. At the same time, India seeks to expand its ties to Afghanistan to counter Pakistan’s influence and safeguard its investments.

While this engagement has yielded some positive outcomes – improving India’s access to Afghan markets and fostering limited cooperation – it has not fundamentally altered the support structures of anti-India jihadist organizations. Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, both backed by Pakistan, continue to operate with impunity, posing persistent threats to Indian security. India’s diplomatic overtures to the Taliban serve as indirect pressure on Pakistan, but groups such as al-Qaida and ISKP remain active, exploiting border regions and Taliban-controlled areas.

The ongoing challenge for India lies in balancing engagement with the Taliban against the risks of emboldening jihadist networks. Intelligence activities focus on monitoring Taliban contacts, tracking jihadist movements, and collaborating with international partners to disrupt terror financing and recruitment. India’s cautious diplomacy reflects the broader regional dynamics, where proxy warfare and intelligence maneuvers shape the security environment.

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The Taliban regime in Afghanistan recently announced that on February 21, it had intercepted a consignment of weapons from Pakistan that was headed for the Wakhan Corridor, a sliver of strategic Afghan territory that borders Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. On the same day, the Pakistan Air Force launched a series of air strikes on alleged camps inside Afghanistan of not only the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but also the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), in retaliation for recent deadly attacks by these groups in Bajaur, Bannu, and Islamabad.

Pakistan’s relationship with various militant and jihadist groups in the region has been complex. Its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was the Taliban’s patron-in-chief for around 25 years, but the two are now at loggerheads. Particularly complex is the ISI’s relationship with ISKP. ISKP has targeted Pakistan several times, as it did with the deadly suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad on February 6. However, reports have also drawn attention to ISKP operating in Balochistan with the support of the ISI.

Afghan intelligence analyst and counterterrorism expert Ajmal Sohail, who is a co-founder and co-president of the Counter Narco-Terrorism Alliance Germany, shared his insights into the complex scenario. In an interview with The Diplomat’s South Asia editor Sudha Ramachandran, Sohail said that “while ISKP poses a threat to Pakistani security, its utility as a strategic asset has grown, enabling Pakistan to manipulate regional power balances and influence developments in Afghanistan.”

You have reported that Taliban intelligence intercepted a consignment of weapons from Pakistan on Feb 21 that was headed for the Wakhan Corridor. For whom was it meant and why?

On February 21 this year, Taliban intelligence intercepted a shipment of approximately 525 weapons and 27,000 rounds of ammunition at the Torkham border. The arms, concealed within trucks, were headed toward the Omari refugee camp and destined for the Wakhan Corridor, and represented a significant escalation in covert operations targeting the Taliban regime.

Intelligence reports attribute the operation to Pakistan’s ISI and Military Intelligence, which orchestrate the supply of arms to anti-Taliban groups and separatists in Afghanistan. Newly active organizations, such as the Afghanistan Independence Front, along with regional factions, ISKP, and other contracted armed groups, were given weapons to conduct attacks against Chinese mining companies and foreign investors, particularly in the Wakhan Corridor.

Additionally, a portion of the weapons was designated for the “Tajikistan Taliban,” a group led by Mahdi Arslan and Muhammad Sharipov, now operating from the Chitral mountain range with Pakistani intelligence support. Their activities target Chinese investors and Tajik border forces in Badakhshan province.

Why is the ISI targeting the Chinese in Badakhshan province?

Pakistan’s ISI has increasingly shifted towards targeting Chinese infrastructure and investment projects in Afghanistan. This strategy reflects Islamabad’s concern that Beijing’s growing direct engagement with Kabul, particularly through mining operations, foreign investment, and potential transit routes, could diminish Pakistan’s geopolitical leverage. By undermining Chinese projects, the ISI seeks to remind Beijing that Pakistan remains a critical gatekeeper for regional connectivity, especially through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Part of this doctrine involves encouraging guerrilla-style attacks on foreign tourists and investors, with Chinese nationals singled out as symbolic targets. The aim is to create insecurity around Chinese ventures and to complicate Beijing’s ability to operate independently in Afghanistan. A particular focus is the Wakhan Corridor, which could serve as an alternative trade route bypassing Pakistan. If China succeeds in building direct infrastructure links through Afghanistan, Pakistan’s role as a strategic intermediary weakens. The ISI’s intrigue, therefore, is designed to redirect Beijing’s reliance back toward Pakistan, preserving its geoeconomic relevance and ensuring that CPEC remains the primary artery for China’s regional ambitions.

The February 21 seizure of the weapons consignment exposed the ongoing proxy conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban, highlighting the role of intelligence agencies in shaping regional security. Pakistan’s use of extremist proxies to advance its strategic interests reflects a long-standing pattern, dating back to the Soviet era and continuing through the post-9/11 period. The incident underscores the risks posed by arms proliferation, cross-border militancy, and the manipulation of refugee populations for covert operations.

