Interviews | Politics | South Asia

NCP Leader Nasiruddin Patwary on Electoral Engineering and Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh

“In our view, Sheikh Hasina surrendered too much space to India, and the BNP government now appears to be moving in a similar direction.”

Nasiruddin Patwary, chief coordinator of the National Citizen Party (NCP), stands surrounded by journalists and camera crews at a polling center in Dhaka-8 constituency on voting day during Bangladesh’s February 2026 parliamentary vote, Feb. 12, 2026.

During Bangladesh’s February 12 parliamentary election, the Dhaka-8 constituency drew unusual national attention. Veteran Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Mirza Abbas faced a younger challenger, Nasiruddin Patwary, chief coordinator of the months-old National Citizen Party (NCP). Patwary was backed by an 11-party Islamist alliance that included the NCP. His campaign focused on corruption, particularly extortion affecting small and medium businesses in central Dhaka, as well as broader calls for institutional reform. Abbas won the seat by just over 5,000 votes, and Patwary rejected the result, alleging that the election had been “engineered.”

A marketing graduate from Dhaka University, Patwary now works at a consultancy, alongside engaging in political activities. In an interview with The Diplomat’s Bangladesh correspondent, Saqlain Rizve, Patwary shared his political journey, and his views on the debate over constitutional reform and Bangladesh’s position between India and Pakistan.

Your political journey appears unusual for a new-generation politician in Bangladesh. How did you first become involved in politics?

I grew up within the expected trajectory of Bangladesh’s rising middle class: school, college, then a stable career. Like many others, I once dreamed of becoming a university teacher, sitting for the civil service exam, or going into business. The turning point came after my Higher Secondary School Certificate (HSC) exam, when I was suddenly arrested from my hostel in Farmgate, Dhaka, in 2013. The police officer said I was arrested because he needed to meet the quota of arrests for the day. Seeing people being beaten and brought into the police station made me question the system. I was a student — so why was I in jail? It became the moment of my political awakening.

Were you involved in politics at that time?

Not in conventional politics. While studying at Darunnazat Siddikia Kamil Madrasa, I had some limited involvement with the Islami Chhatra Shibir [the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami], mainly out of curiosity rather than organized political ambition. Before that, I studied in the Dakhil madrassa system, where discussions about Islamic political movements were quite common. People often talked about organizations such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Andolon Bangladesh, and Khelafat Majlish, and I was interested in understanding their ideas.

While in jail, I met many opposition activists, including members of the BNP. Through conversations with them, and through events like the Shapla Chattar incident, a 2013 crackdown in Dhaka where security forces dispersed a mass rally by Islamist group Hefazat-e-Islam, which led to deaths and widespread controversy, my political thinking gradually began to take form.

How did your political interest develop after entering Dhaka University (DU)?

After entering DU and moving into the residential hall, I began observing campus politics closely. I saw overcrowded dormitories and how students were sometimes pushed into political programs. Even during my admission test, I noticed political processions on campus, which made me curious about how these movements operated. Gradually, I became involved in activism, including the agitation demanding restoration of the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU). As a marketing student, I was also interested in economic issues and interacted with left-leaning groups such as Chhatra Union and Chhatra Federation.

Later events, including the 2018 quota reform movement — student-led protests over public sector job quotas — the murder of Abrar Fahad, and the DUCSU election, further shaped my political thinking. After leaving campus, I became involved with the Amar Bangladesh (AB) Party while remaining politically active.

During the 2024 mass movement, which party were you with?

Before the 2024 movement, I was with the AB Party. At the university, we worked more as a sectoral group rather than strictly along party lines. Many of us came from different political backgrounds, but we shared the view that little change would come through the existing establishment parties. Since around 2016-2018, many of us had already been thinking about the need to oust Sheikh Hasina. The political conditions in 2024 finally made that possible.

Earlier, you were drawn to activism and movements for change. Now that you are in mainstream politics, how do you see the difference?

In Bangladesh, many things still need to change, so activism remains very important. Even in countries with strong institutions like the United States, movements such as Black Lives Matter emerge. Change cannot come only from parliament.

Through politics, we have tried to understand the root of the problem. In our country, there is little accountability and transparency, largely because the system lacks strong checks and balances. When that happens, power can concentrate in the hands of one individual. We saw that under Sheikh Hasina, and it could happen again.

What we want is a system where the constitution stands above individuals. Our struggle can take different forms — activism, political organization, or social movements. Activism will continue because the goal is real change in Bangladesh.

