The Koreas | Diplomacy | East Asia

Breaking Down the Belarus-North Korea Summit

Lukashenko’s visit reflects a broader evolution in North Korea’s foreign policy, which is slowly expanding in the post-COVID era and is increasingly influenced by ties with the Kremlin.

In this photo supplied by North Korean state media, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un shake hands after signing their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Pyongyang, North Korea, Mar. 26, 2026.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made his first-ever trip to Pyongyang last week, marking a rare summit for North Korea and upgrading the relationship between the two governments. The summit produced a new “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” between Belarus and North Korea as well as around ten other sectoral agreements.

While some observers may dismiss the meeting as little more than a gathering of Kremlin-aligned authoritarian leaders, such a view overlooks both the rarity and the strategic significance of the engagement. In reality, this is the most significant development in bilateral relations that North Korea has pursued in the post-COVID era. The Kim-Lukashenko summit offers important insight into two important dynamics: the deepening influence of the North Korea-Russia relationship in Pyongyang; and second, the emergence of a replicable template for North Korea’s future bilateral relationships. 

The Rarity of Kim Jong Un’s Bilateral Engagements

Summits are relatively routine diplomatic occurrences for many countries throughout the world, but Kim Jong Un has engaged in remarkably few bilateral, head-of-government-level meetings since assuming power in 2011. In fact, Lukashenko is only the fifth world leader that Kim has hosted in Pyongyang during his nearly 15 years as North Korea’s leader, and just the eighth with whom he has had a bilateral meeting anywhere in the world.

This limited diplomatic record underscores the significance of the Belarus summit. Counting only formal bilateral meetings and excluding multilateral sidebars and interactions (such as the massive celebration North Korea hosted for the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Kim’s attendance at China’s own 80th anniversary celebrations marking the end of World War II), the full list of Kim’s formal bilateral engagements reveals this highly selective approach, largely concentrated among a small circle of partners:

Against this backdrop, Lukashenko’s inclusion is notable not as an outlier, but as evidence of a deliberate expansion of Pyongyang’s portfolio of diplomatic partners.

The Belarus-North Korea Relationship

Belarus was among the first former Soviet Bloc countries to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, doing so in 1992 just a year after gaining independence. Yet for decades, the relationship remained shallow and undeveloped.

Under Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang showed little interest in cultivating ties with Belarus, particularly after Vladimir Putin downgraded the North Korea-Russia alliance agreement to the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation in 2000. It was not until 2015 that meaningful engagement resumed, when then-North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong traveled to the Belarusian capital to meet his counterpart, Vladimir Makei. The two pledged future economic and political cooperation. In September 2016, North Korea reported that it had opened an embassy in Minsk, which previously hosted only a representative office. 

Still, progress in ties remained incremental until a key inflection point: the September 2023 summit between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un at Vostochny Cosmodrome. In the years that followed, Belarus-North Korea cooperation accelerated, culminating in last week’s summit.

At the center of the Kim-Lukashenko summit was the newly signed Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. While neither side has disclosed the full text, the Belarusian presidential office described it as a framework that “clearly and openly sets out the goals and principles of bilateral interaction, and defines the institutional framework for future mutually beneficial processes.” In other words, it institutionalizes mechanisms for engagement and the expected rights, duties, and obligations related to bilateral relations.

To support implementation of this new treaty, officials from the two governments also concluded around 10 bilateral agreements. Described as “sectoral agreements,” they covered functional areas such as agriculture, education, healthcare, and sports. The two governments did not disclose the full range of sectors covered.

The critical question then is if and how security cooperation was covered in their agreements. In particular, does the bilateral treaty contain any sort of alliance-related commitments? Certainly, this was the most important feature of the 2024 Treaty on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, which has underwritten Korean People’s Army participation in the Russia-Ukraine War. However, based on the treaty’s title and the fledgling nature of Belarus-North Korea ties, it is unlikely to have similar defense commitments. Instead, it is plausible that there is a “commitment to consult” if either party faces the threat of aggression or regional crisis, which is a common feature in similar agreements, including the 2000 friendship treaty between Russia and North Korea.

North Korea Is Drifting Further Into the Russian Orbit

The strengthening of ties between Pyongyang and Minsk carries broader geopolitical implications, particularly with regard to Russia.

Politically, closer engagement with Belarus further embeds North Korea with a treaty ally of Russia, and one that has staked its regime survival on its relationship with Putin. While Kim Jong Un has demonstrated little interest in subordination to the Kremlin, expanding ties with Russia’s partners inevitably brings Pyongyang closer to Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Practically, this alignment is likely to increase Russia-oriented activities and policies from Pyongyang, potentially including greater emphasis on Russian language training among officials and more frequent diplomatic engagement in Eastern Europe. Further, the North Korean propaganda machine will be churning out more content emphasizing the depth and importance of ties with Russia and former Soviet states.

