Interviews | Security | South Asia

Counterterrorism Expert Ajmal Sohail on Pakistan’s ISI Targeting the Chinese in Afghanistan

“By undermining Chinese projects [in Afghanistan], the ISI seeks to remind Beijing that Pakistan remains a critical gatekeeper for regional connectivity, especially through CPEC.”

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan recently announced that on February 21, it had intercepted a consignment of weapons from Pakistan that was headed for the Wakhan Corridor, a sliver of strategic Afghan territory that borders Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan. On the same day, the Pakistan Air Force launched a series of air strikes on alleged camps inside Afghanistan of not only the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but also the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), in retaliation for recent deadly attacks by these groups in Bajaur, Bannu, and Islamabad.

Pakistan’s relationship with various militant and jihadist groups in the region has been complex. Its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was the Taliban’s patron-in-chief for around 25 years, but the two are now at loggerheads. Particularly complex is the ISI’s relationship with ISKP. ISKP has targeted Pakistan several times, as it did with the deadly suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad on February 6. However, reports have also drawn attention to ISKP operating in Balochistan with the support of the ISI.

Afghan intelligence analyst and counterterrorism expert Ajmal Sohail, who is a co-founder and co-president of the Counter Narco-Terrorism Alliance Germany, shared his insights into the complex scenario. In an interview with The Diplomat’s South Asia editor Sudha Ramachandran, Sohail said that “while ISKP poses a threat to Pakistani security, its utility as a strategic asset has grown, enabling Pakistan to manipulate regional power balances and influence developments in Afghanistan.”

You have reported that Taliban intelligence intercepted a consignment of weapons from Pakistan on Feb 21 that was headed for the Wakhan Corridor. For whom was it meant and why?

On February 21 this year, Taliban intelligence intercepted a shipment of approximately 525 weapons and 27,000 rounds of ammunition at the Torkham border. The arms, concealed within trucks, were headed toward the Omari refugee camp and destined for the Wakhan Corridor, and represented a significant escalation in covert operations targeting the Taliban regime.

Intelligence reports attribute the operation to Pakistan’s ISI and Military Intelligence, which orchestrate the supply of arms to anti-Taliban groups and separatists in Afghanistan. Newly active organizations, such as the Afghanistan Independence Front, along with regional factions, ISKP, and other contracted armed groups, were given weapons to conduct attacks against Chinese mining companies and foreign investors, particularly in the Wakhan Corridor.

Additionally, a portion of the weapons was designated for the “Tajikistan Taliban,” a group led by Mahdi Arslan and Muhammad Sharipov, now operating from the Chitral mountain range with Pakistani intelligence support. Their activities target Chinese investors and Tajik border forces in Badakhshan province.

Why is the ISI targeting the Chinese in Badakhshan province?

Pakistan’s ISI has increasingly shifted towards targeting Chinese infrastructure and investment projects in Afghanistan. This strategy reflects Islamabad’s concern that Beijing’s growing direct engagement with Kabul, particularly through mining operations, foreign investment, and potential transit routes, could diminish Pakistan’s geopolitical leverage. By undermining Chinese projects, the ISI seeks to remind Beijing that Pakistan remains a critical gatekeeper for regional connectivity, especially through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Part of this doctrine involves encouraging guerrilla-style attacks on foreign tourists and investors, with Chinese nationals singled out as symbolic targets. The aim is to create insecurity around Chinese ventures and to complicate Beijing’s ability to operate independently in Afghanistan. A particular focus is the Wakhan Corridor, which could serve as an alternative trade route bypassing Pakistan. If China succeeds in building direct infrastructure links through Afghanistan, Pakistan’s role as a strategic intermediary weakens. The ISI’s intrigue, therefore, is designed to redirect Beijing’s reliance back toward Pakistan, preserving its geoeconomic relevance and ensuring that CPEC remains the primary artery for China’s regional ambitions.

The February 21 seizure of the weapons consignment exposed the ongoing proxy conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban, highlighting the role of intelligence agencies in shaping regional security. Pakistan’s use of extremist proxies to advance its strategic interests reflects a long-standing pattern, dating back to the Soviet era and continuing through the post-9/11 period. The incident underscores the risks posed by arms proliferation, cross-border militancy, and the manipulation of refugee populations for covert operations.

For regional security, the episode raised concerns about the potential for escalation, retaliation, and the involvement of external actors such as China and Russia. The Taliban’s assertion of sovereignty through intelligence operations signals a shift in Afghanistan’s security posture, challenging Pakistan’s influence and complicating the calculus for neighboring states. Policymakers and analysts must consider the broader implications for stability, border management, and the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies.

Can you explain the reasons for Pakistan’s ongoing military strikes on Afghanistan?

Pakistan’s recent military actions against the Taliban regime stem from concerns about border security and a need to maintain regional influence. The strikes target cross-border militant activity, and urge Kabul to signal Pakistan’s continued centrality in both security and trade matters. Pakistan also blames the Afghan Taliban for harboring TTP militants responsible for attacks within Pakistan and uses military action to discourage such sanctuaries. Therefore, Islamabad seeks to reinforce its role as South Asia’s key security player, especially with China considering direct routes through Afghanistan.

Hence, the airstrikes aim to pressure the Taliban government to reconsider its support for anti-Pakistan militants like the TTP, as well as reaffirm Pakistan’s regional influence and sway over external actors like China, the U.S., and Gulf states. It aims at bolstering its negotiating power in future diplomatic talks.

The Pakistan military also wants to assure the Pakistani public of its commitment to national sovereignty following repeated militant attacks.

What is Pakistan’s relationship with ISKP, and how has it evolved over the years?

Since its emergence in 2015 under Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai, ISKP has evolved into a formidable actor in South Asian jihadism. ISKP originated from defectors of the TTP, adopting an openly antagonistic stance toward Pakistan and carrying out attacks within the country. Pakistani authorities have periodically targeted ISKP operatives, but the relationship remains complex and nuanced.

Recent intelligence assessments suggest that Pakistan’s ISI leverages ISKP as a counterweight to the Afghan Taliban and as a proxy against domestic adversaries, including the TTP and Baloch separatists. While ISKP poses a threat to Pakistani security, its utility as a strategic asset has grown, enabling Pakistan to manipulate regional power balances and influence developments in Afghanistan.

The proxy dynamics between ISKP and Pakistani intelligence reflect broader trends in South Asian security, where state actors employ militant groups to advance geopolitical objectives. This approach has contributed to instability, undermined counterterrorism efforts, and fueled cycles of violence. The evolving relationship between ISKP and ISI exemplifies the challenges of distinguishing between adversaries and assets in an environment marked by fluid alliances and shifting loyalties.

For domestic and regional stability, Pakistan’s engagement with ISKP raises questions about the effectiveness of its counterterrorism policies, the risks of blowback, and the impact on relations with neighboring states. The manipulation of jihadist groups for strategic gain remains a double-edged sword, with long-term repercussions for security and governance.

Several IS affiliates – Islamic State of Khorasan Province, Islamic State of Pakistan Province (ISPP), Islamic State of Hind Province (ISHP), etc – are operating in South Asia. What is their relationship with each other? And with the ISI?

The Islamic State’s regional branches – ISHP in India,........

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