Since constitutional reform has come up, tensions have emerged between the ruling BNP and other political alliances over the July Charter, with the 11-party alliance warning it may return to the streets. How do you see this dispute?

During the mass uprising, one demand was clear — reform. Many believed Bangladesh needed a new political settlement, even what we called a “Second Republic.”

There were two paths: drafting a new constitution or reforming the current one, especially where checks and balances are weak. A Consensus Commission was formed and all parties participated, with the understanding that reforms would later be ratified through parliament or a referendum. But once the issue reached parliament, the BNP began showing hesitation about stronger accountability, even though they had already taken part in the discussions and signed the agreement.

Reform is not just an NCP demand. For decades, Bangladesh has faced crises in institutions — from healthcare and education to the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Election Commission. Strengthening institutions is a public demand that came out of the mass uprising itself. And we will remain active both on the streets and in parliament, because these reforms must be pursued through every possible avenue.

You have repeatedly spoken about “election engineering.” The NCP and leaders of the 11-party alliance have also used that term. Are you suggesting the election was manipulated?

The term “engineering” was not widely used before, but in this election, it became clear. An election has three phases — pre-election, voting, and post-election — and we saw problems in each.

Our concerns began in the pre-election phase, when Chief Interim Adviser Muhammad Yunus met the BNP’s then-acting chairman, Tarique Rahman, in London, raising questions about possible political understandings. During the election, we also saw unusual shifts in voting patterns, with traditional Awami League vote banks appearing to move toward the BNP in several areas.

On election day, the army played a positive role but was not stationed inside polling centers. Inside, many officials appeared to favor one side. What we saw was not open ballot theft but a systematic addition of votes, center by center. There were also delays in announcing results in several constituencies. When the process is influenced at different stages, that is what we call election engineering.

During the election campaign, you interacted closely with voters. What did you see as people’s real aspirations?

People’s aspirations are actually very simple. They want to live peacefully and have basic services such as gas and electricity. Many elderly people told me they just want safe public spaces where they can go out and spend some time. A major concern is the rising cost of living, as many said their salaries no longer match market prices. People also want less traffic congestion in Dhaka and no corruption when trying to admit their children to school. Business owners spoke about extortion and corruption in government offices, saying they often face intimidation while trying to run their businesses.

In reality, people are not asking for luxury — only what a state should normally provide: basic services, safety, and the freedom to speak without fear. In my campaign, I tried to raise these issues and connect with people in a friendly, often humorous way.

It has been over a month since the new government was formed after the election. How do you view the government’s performance so far?

In my view, these are populist activities. Without structural changes to the state, symbolic gestures — giving small financial support, calling in imams (clerics who lead prayers in a mosque) and pandits (Hindu priests), or turning off lights and fans in offices — do not address the deeper problems.

What Bangladesh really needs is institutional reform. The constitution requires changes, and there should be clear plans for youth employment, the future of the middle class, and the broader economy. There are also concerns about appointments in key institutions. Already in institutions like the Bangladesh Bank, in universities, and other important agencies, people who do not have the necessary expertise have been appointed.

Is the BNP reluctant to pursue justice as well, especially regarding the trial of the AL?

Yes. In my view, there is reluctance because some form of political understanding has been reached between the BNP and AL. That is why we are seeing hesitation on the question of justice.

There has been considerable discussion relating to the president in recent weeks. How do you view this issue?

This election took place based on public aspirations, and the people’s verdict clearly went against the AL. In that context, we see the current president as someone directly linked to the previous regime.

The presidency as an institution deserves respect, but if the person occupying that office is connected to wrongdoing, there will naturally be objections. For us, the issue is accountability — no one should be beyond justice simply because they hold a constitutional post.

Leaders from the BNP and some allied groups argue that when the interim government took oath on August 8, 2024, the president was already in office and there was no objection then. Why is the issue being raised now?

The situation on August 8 was an emergency. If the president had stepped aside at that moment, the state would have faced a constitutional vacuum because there was no functionary ready to replace him.

Let us turn to regional politics. Bangladesh–India relations appeared frozen for some time, but there are now signs of renewed engagement. How do you and your party see these developments?

Bangladesh’s core concern in its foreign relations is justice and dignity. These principles were central to our independence in 1971. Sovereignty means the right to make our own decisions without external domination.

If relations with India are based on fairness and mutual respect, we have no problem. We are neighbors. But that relationship of equality has not yet fully developed. In our view, Sheikh Hasina surrendered too much space to India, and the BNP government now appears to be moving in a similar direction.

There has also been discussion about a shift in relations with Pakistan. Under Sheikh Hasina, the AL often used anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Looking ahead, how does your party see the Bangladesh-Pakistan-India triangle?

