Peru’s Political Crisis Shows How China Could Militarily Use the Port of Chancay Against the US

Two otherwise unrelated events highlight a significant strategic risk in Peru for the United States and the region.

On February 18, 2026, the Peruvian Congress censured and removed transitional President Jose Jeri and replaced him with Jose Maria Balcazar, a lawyer expelled in 2024 by Peru’s legal association with a long list of corruption allegations against him and controversial for his public advocacy of child marriage and sexual relations by teachers and other adults with minors. 

Balcazar is a member of the far-left Peru Libre party, which is tied to Cuba-trained communist Vladimir Cerron, who is wanted by Peru for corruption, and former President Pedro Castillo, who was jailed for trying to dissolve Peru’s Congress.

The appointment of Balcazar by Peru’s Congress came only a week after another critical event that received less international attention: a finding by a Peruvian court that, pursuant to a change by the government to its own laws in 2024, the nation’s investment oversight organization, Ositran, had no legal authority to oversee the Port of Chancay, operated under the exclusive control of China’s state-owned logistics giant COSCO.

These two otherwise unrelated events highlight a significant strategic risk in Peru for the United States and the region. Despite a sincere commitment by most Peruvians to the contrary, in time of war, the Port of Chancay could be used to resupply Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships operating in the Eastern Pacific, presenting a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, as well as to the militaries of U.S.-aligned neighboring countries. In the context of a major war in the Indo-Pacific, a political crisis in Peru could create a situation where the Peruvian Armed Forces lack the knowledge, or clear mandate, to stop COSCO from using the port that it exclusively controls for anti-U.S. military purposes.

For over 17 years, I have had the privilege to interact with Peru’s Armed Forces in different capacities. I have been impressed by their professionalism and their commitment to remain apolitical in political crises and to follow the orders of the nation’s civilian leaders. That is a very good thing, but it is ironically also part of the present grave risk.

Among those Peruvian officers whom I consider colleagues and friends, none would knowingly support allowing the Chinese to use Chancay for military action against the United States, and many would find speculation that could occur to be a professional affront. Yet the risk has nothing to do with their intentions and is actually magnified by their professionalism and democratic commitment.

The real possibility of the PLAN exploiting Chancay against the United States in time of war comes from the near absolute physical control of Chancay operations by COSCO, in combination with a Peruvian system in which a highly transactional Congress can – and frequently does – remove Presidents. Jose Maria Balcazar is Peru’s ninth president in 10 years.  The removal of Jose Jeri, as a transitional president, required only a majority vote of the unicameral legislature, although the move to a bicameral body this July will make it somewhat more difficult to remove a president. 

Still, votes in Peru’s Congress are notably subject to a negotiation of future benefits – and some would say “purchase” – rather than matters of party ideology or principle. For the leftist Balcazar to obtain the 64 votes that elected him president by secret ballot, when the Peruvian left has only about 40 members in the 130-member body, required some of the Congress’ most right-wing members to vote for him. Their possible motives have received much speculation in Peru. 

This dynamic suggests that in a future conflict, Beijing may be able to influence who is president in Peru – the extent to which China is able to use Peru........

© The Diplomat