BRICS: Can India Lead a Bloc Without a Cause?
Flashpoints | Security | South Asia
BRICS: Can India Lead a Bloc Without a Cause?
BRICS appears to be more riddled with internal conflicts than most multilateral groups.
When Jim O’Neill, then-chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, coined the term BRIC in a 2001 research paper, he was referring to the collective potential of Brazil, Russia, India, and China to influence the world economy. By 2006, the four countries started meeting informally, before setting up BRIC in 2009 and expanding it to include South Africa in 2010. There was optimism that BRICS would usher in an alternate pathway to global governance and emerge as a credible voice of the Global South.
By 2021, O’Neill was of the opinion that the five BRICS countries had proven incapable of uniting as a meaningful global force. The group’s inability to take a unified stand on major issues was a principal reason for O’Neill’s conclusion. The ambiguous stance of BRICS and its current chair, India, regarding the ongoing war in Iran serves to reinforce that judgement. Even expanded, with 10 members drawn from across continents now, including Iran, the group remains unable to develop substantive policies on major global issues. It is thus surprising that BRICS has remained intact without splitting or collapsing.
On April 14, Iranian Ambassador to India Mohammad Fathali said that India could play an important role as the chair of BRICS in fostering dialogue and regional stability. His comments come ahead of an upcoming BRICS meeting. Fathali’s statement was an expression of hope and a nudge to India to use its good offices to impress upon the United States and Israel to end the war. New Delhi, so far, has dilly-dallied in making any such moves, although Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has remained in touch with U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu through periodic phone calls.
Tehran, which joined BRICS in January 2024, has called upon the group to take a stronger stance on the war. But Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Gulf states in general and the UAE and Saudi Arabia, in particular, have created a curious dilemma for the group and its chair. The UAE, like Iran, has been a formal member of BRICS since early 2024. Saudi Arabia hasn’t joined the group, but attends its summits as a guest or partner country. Neither has responded to Iran’s attacks militarily. BRICS as a collective should be able to protect the interests of the UAE and Saudi Arabia as well as those of Iran. But doing so is a diplomatic impossibility at this juncture, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia being close partners of the United States.
Even with this complex geopolitical backdrop, India’s own position, often referred to as a “balancing act,” can be characterized as silence on the larger strategic questions. Since the start of the war, Indian leadership has spoken to the leaders of Iran, the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf countries. But many of these conversations are about ensuring the safety of its own citizens in the Middle Eastern region. India’s close relationship with Israel makes it a herculean task for New Delhi to pose as a neutral actor. Not surprisingly, New Delhi, even as the chair of BRICS, has done very little to position itself as a leader of the bloc, or call for peace and cessation of violence affecting its member states.
This is not the first time that BRICS has faced challenges in reaching a unified position, particularly when one of its members is involved in a conflict.........