The world today is increasingly shaped by conflict. Our position, however, is simple — Bangladesh should engage wherever there is dignity, justice, and benefit for the country. Diplomacy does not mean moving away from one country only to fall into the lap of another. Creating distance from India does not mean Bangladesh must move toward Pakistan. That is not diplomacy.

There are perceptions in some quarters that the 11-party alliance maintains a pro-Pakistan orientation. How do you address those concerns?

No, that is not accurate. The NCP’s foreign policy position is clear. We want relations with all countries based on justice, dignity, and mutual respect, without foreign interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. Bangladesh has historically supported regional cooperation through platforms like the Non-Aligned Movement and SAARC. South Asia needs stronger regional cooperation.

Does that mean the NCP supports restructuring or revitalizing SAARC?

Yes. South Asia needs stronger economic and social cooperation.

Does the NCP plan to remain with the 11-party alliance or with the Jamaat?

Bangladesh’s politics had become polarized between two blocs. Outside the BNP and Jamaat, there was effectively little space for a third force. Ideally, we wanted to work with the BNP, but they avoided key issues like structural reform and accountability.

At the same time, Jamaat has its own religious ideology, which is not our position. Our focus is reform. In electoral reality, however, we were compelled to take a strategic position.

Our ideas are not the same as Jamaat’s. If they were, we would simply have joined Jamaat. They have won seats through democratic recognition from the people, but our alliance was about political strategy and reform.

Were there mistakes by the NCP that could have been avoided?

Of course. We relied too much on certain civil society figures and gave too much space to established parties. The Election Commission should have been restructured more effectively. We also faced limitations. Many young candidates lacked resources, and we were not fully organized. These are areas where we need self-criticism.

The NCP often presents itself as a party representing Gen-Z politics. Do you feel that this generation has been given enough space in Bangladesh’s current political system?

Not really. Gen-Z exists in every political party, but after the mass uprising, the political establishment did not truly give space to that generation. When we tried to represent that energy through the NCP, there was a campaign of character assassination, with claims that Gen-Z does not understand politics or cannot run the state.

This attitude was not limited to one party. Many old-guard parties behaved similarly. Our candidates faced systematic obstacles during the election, and even our party symbol faced discrimination, showing how difficult it remains for a new generation to enter mainstream politics in Bangladesh.

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During Bangladesh’s February 12 parliamentary election, the Dhaka-8 constituency drew unusual national attention. Veteran Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Mirza Abbas faced a younger challenger, Nasiruddin Patwary, chief coordinator of the months-old National Citizen Party (NCP). Patwary was backed by an 11-party Islamist alliance that included the NCP. His campaign focused on corruption, particularly extortion affecting small and medium businesses in central Dhaka, as well as broader calls for institutional reform. Abbas won the seat by just over 5,000 votes, and Patwary rejected the result, alleging that the election had been “engineered.”

A marketing graduate from Dhaka University, Patwary now works at a consultancy, alongside engaging in political activities. In an interview with The Diplomat’s Bangladesh correspondent, Saqlain Rizve, Patwary shared his political journey, and his views on the debate over constitutional reform and Bangladesh’s position between India and Pakistan.

Your political journey appears unusual for a new-generation politician in Bangladesh. How did you first become involved in politics?

I grew up within the expected trajectory of Bangladesh’s rising middle class: school, college, then a stable career. Like many others, I once dreamed of becoming a university teacher, sitting for the civil service exam, or going into business. The turning point came after my Higher Secondary School Certificate (HSC) exam, when I was suddenly arrested from my hostel in Farmgate, Dhaka, in 2013. The police officer said I was arrested because he needed to meet the quota of arrests for the day. Seeing people being beaten and brought into the police station made me question the system. I was a student — so why was I in jail? It became the moment of my political awakening.

Were you involved in politics at that time?

Not in conventional politics. While studying at Darunnazat Siddikia Kamil Madrasa, I had some limited involvement with the Islami Chhatra Shibir [the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami], mainly out of curiosity rather than organized political ambition. Before that, I studied in the Dakhil madrassa system, where discussions about Islamic political movements were quite common. People often talked about organizations such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Andolon Bangladesh, and Khelafat Majlish, and I was interested in understanding their ideas.

While in jail, I met many opposition activists, including members of the BNP. Through conversations with them, and through events like the Shapla Chattar incident, a 2013 crackdown in Dhaka where security forces dispersed a mass rally by Islamist group Hefazat-e-Islam, which led to deaths and widespread controversy, my political thinking gradually began to take form.

