Flashpoints | Security | South Asia

Afghanistan and the BLA’s Evolving Capabilities

Reported discussions in Kandahar point to a possible expansion of the BLA’s external support networks as the group comes under pressure in Pakistan.

On October 1, Pakistan’s military said that representatives of several militant groups had met in Kandahar in August to discuss coordinating manpower and operations against Pakistani security forces. Military spokesperson Lt. Gen. Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry said the meeting was chaired by Mullah Shirleen, the Taliban-appointed governor of Kandahar, and involved representatives of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) seeking additional fighters from networks associated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a Pakistani militant leader based in North Waziristan. A separate intelligence report identified figures linked to al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) among those present. 

For the BLA, the significance of the meeting lies less in the presence of other militant groups than in what access to Afghanistan could provide the organization: additional manpower, relationships with established militant networks, and a deeper operating environment beyond Balochistan. The reported discussions therefore point to a possible expansion of the BLA’s external support networks at a time when the group has been developing more sophisticated operational capabilities. 

Afghan officials denied that the meeting took place, and the allegations have not been independently established. Pakistan has long accused the Taliban government of sheltering militants, and relations between the two countries are openly hostile. Fighting in October 2025 killed dozens and nearly closed the border; cross-border strikes resumed in February 2026 and continued intermittently through September. Each side’s claims therefore deserve caution. But we can still consider the basic question: what role is Afghanistan playing in the BLA’s evolving military capabilities? 

A United Nations Security Council monitoring report published in August found that BLA members had access to U.S.- and NATO-origin equipment left behind in Afghanistan, including M4 and M16 rifles, reconnaissance drones, night-vision devices, and thermal equipment. The report also cited information from a member state that BLA members had trained alongside Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) personnel at facilities in Afghanistan, including in drone and urban warfare.

The BLA’s January 2026 offensive illustrated these capabilities being put to use in its operations. On January 31, the group claimed simultaneous attacks across Balochistan, including Quetta, Gwadar, Noshki and Panjgur. Pakistan’s military said 18 civilians and 15 security personnel died and that its forces killed 92 militants, while the BLA said it killed 84 security personnel. Neither tally has been independently confirmed. 

A February assessment reported that the group had used drones, satellite communications, and U.S.-made weapons, linking some of the weaponry to equipment left behind in Afghanistan. That does not mean every drone or rifle came from there, however, since commercial drones, communications equipment, and weapons can be obtained through multiple channels. 

One such channel is Balochistan’s western border with Iran. BLA and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) members have reportedly maintained a presence in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province, and in January 2024 Pakistan struck locations there that it identified as belonging to the two groups.........

© The Diplomat