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Dependence Without Trust: The Drivers of Pakistan-UAE Divergence

14 0
13.04.2026

The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

Dependence Without Trust: The Drivers of Pakistan-UAE Divergence

The recent geopolitical turbulence surrounding the United States-Israel-Iran conflict may become a pivotal moment for Pakistan-United Arab Emirates ties after nearly a decade of simmering mistrust. 

From Abu Dhabi’s vantage point, Pakistan has decisively prioritized Saudi Arabia over the Emirates. That view was cemented when Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Riyadh in September 2025.

While the recent Middle East conflict brought to the fore fissures in Pakistan-United Arab Emirates ties, the underlying discontent had been building for years. It is rooted in strategic divergences over regional issues, unmet expectations of political support, and the inability of either side to shape the other’s behavior to advance their respective national security interests. Despite persistent mistrust, both sides prioritized leadership-level, personalized engagements to bridge differences and find pathways for cooperation where possible.

For Pakistan’s state and society, ties with the UAE have been important in different ways. For successive governments, the UAE has remained a crucial source of emergency financial support, a stable source of remittances given that the country hosts a significant Pakistani diaspora, and a supporter of Pakistan’s engagement across the Gulf region. For Pakistani elites, Dubai has emerged as a second home where their wealth is invested; for the Pakistani middle class, finding employment in the UAE is a pathway to entering the international labour market; and for Pakistani workers, securing semi-skilled jobs is often a ticket out of generational poverty at home.

Over time, a troubling dynamic took shape: mistrust grew even as Pakistan’s financial dependence on the UAE deepened. That is the central contradiction shaping the relationship today. On the surface, the bilateral partnership still appears important, as Pakistan’s reliance on Abu Dhabi’s financial support grew steadily from December 2018, when the UAE announced a $3 billion deposit in Pakistan’s central bank to support the country’s external position, signaling crucial backing for the PTI-led hybrid regime. At that time, Pakistani officials also spoke of securing oil supplies on deferred payment. What followed was the emergence of a near-permanent fiscal lifeline. In April 2021, the UAE rolled over a $2 billion deposit. In July 2023, it placed another $1 billion in the State Bank of Pakistan as Islamabad sought IMF backing under the Shehbaz Sharif-led hybrid regime.

In January 2024, two $1 billion deposits were rolled over for another year, and the same pattern continued in January 2025. In January 2026, Pakistan sought another rollover for 12 months, however the UAE remained non-committal and only extended deposit on monthly basis until end March 2026, when it sought return of all deposits. In September 2024 the IMF had openly acknowledged that Pakistan had received significant financing assurances from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and China in support of its ongoing program that lasts until September 2027. 

Taken together, these rollovers embedded the UAE deeply into Pakistan’s external financing architecture. For Pakistan’s macroeconomic stability, continued Emirati support became critically important, thereby deepening Pakistan’s dependence.

But inter-state relations do not remain stable when one side reads continued support as proof of pragmatic cooperation, while the other sees that same support as a source of leverage. This asymmetry in expectations gradually translated into divergent political behavior. For instance, in 2015, Pakistan’s refusal to join the Yemen war triggered a sharp rebuke from the UAE. Emirati officials publicly complained that while Gulf economic and investment support was welcome in Islamabad, political backing was absent at a critical moment. That episode damaged trust, which was painstakingly repaired between 2017 and 2022 through sustained personal diplomacy led by General Qamar Javed Bajwa and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ). Bajwa, during his time as Army chief, undertook extensive Gulf-wide outreach, helping stabilize ties after the Yemen rupture.

This stabilization did not erase the deeper strategic drift. Over time, both sides began prioritizing different regional partners. Islamabad increasingly believes the UAE has decisively prioritized India over Pakistan, while Abu Dhabi holds that Pakistan accords primacy to Saudi Arabia over the Emirates. The UAE’s deepening political and security ties with India have unsettled Pakistan, which fears that expanding Indian engagement across the Gulf could undermine its traditional sources of political and economic support. The UAE’s role in I2U2 – consisting also of India,........

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