Interviews | Politics | South Asia

NCP Leader Nasiruddin Patwary on Electoral Engineering and Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh

“In our view, Sheikh Hasina surrendered too much space to India, and the BNP government now appears to be moving in a similar direction.”

Nasiruddin Patwary, chief coordinator of the National Citizen Party (NCP), stands surrounded by journalists and camera crews at a polling center in Dhaka-8 constituency on voting day during Bangladesh’s February 2026 parliamentary vote, Feb. 12, 2026.

During Bangladesh’s February 12 parliamentary election, the Dhaka-8 constituency drew unusual national attention. Veteran Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Mirza Abbas faced a younger challenger, Nasiruddin Patwary, chief coordinator of the months-old National Citizen Party (NCP). Patwary was backed by an 11-party Islamist alliance that included the NCP. His campaign focused on corruption, particularly extortion affecting small and medium businesses in central Dhaka, as well as broader calls for institutional reform. Abbas won the seat by just over 5,000 votes, and Patwary rejected the result, alleging that the election had been “engineered.”

A marketing graduate from Dhaka University, Patwary now works at a consultancy, alongside engaging in political activities. In an interview with The Diplomat’s Bangladesh correspondent, Saqlain Rizve, Patwary shared his political journey, and his views on the debate over constitutional reform and Bangladesh’s position between India and Pakistan.

Your political journey appears unusual for a new-generation politician in Bangladesh. How did you first become involved in politics?

I grew up within the expected trajectory of Bangladesh’s rising middle class: school, college, then a stable career. Like many others, I once dreamed of becoming a university teacher, sitting for the civil service exam, or going into business. The turning point came after my Higher Secondary School Certificate (HSC) exam, when I was suddenly arrested from my hostel in Farmgate, Dhaka, in 2013. The police officer said I was arrested because he needed to meet the quota of arrests for the day. Seeing people being beaten and brought into the police station made me question the system. I was a student — so why was I in jail? It became the moment of my political awakening.

Were you involved in politics at that time?

Not in conventional politics. While studying at Darunnazat Siddikia Kamil Madrasa, I had some limited involvement with the Islami Chhatra Shibir [the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami], mainly out of curiosity rather than organized political ambition. Before that, I studied in the Dakhil madrassa system, where discussions about Islamic political movements were quite common. People often talked about organizations such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Andolon Bangladesh, and Khelafat Majlish, and I was interested in understanding their ideas.

While in jail, I met many opposition activists, including members of the BNP. Through conversations with them, and through events like the Shapla Chattar incident, a 2013 crackdown in Dhaka where security forces dispersed a mass rally by Islamist group Hefazat-e-Islam, which led to deaths and widespread controversy, my political thinking gradually began to take form.

How did your political interest develop after entering Dhaka University (DU)?

After entering DU and moving into the residential hall, I began observing campus politics closely. I saw overcrowded dormitories and how students were sometimes pushed into political programs. Even during my admission test, I noticed political processions on campus, which made me curious about how these movements operated. Gradually, I became involved in activism, including the agitation demanding restoration of the Dhaka University Central Students’ Union (DUCSU). As a marketing student, I was also interested in economic issues and interacted with left-leaning groups such as Chhatra Union and Chhatra Federation.

Later events, including the 2018 quota reform movement — student-led protests over public sector job quotas — the murder of Abrar Fahad, and the DUCSU election, further shaped my political thinking. After leaving campus, I became involved with the Amar Bangladesh (AB) Party while remaining politically active.

During the 2024 mass movement, which party were you with?

Before the 2024 movement, I was with the AB Party. At the university, we worked more as a sectoral group rather than strictly along party lines. Many of us came from different political backgrounds, but we shared the view that little change would come through the existing establishment parties. Since around 2016-2018, many of us had already been thinking about the need to oust Sheikh Hasina. The political conditions in 2024 finally made that possible.

Earlier, you were drawn to activism and movements for change. Now that you are in mainstream politics, how do you see the difference?

In Bangladesh, many things still need to change, so activism remains very important. Even in countries with strong institutions like the United States, movements such as Black Lives Matter emerge. Change cannot come only from parliament.

Through politics, we have tried to understand the root of the problem. In our country, there is little accountability and transparency, largely because the system lacks strong checks and balances. When that happens, power can concentrate in the hands of one individual. We saw that under Sheikh Hasina, and it could happen again.

What we want is a system where the constitution stands above individuals. Our struggle can take different forms — activism, political organization, or social movements. Activism will continue because the goal is real change in Bangladesh.

Since constitutional reform has come up, tensions have emerged between the ruling BNP and other political alliances over the July Charter, with the 11-party alliance warning it may return to the streets. How do you see this dispute?

During the mass uprising, one demand was clear — reform. Many believed Bangladesh needed a new political settlement, even what we called a “Second Republic.”

There were two paths: drafting a new constitution or reforming the current one, especially where checks and balances are weak. A Consensus Commission was formed and all parties participated, with the understanding that reforms would later be ratified through parliament or a referendum. But once the issue reached parliament, the BNP began showing hesitation about stronger accountability, even though they had already taken part in the discussions and signed the agreement.

Reform is not just an NCP demand. For decades, Bangladesh has faced crises in institutions — from healthcare and education to the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Election Commission. Strengthening institutions is a public demand that came out of the mass uprising itself. And we will remain active both on the streets and in parliament, because these reforms must be pursued through every possible avenue.

You have repeatedly spoken about “election engineering.” The NCP and leaders of the 11-party alliance have also used that term. Are you suggesting the election was manipulated?

The term “engineering” was not widely used before, but in this election, it became clear. An election has three phases — pre-election, voting, and post-election — and we saw problems in each.

Our concerns began in the pre-election phase, when Chief Interim Adviser Muhammad Yunus met the BNP’s then-acting chairman, Tarique Rahman, in London, raising questions about possible political understandings. During the election, we also saw unusual shifts in voting patterns, with........

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