The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

3 Governments, 1 China Policy? Dhaka’s Evolving Engagement With Beijing

While Bangladesh’s domestic politics have undergone huge change over the past two years, its relations with China have displayed greater continuity than rupture.

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at a bilateral meeting held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, June 26, 2026.

Bangladeshi Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s first overseas tour since taking office in February did not begin in Beijing or New Delhi. Instead, it began in Kuala Lumpur, where discussions centered on labor migration, trade, investment and economic cooperation.

Rahman then travelled to China for the second leg of his tour, which combined participation in the Summer Davos forum with an official bilateral visit.

The sequencing was noteworthy as China is Bangladesh’s largest trade partner and one of its most important development partners. Yet, Beijing was not chosen as Rahman’s inaugural foreign destination. Equally notable was the absence of an early visit to India, Bangladesh’s closest neighbor.

Whether this reflected diplomatic scheduling, economic priorities, or the political environment inherited by the new government, the sequence shows the balancing act facing Dhaka’s new administration.

But more important than which capital came first on Rahman’s agenda is a deeper question: Has Bangladesh’s China policy fundamentally changed under successive governments, or has engagement with Beijing become one of the few areas of continuity in Bangladesh’s foreign policy?

A comparison of the joint statements issued during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Beijing in July 2024, Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’ visit in March 2025, and Rahman’s visit in June 2026 suggests that while the emphasis of the relationship has evolved, its overall trajectory has remained remarkably consistent.

At first glance, the three visits appear to represent three different political moments. Hasina’s China visit came months after her Awami League secured another term in office in a general election that was widely criticized as flawed.

Yunus visited Beijing after the dramatic political transition of August 2024, when Hasina was ousted from power. He was leading an interim administration whose foreign policy direction was uncertain. His administration’s relations with India were fraught with tension. Rahman’s visit last week came months after his Bangladesh Nationalist Party swept to power in the 2026 general election. Unlike the Hasina and Yunus administrations, Rahman’s government enjoys democratic credibility.

Despite these different political contexts, the official documents reveal considerable continuity.

Hasina’s 2024 visit maintained diplomatic engagement with China without producing major shifts in bilateral relations. The two countries elevated their relationship from a Strategic Partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership, laying out an expansive agenda covering Belt and Road cooperation, infrastructure, trade, digital economy, finance, agriculture, maritime cooperation, defense exchanges, education, health, and climate cooperation. The document reflected China’s continued commitment to Bangladesh’s infrastructure-led development model, while Bangladesh sought larger financial commitments and deeper economic integration.

Yet the immediate outcomes of that visit were viewed in Dhaka with mixed feelings. Bangladesh reportedly sought substantially greater financial support than Beijing ultimately offered, leading many to question whether the diplomatic upgrade had been matched by economic deliverables.

The political transition that followed only a few weeks later created uncertainty about whether Bangladesh’s approach toward China would change.

Instead, Yunus’ March 2025 visit demonstrated the resilience of the bilateral relationship. Rather than introducing a new framework, the joint press release largely reaffirmed the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership established under Hasina. Cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative, Mongla Port, the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone in Chittagong, trade negotiations, investment, water management, and the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project all remained on the agenda.

Despite one of the most significant political transitions in Bangladesh’s recent history, the country’s approach toward China changed far less than many had anticipated. Beijing welcomed the interim government and emphasized support for Bangladesh’s reform process without seeking to redefine the bilateral relationship.

Rahman’s visit appears to represent a different phase not because it abandoned previous priorities, but because it sought to deepen them institutionally.

Many of the economic themes remain familiar. Trade, investment, industrial cooperation, Mongla Port modernization, the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone, green energy, and connectivity all reappear in the latest joint statement. Teesta also remains central.

But the 2026 communiqué introduces elements that were either absent or far less developed in the previous documents.

One development that deserves close attention is China’s proposal for a China-Myanmar-Bangladesh........

© The Diplomat