How did your political interest develop after entering Dhaka University (DU)?

After entering DU and moving into the residential hall, I began observing campus politics closely. I saw overcrowded dormitories and how students were sometimes pushed into political programs. Even during my admission test, I noticed political processions on campus, which made me curious about how these movements operated. Gradually, I became involved in activism, including the agitation demanding restoration of the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU). As a marketing student, I was also interested in economic issues and interacted with left-leaning groups such as Chhatra Union and Chhatra Federation.

Later events, including the 2018 quota reform movement — student-led protests over public sector job quotas — the murder of Abrar Fahad, and the DUCSU election, further shaped my political thinking. After leaving campus, I became involved with the Amar Bangladesh (AB) Party while remaining politically active.

During the 2024 mass movement, which party were you with?

Before the 2024 movement, I was with the AB Party. At the university, we worked more as a sectoral group rather than strictly along party lines. Many of us came from different political backgrounds, but we shared the view that little change would come through the existing establishment parties. Since around 2016-2018, many of us had already been thinking about the need to oust Sheikh Hasina. The political conditions in 2024 finally made that possible.

Earlier, you were drawn to activism and movements for change. Now that you are in mainstream politics, how do you see the difference?

In Bangladesh, many things still need to change, so activism remains very important. Even in countries with strong institutions like the United States, movements such as Black Lives Matter emerge. Change cannot come only from parliament.

Through politics, we have tried to understand the root of the problem. In our country, there is little accountability and transparency, largely because the system lacks strong checks and balances. When that happens, power can concentrate in the hands of one individual. We saw that under Sheikh Hasina, and it could happen again.

What we want is a system where the constitution stands above individuals. Our struggle can take different forms — activism, political organization, or social movements. Activism will continue because the goal is real change in Bangladesh.

Since constitutional reform has come up, tensions have emerged between the ruling BNP and other political alliances over the July Charter, with the 11-party alliance warning it may return to the streets. How do you see this dispute?

During the mass uprising, one demand was clear — reform. Many believed Bangladesh needed a new political settlement, even what we called a “Second Republic.”

There were two paths: drafting a new constitution or reforming the current one, especially where checks and balances are weak. A Consensus Commission was formed and all parties participated, with the understanding that reforms would later be ratified through parliament or a referendum. But once the issue reached parliament, the BNP began showing hesitation about stronger accountability, even though they had already taken part in the discussions and signed the agreement.

Reform is not just an NCP demand. For decades, Bangladesh has faced crises in institutions — from healthcare and education to the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Election Commission. Strengthening institutions is a public demand that came out of the mass uprising itself. And we will remain active both on the streets and in parliament, because these reforms must be pursued through every possible avenue.

You have repeatedly spoken about “election engineering.” The NCP and leaders of the 11-party alliance have also used that term. Are you suggesting the election was manipulated?

The term “engineering” was not widely used before, but in this election, it became clear. An election has three phases — pre-election, voting, and post-election — and we saw problems in each.

Our concerns began in the pre-election phase, when Chief Interim Adviser Muhammad Yunus met the BNP’s then-acting chairman, Tarique Rahman, in London, raising questions about possible political understandings. During the election, we also saw unusual shifts in voting patterns, with traditional Awami League vote banks appearing to move toward the BNP in several areas.

On election day, the army played a positive role but was not stationed inside polling centers. Inside, many officials appeared to favor one side. What we saw was not open ballot theft but a systematic addition of votes, center by center. There were also delays in announcing results in several constituencies. When the process is influenced at different stages, that is what we call election engineering.

During the election campaign, you interacted closely with voters. What did you see as people’s real aspirations?

People’s aspirations are actually very simple. They want to live peacefully and have basic services such as gas and electricity. Many elderly people told me they just want safe public spaces where they can go out and spend some time. A major concern is the rising cost of living, as many said their salaries no longer match market prices. People also want less traffic congestion in Dhaka and no corruption when trying to admit their children to school. Business owners spoke about extortion and corruption in government offices, saying they often face intimidation while trying to run their businesses.

In reality, people are not asking for luxury — only what a state should normally provide: basic services, safety, and the freedom to speak without fear. In my campaign, I tried to raise these issues and connect with people in a friendly, often humorous way.

It has been over a month since the new government was formed after the election. How do you view the government’s performance so far?

In my view, these are populist activities. Without structural changes to the state, symbolic gestures — giving small financial support, calling in imams (clerics who lead prayers in a mosque) and pandits (Hindu priests), or turning off lights and fans in offices — do not address the deeper problems.

