Asia Defense | Security | Southeast Asia

The Philippines in 2026: Between Alliance Commitment and Strategic Hedging

Despite holding fast to its alliance with the United States, several recent developments suggest that Manila has not forgotten how to hedge.

There is a perception in foreign policy circles that despite the unpredictability and sweeping changes in U.S. foreign policy toward allies and partners under President Donald Trump, the Philippines remains one of the few countries firmly aligned with Washington, as ASEAN member states calibrate their positions between the world’s superpower and the region’s dominant power – China.

Recent research reinforces this perception. In the latest State of Southeast Asia public opinion survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Philippine respondents chose the U.S. over China by the widest margin among ASEAN member-states – 77 percent versus 23 percent – when forced to pick between the two powers. The 2026 report also showed that across Southeast Asia as a whole, China emerged as the preferred choice over the U.S., a reversal of the Institute’s 2025 findings.

The Southeast Asia Influence Index 2025 by Sydney’s Lowy Institute similarly found that while China holds greater influence over the U.S. in the majority of ASEAN member states, the Philippines, alongside Singapore and Timor-Leste, was among the few countries where the U.S. ranked higher across all five measures of influence: economic relationships, defense networks, cultural influence, diplomatic relationships, and regional engagement.

These findings underpin the prevailing narrative that as Southeast Asian nations drift toward Beijing or carefully manage great power competition, the Philippines remains steadfastly in the American column. That characterization, however, tells only part of the story. Recent developments suggest that the Philippines has not forgotten how to hedge. While maintaining its alliance commitments with Washington, Manila has been sending deliberate signals of a more nuanced foreign policy posture – one shaped by its awareness of the evolving strategic environment and the demands of its own national interests.

Firm on Sovereignty, Open to Engagement

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has pursued a firm policy in defending its national interests, which has translated into a more assertive posture toward China than virtually any other ASEAN member state. The reality of Chinese coercion of Filipino fishermen and uniformed personnel in the West Philippine Sea has hardened public sentiment and sharpened Manila’s commitment to its maritime claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 arbitral ruling.

The Philippines’ transparency strategy has dominated the discourse whenever Philippines-China relations are discussed. But a firm position in the West Philippine Sea does not preclude strategic hedging elsewhere. In fact, it may require it, particularly when developments in the strategic environment demand a recalibration of Manila’s approach. This has resulted in a posture that actively maintains its U.S. alliance while keeping channels of engagement with Beijing open.

A tangible sign of this came in January, when the Philippines announced a 14-day visa-free entry arrangement for Chinese nationals, in line with the president’s directive to facilitate trade, investment, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges with Beijing. The one-year pilot could be read as a positive economic signal to Beijing amid the ongoing maritime dispute, consistent with the Philippines’ role as ASEAN chair for 2026. It is also a way for Manila to subtly communicate its willingness to separate the security dimension from the diplomatic and economic tracks of the relationship.

A more significant set of developments followed in late March. In a Bloomberg television interview, Marcos acknowledged that there would be a “very serious restructuring” of the Philippines’ relations with China and the need to “redraw” Manila’s international relationships amid shifting geopolitical realities. He also reiterated that the Philippines has always sought to differentiate its territorial disputes from its trade arrangements – a formulation that has long been the operating logic of Manila’s hedging strategy, albeit not previously stated openly.

Days after the Bloomberg interview, the Philippines and China convened the 24th Foreign Ministry Consultations and the 11th Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea from March 27 to 28 in Quanzhou, Fujian Province. Both sides made progress on practical confidence-building measures, including coast guard........

© The Diplomat