For regional security, the episode raised concerns about the potential for escalation, retaliation, and the involvement of external actors such as China and Russia. The Taliban’s assertion of sovereignty through intelligence operations signals a shift in Afghanistan’s security posture, challenging Pakistan’s influence and complicating the calculus for neighboring states. Policymakers and analysts must consider the broader implications for stability, border management, and the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies.

Can you explain the reasons for Pakistan’s ongoing military strikes on Afghanistan?

Pakistan’s recent military actions against the Taliban regime stem from concerns about border security and a need to maintain regional influence. The strikes target cross-border militant activity, and urge Kabul to signal Pakistan’s continued centrality in both security and trade matters. Pakistan also blames the Afghan Taliban for harboring TTP militants responsible for attacks within Pakistan and uses military action to discourage such sanctuaries. Therefore, Islamabad seeks to reinforce its role as South Asia’s key security player, especially with China considering direct routes through Afghanistan.

Hence, the airstrikes aim to pressure the Taliban government to reconsider its support for anti-Pakistan militants like the TTP, as well as reaffirm Pakistan’s regional influence and sway over external actors like China, the U.S., and Gulf states. It aims at bolstering its negotiating power in future diplomatic talks.

The Pakistan military also wants to assure the Pakistani public of its commitment to national sovereignty following repeated militant attacks.

What is Pakistan’s relationship with ISKP, and how has it evolved over the years?

Since its emergence in 2015 under Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai, ISKP has evolved into a formidable actor in South Asian jihadism. ISKP originated from defectors of the TTP, adopting an openly antagonistic stance toward Pakistan and carrying out attacks within the country. Pakistani authorities have periodically targeted ISKP operatives, but the relationship remains complex and nuanced.

Recent intelligence assessments suggest that Pakistan’s ISI leverages ISKP as a counterweight to the Afghan Taliban and as a proxy against domestic adversaries, including the TTP and Baloch separatists. While ISKP poses a threat to Pakistani security, its utility as a strategic asset has grown, enabling Pakistan to manipulate regional power balances and influence developments in Afghanistan.

The proxy dynamics between ISKP and Pakistani intelligence reflect broader trends in South Asian security, where state actors employ militant groups to advance geopolitical objectives. This approach has contributed to instability, undermined counterterrorism efforts, and fueled cycles of violence. The evolving relationship between ISKP and ISI exemplifies the challenges of distinguishing between adversaries and assets in an environment marked by fluid alliances and shifting loyalties.

For domestic and regional stability, Pakistan’s engagement with ISKP raises questions about the effectiveness of its counterterrorism policies, the risks of blowback, and the impact on relations with neighboring states. The manipulation of jihadist groups for strategic gain remains a double-edged sword, with long-term repercussions for security and governance.

Several IS affiliates – Islamic State of Khorasan Province, Islamic State of Pakistan Province (ISPP), Islamic State of Hind Province (ISHP), etc – are operating in South Asia. What is their relationship with each other? And with the ISI?

The Islamic State’s regional branches – ISHP in India, ISPP in Pakistan, and ISKP in Afghanistan – operate under a loosely coordinated framework, guided by the central command of the Islamic State. While sharing the ideological goal of establishing a global caliphate, each branch adapts its operations to local conditions, recruiting members, disseminating propaganda, and conducting attacks as opportunities arise.

ISKP leads operations across South and Central Asia, serving as the organizational and operational hub for affiliated groups. ISPP and ISHP, formed in 2019, primarily focus on recruitment and propaganda targeting Pakistan and India, respectively. Their activities include online radicalization, dissemination of extremist content, and attempts to exploit local grievances related to religious and political tensions.

Operational coordination among the branches remains limited, with ISKP maintaining leadership and strategic direction. Allegations persist of ISI providing safe havens and access to former training facilities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, facilitating cross-border movement and joint training activities. Intelligence and financial backing play critical roles in sustaining these networks, enabling them to adapt to changing security environments and counterterrorism pressures.

The resilience of Islamic State affiliates in South Asia underscores the challenges faced by regional governments in disrupting recruitment, propaganda, and operational planning. The fragmentation of jihadist networks, combined with manipulation by intelligence services, complicates efforts to counter violent extremism and prevent the spread of transnational ideology.

There are reports that the ISI has brought ISKP and the Laskhar-e-Taiba together. What are its implications?

Intelligence reports indicate that the ISI has facilitated connections between ISKP and Lashkar-e-Taiba, particularly in Balochistan. Former Taliban military training camps in Gulistan, Pishin, and Zhob have been repurposed for joint training activities since mid-2025, enabling the exchange of tactics, resources, and personnel between the groups.

This intelligence-backed collaboration is designed to target Baloch separatists and the TTP, curb Taliban influence within Pakistan, and increase instability in Balochistan. The implications extend to CPEC, with risks of disruption to infrastructure projects and heightened security challenges. The alignment also impacts Kashmir, where shared anti-India objectives drive operational planning and recruitment.