What Bangladesh really needs is institutional reform. The constitution requires changes, and there should be clear plans for youth employment, the future of the middle class, and the broader economy. There are also concerns about appointments in key institutions. Already in institutions like the Bangladesh Bank, in universities, and other important agencies, people who do not have the necessary expertise have been appointed.

Is the BNP reluctant to pursue justice as well, especially regarding the trial of the AL?

Yes. In my view, there is reluctance because some form of political understanding has been reached between the BNP and AL. That is why we are seeing hesitation on the question of justice.

There has been considerable discussion relating to the president in recent weeks. How do you view this issue?

This election took place based on public aspirations, and the people’s verdict clearly went against the AL. In that context, we see the current president as someone directly linked to the previous regime.

The presidency as an institution deserves respect, but if the person occupying that office is connected to wrongdoing, there will naturally be objections. For us, the issue is accountability — no one should be beyond justice simply because they hold a constitutional post.

Leaders from the BNP and some allied groups argue that when the interim government took oath on August 8, 2024, the president was already in office and there was no objection then. Why is the issue being raised now?

The situation on August 8 was an emergency. If the president had stepped aside at that moment, the state would have faced a constitutional vacuum because there was no functionary ready to replace him.

Let us turn to regional politics. Bangladesh–India relations appeared frozen for some time, but there are now signs of renewed engagement. How do you and your party see these developments?

Bangladesh’s core concern in its foreign relations is justice and dignity. These principles were central to our independence in 1971. Sovereignty means the right to make our own decisions without external domination.

If relations with India are based on fairness and mutual respect, we have no problem. We are neighbors. But that relationship of equality has not yet fully developed. In our view, Sheikh Hasina surrendered too much space to India, and the BNP government now appears to be moving in a similar direction.

There has also been discussion about a shift in relations with Pakistan. Under Sheikh Hasina, the AL often used anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Looking ahead, how does your party see the Bangladesh-Pakistan-India triangle?

The world today is increasingly shaped by conflict. Our position, however, is simple — Bangladesh should engage wherever there is dignity, justice, and benefit for the country. Diplomacy does not mean moving away from one country only to fall into the lap of another. Creating distance from India does not mean Bangladesh must move toward Pakistan. That is not diplomacy.

There are perceptions in some quarters that the 11-party alliance maintains a pro-Pakistan orientation. How do you address those concerns?

No, that is not accurate. The NCP’s foreign policy position is clear. We want relations with all countries based on justice, dignity, and mutual respect, without foreign interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. Bangladesh has historically supported regional cooperation through platforms like the Non-Aligned Movement and SAARC. South Asia needs stronger regional cooperation.

Does that mean the NCP supports restructuring or revitalizing SAARC?

Yes. South Asia needs stronger economic and social cooperation.

Does the NCP plan to remain with the 11-party alliance or with the Jamaat?

Bangladesh’s politics had become polarized between two blocs. Outside the BNP and Jamaat, there was effectively little space for a third force. Ideally, we wanted to work with the BNP, but they avoided key issues like structural reform and accountability.

At the same time, Jamaat has its own religious ideology, which is not our position. Our focus is reform. In electoral reality, however, we were compelled to take a strategic position.

Our ideas are not the same as Jamaat’s. If they were, we would simply have joined Jamaat. They have won seats through democratic recognition from the people, but our alliance was about political strategy and reform.

Were there mistakes by the NCP that could have been avoided?

Of course. We relied too much on certain civil society figures and gave too much space to established parties. The Election Commission should have been restructured more effectively. We also faced limitations. Many young candidates lacked resources, and we were not fully organized. These are areas where we need self-criticism.

The NCP often presents itself as a party representing Gen-Z politics. Do you feel that this generation has been given enough space in Bangladesh’s current political system?

Not really. Gen-Z exists in every political party, but after the mass uprising, the political establishment did not truly give space to that generation. When we tried to represent that energy through the NCP, there was a campaign of character assassination, with claims that Gen-Z does not understand politics or cannot run the state.

This attitude was not limited to one party. Many old-guard parties behaved similarly. Our candidates faced systematic obstacles during the election, and even our party symbol faced discrimination, showing how difficult it remains for a new generation to enter mainstream politics in Bangladesh.

Saqlain Rizve is a Bangladeshi journalist and photographer who covers politics and society from Dhaka for The Diplomat.

2026 Bangladesh elections

Bangladesh constitutional reforms

Bangladesh Nationalist Party

India-Bangladesh relations

National Citizen Party

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