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China’s Strategic Plan for Space Superiority

China defines space superiority as achieving space logistics and infrastructure, and then using them for the kind of war it might fight.

This screenshot from CCTV (China Central Television) shows China’s first moon rover Yutu, or Jade Rabbit, in an image taken by the camera on the Chang’e 3 moon lander, Dec. 15, 2013.

The term space superiority is in vogue these days. According to the United States Space Force (USSF): 

Space superiority allows military forces in all domains to operate at a time and place of their choosing without prohibitive interference from space or counterspace threats, while also denying the same to an adversary. Space superiority extends beyond protecting friendly space capabilities from attack; it also encompasses protection of friendly forces in all domains from space-enabled attack.

Space superiority allows military forces in all domains to operate at a time and place of their choosing without prohibitive interference from space or counterspace threats, while also denying the same to an adversary. Space superiority extends beyond protecting friendly space capabilities from attack; it also encompasses protection of friendly forces in all domains from space-enabled attack.

 To me, space superiority involves the ability to achieve “command of a particular point in space” for the time required to achieve a specific end goal. By extension, space superiority means developing the logistics to maintain a strategic edge for yourself and denying your competitor/adversary that same advantage in space. This would also mean achieving the strategic high ground in space, as nations have done throughout history on land, in the air, and at sea, especially in times of crisis and/or conflict. 

China defines space superiority as achieving space logistics and infrastructure, and then using them for the kind of war it might fight. This aspect was proven during my research trip to China to study their space program. The question we should ask when we consider the use of space superiority is what kind of war will it support: a limited war, a protracted war, a gray zone conflict, or a major war in space? 

If you notice, the focus on what constitutes space superiority is different for China. Consequently, the United States is watching the wrong indicators of Chinese space power. Most analyses seem to concentrate on the number of satellites launched and China’s counterspace weapons, but these reveal only part of the story. While we learn about Chinese satellites’ maneuvers in space, such as those undertaken in July 2025 by the Shijian 21 and Shijian 25, they tell us little about their purpose and strategic effects. 

Positions in space are the newest strategic high ground, offering persistent surveillance, precision navigation, global communications, missile warning, and rapid targeting data. To me, the state that sustains these functions while denying them to an adversary shapes the terms of conflict; the same logic extends to building presence on the Moon or Mars. In maneuver warfare, the side that observes, orients, decides, and acts most quickly – as John Boyd recognized – seizes the initiative, but in space, maneuver is bound by orbital mechanics, communications latency, fuel, and geometry. 

Therefore, possessing and launching satellites is not enough; a capable force must know its delta-v budget, how it sustains itself, and how its trajectory choices trade vulnerability for opportunity. These aspects are revealed in China’s focus on space logistics as a key component of its space superiority concept. 

The Moon as Strategic Geography

The most consequential development is that China is beginning to solve the logistics problem of warfare in space. For instance, the upcoming Chang’e 7 lunar mission, to be launched later this year, is surveying the Lunar South Pole and searching for resources, including water ice in permanently shadowed regions. If Chang’e 7 is successful, the mission will contribute to the knowledge China needs for sustained operations on and around the Moon. 

The immediate gain for China is information about strategically useful geography. Where is lunar water located? How concentrated is it? Can robotic autonomous systems reach it? Where are the most useful landing areas? Which locations combine access to resources with favorable sunlight and communications? These are key questions because transporting everything from Earth is expensive, as I have argued elsewhere. 

If lunar water can eventually be extracted at a useful scale, it could support life-support systems and potentially be separated into hydrogen and oxygen. That raises the long-term possibility of producing propellant on the Moon. This becomes more significant when Chang’e 7 is connected to Chang’e 8 and the proposed International Lunar Research Station to be built by China in 2036. As per an article by Chi Wang et. al, “Taking into account the future location of the lunar research station, the CE-7 [Chang’e 7] mission will select the lunar south pole region as its preferred landing area.”

China is accumulating the scientific knowledge, surface experience, communications architecture, and robotic capabilities required for a more persistent lunar presence: think space logistics that result in space superiority.

China’s planetary defense program presents an even clearer example of why U.S. assessments must move beyond the binary distinction between civilian and military space when understanding China’s conception of space superiority. 

China is developing technologies to track, approach, and strike objects at enormous distances. According to an article by Nikola Schmidt et al, “China’s planetary defense program has evolved from scattered scientific initiatives into a strategically integrated component of its space policy with the aim of contributing to the Chinese dream of becoming a recognized global power.” 

Wu Weiren, the chief designer of China’s Lunar program, and director and chief scientist of the Deep Space Exploration laboratory, stated that “we have planned to launch this effort [planetary defense] focusing on a kinetic impact test against an asteroid next year [meaning 2026].”  The dual-use capability is pretty obvious. 

In accordance with Wu’s statement, China has announced plans for an asteroid-deflection demonstration involving observation of a target followed by a high-velocity kinetic impact. Reporting on Chinese research has discussed an impactor striking at approximately 9 kilometers per second, roughly Mach 26. 

The proposed Chinese mission has identified asteroid 2015 XF261, estimated at around 30 meters in diameter, as a potential target. Simulation studies........

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