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India and Australia Are Reshaping What It Means To Be Strategic Partners

Amid power shifts in the Indo-Pacific, there is greater realization in both countries of each other’s value as a stable, reliable partner.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi shakes hands with his Australian counterpart, Antony Albanese, during his visit to Australia, July 9. 2026.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia on July 8-10 has cemented the deepening geostrategic relationship between Canberra and New Delhi.

As part of his state visit, Modi was in Melbourne for the third Australia-India Annual Summit, where both sides finalized memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and agreements in the fields of maritime security, civil nuclear energy, skill development, emerging technologies, science and technology, and filmmaking.

In addition to a one-on-one discussion with his Australian counterpart, Anthony Albanese, Modi also met with Australia’s governor-general and the leader of the opposition. He also addressed the Australia-India CEOs Forum, the Economic Roadmap Business event, and a crowd of roughly 30,000 people, including members of the Indian diaspora, at the Marvel Stadium.

One of the key outcomes of the visit was the signing of the Administrative Arrangement to enable uranium exports to India for peaceful purposes under the 2015 Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Although the agreement has been in place for over a decade now, the export of uranium to India was stalled due to the lack of agreement over reporting-related issues. The signing of this agreement puts in place a framework, which now allows private Australian and Indian companies to conclude the necessary commercial contracts to begin sales. In essence, it facilitates Australian uranium exports to India to help increase its share of non-fossil fuel power capacity and strengthens Australia’s export relationship with India. It is unclear at this point how much uranium Australia would export or when shipments would begin.

Economics alone does not explain Australia’s decision to expedite uranium sales to India. Due to mining restrictions, uranium exports have been a limited industry in Australia. Despite Australia’s claim to around 28 percent of the world’s uranium resources, its exports are just 6.7 percent of global uranium requirements.

India already has access to uranium from multiple countries. In February this year, Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s national operator and the world’s largest uranium producer, signed an agreement with India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to supply significant quantities of uranium to fuel India’s nuclear power plants. Then in March, Canada’s Cameco entered a long-term agreement to supply nearly 22 million pounds of uranium ore concentrate to the DAE between 2027 and 2035, with a contract value estimated at about US$1.9 billion.

So, what explains why Australia decided finally to sell uranium to India? History provides some insights here. Back in 2007, Australia decided to sell uranium to China and Russia in a bid to improve bilateral ties with these countries. With the ongoing power shifts in the Indo-Pacific, similar considerations possibly shaped Canberra’s decision, as there is greater realization of New Delhi’s value as a stable, reliable partner.

Slow but steady efforts to improve bilateral relations have already contributed to rapprochement between India and Australia, which were once in separate strategic spheres. The decision to export uranium to India carries important symbolic value, which must not be ignored. It removes what was seen as the final hurdle for bilateral ties to evolve into a truly comprehensive strategic partnership.

Back in 2007, former Australian Prime Minister John Howard announced that Canberra’s decision to export uranium to India would be contingent on the conclusion of a U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, then........

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