The collaboration between ISKP and the LeT highlights the risks of escalation, given ideological differences and competing agendas among proxy groups. While intelligence services seek to manipulate jihadist networks for strategic gain, the potential for unintended consequences remains high. The proliferation of joint training camps and the integration of operational capabilities amplify the threat to regional stability, complicating counterterrorism responses and increasing the likelihood of cross-border attacks.

For policymakers, the ISI-facilitated links between ISKP and LeT underscore the need for enhanced intelligence cooperation, robust border security, and targeted disruption of militant infrastructure. The evolving alliances among jihadist groups demand a comprehensive approach, balancing immediate security concerns with long-term efforts to address root causes and prevent radicalization.

What role is the ISKP playing in Balochistan?

ISKP has expanded its presence in Balochistan, targeting Baloch activists and the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA). Increased pressure from the Taliban in Afghanistan prompted ISKP to establish operational bases in districts such as Mastung, intensifying clashes with separatist groups and redefining the regional power balance.

In 2025, hostilities escalated following attacks on BLA camps, leading ISKP to declare open war against the group, which it labels as “secular infidels.” ISKP’s operations in Balochistan focus primarily on Baloch separatists, rather than Pakistani military or intelligence services, reflecting a strategic shift in targeting priorities and operational objectives.

The expansion of ISKP into Balochistan has implications for regional stability, exacerbating tensions between separatist movements and jihadist groups. The involvement of the ISI in facilitating ISKP’s activities complicates the security environment, raising questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and the risks of spillover into neighboring provinces.

For regional power balances, ISKP’s role in Baluchistan represents a challenge to both state and non-state actors, undermining efforts to resolve longstanding grievances and fueling cycles of violence. The proliferation of operational bases and the targeting of separatists highlight the intersection of ideology, strategy, and intelligence manipulation in shaping South Asia’s security landscape.

Has the Islamic State been able to make inroads in India?

The Islamic State’s India-focused branch, ISHP, has prioritized propaganda efforts, particularly in Kashmir, exploiting grievances related to perceived anti-Muslim policies. Online recruitment campaigns have resulted in several dozen arrests and the formation of small cells, mainly in southern India and Kashmir.

Despite these efforts, ISHP has not succeeded in launching large-scale attacks or establishing significant territorial or organizational bases comparable to Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed. Robust counterterrorism and social integration initiatives have limited ISHP’s operational capacity, with Indian authorities deploying intelligence resources to monitor recruitment, disrupt plots, and counter extremist messaging.

The limitations of ISHP reflect broader trends in India’s approach to counterterrorism, emphasizing community engagement, intelligence-led policing, and international cooperation. The fragmentation of jihadist networks and the resilience of local security structures have constrained the ability of transnational groups to gain traction, though the risk of lone-wolf attacks and online radicalization persists.

For security analysts and policymakers, the Islamic State’s penetration in India underscores the importance of addressing underlying grievances, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and promoting social cohesion to mitigate the threat of violent extremism.

How has India’s engagement with the Taliban regime impacted alignments and alliances in South Asia’s jihadist/terrorist landscape?

After the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, India confronted a strategic dilemma. Historically, India had opposed the Taliban due to its close ties with Pakistan’s ISI and its support for anti-India jihadist groups. The abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces and the Taliban’s ascendance forced India to reassess its approach, balancing security concerns with the need to protect economic interests and regional influence.

India opted for a pragmatic strategy of soft diplomacy, relying on humanitarian aid, trade, and limited diplomatic engagement. This approach included support for Afghan dry fruit traders, funding for infrastructure projects such as the Chabahar port, and discreet outreach to Taliban officials. India has withheld formal recognition of the Taliban regime, maintaining a cautious stance to avoid legitimizing a government with a history of supporting jihadist proxies. At the same time, India seeks to expand its ties to Afghanistan to counter Pakistan’s influence and safeguard its investments.

While this engagement has yielded some positive outcomes – improving India’s access to Afghan markets and fostering limited cooperation – it has not fundamentally altered the support structures of anti-India jihadist organizations. Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, both backed by Pakistan, continue to operate with impunity, posing persistent threats to Indian security. India’s diplomatic overtures to the Taliban serve as indirect pressure on Pakistan, but groups such as al-Qaida and ISKP remain active, exploiting border regions and Taliban-controlled areas.

The ongoing challenge for India lies in balancing engagement with the Taliban against the risks of emboldening jihadist networks. Intelligence activities focus on monitoring Taliban contacts, tracking jihadist movements, and collaborating with international partners to disrupt terror financing and recruitment. India’s cautious diplomacy reflects the broader regional dynamics, where proxy warfare and intelligence maneuvers shape the security environment.

Sudha Ramachandran is South Asia editor at The Diplomat.

Chinese projects in Afghanistan

Pakistan-Taliban regime

Pakistan-Wakhan corridor

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