At the same time, this has broader implications in the relationship with China. While Beijing still retains significant leverage, expanding ties with Russia-aligned states diversifies North Korea’s international partnerships, opening up alternatives that can reduce reliance upon China. This in turn strengthens Pyongyang’s position in its deliberations with Beijing. These factors may be influencing the facts that the Chinese Foreign Ministry has yet to comment on the Belarus-North Korea summit and that the rare event has received little if any coverage in Chinese state media outlets – different from Beijing’s coverage of Kim Jong Un’s past engagements with world leaders.

A Template for Future Relationships

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Lukashenko visit is the precedent that it sets. Development of diplomatic relationships may happen quickly or incrementally. The process could employ a bottom-up or top-down approach. The relationships could evolve organically from circumstance, deliberately from the initiatives of bilateral partners, or through fostering by third parties. 

In this case, the Kim Jong Un regime identified its deliberate, bilateral, and bottom-up approach. The path to the summit was a years-long process that unfolded through a structured sequence of engagements: first, the initiation of working-level, sector-specific meetings, followed by vice ministerial and ministerial negotiations. Then came the conclusion of preliminary sectoral agreements, engagement via a formal intergovernmental committee, and negotiation of a formal bilateral treaty and implementation arrangements. The process culminated in a leader-level summit to formalize the treaty and corresponding agreements

For the Kim Jong Un regime, this sets a precedent for its diplomatic practices going forward. In this, the step-by-step approach offers a clear template for how North Korea may pursue relationships with other states moving forward, which stands in stark contrast to the top-down, leader-driven summit diplomacy that governments in the United States and South Korea have advocated for in the past. For observers seeking to understand which countries may be next for an upgrade in diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, this template presents key indicators for which countries to watch.

Now that the summit is complete, the next steps for North Korea and Belarus are technical. Upon returning to Minsk, the Belarusian foreign minister announced that the government would be opening an embassy in Pyongyang at Lukashenko’s direction. Officials will then set to work on implementation of their numerous agreements, and the two sides will have to determine the order and priority of cooperation. The governments may disclose the nature of these activities, or they may keep them close to the chest. 

The Lukashenko-Kim summit was not merely symbolic. It reflects a broader evolution in North Korea’s foreign policy that is slowly expanding in the post-COVID era and is influenced by its deepening ties with the Kremlin. For analysts and policymakers, the insights gained from this summit are important for understanding this evolution and anticipating where the Kim regime may go from here. With a template for building bilateral ties and clear trajectory for alignment, it is now a question of who may be next in the lineup of prospective North Korean partners.

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Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made his first-ever trip to Pyongyang last week, marking a rare summit for North Korea and upgrading the relationship between the two governments. The summit produced a new “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” between Belarus and North Korea as well as around ten other sectoral agreements.

While some observers may dismiss the meeting as little more than a gathering of Kremlin-aligned authoritarian leaders, such a view overlooks both the rarity and the strategic significance of the engagement. In reality, this is the most significant development in bilateral relations that North Korea has pursued in the post-COVID era. The Kim-Lukashenko summit offers important insight into two important dynamics: the deepening influence of the North Korea-Russia relationship in Pyongyang; and second, the emergence of a replicable template for North Korea’s future bilateral relationships. 

The Rarity of Kim Jong Un’s Bilateral Engagements

Summits are relatively routine diplomatic occurrences for many countries throughout the world, but Kim Jong Un has engaged in remarkably few bilateral, head-of-government-level meetings since assuming power in 2011. In fact, Lukashenko is only the fifth world leader that Kim has hosted in Pyongyang during his nearly 15 years as North Korea’s leader, and just the eighth with whom he has had a bilateral meeting anywhere in the world.

This limited diplomatic record underscores the significance of the Belarus summit. Counting only formal bilateral meetings and excluding multilateral sidebars and interactions (such as the massive celebration North Korea hosted for the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Kim’s attendance at China’s own 80th anniversary celebrations marking the end of World War II), the full list of Kim’s formal bilateral engagements reveals this highly selective approach, largely concentrated among a small circle of partners:

Against this backdrop, Lukashenko’s inclusion is notable not as an outlier, but as evidence of a deliberate expansion of Pyongyang’s portfolio of diplomatic partners.

The Belarus-North Korea Relationship

Belarus was among the first former Soviet Bloc countries to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, doing so in 1992 just a year after gaining independence. Yet for decades, the relationship remained shallow and undeveloped.

Under Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang showed little interest in cultivating ties with Belarus, particularly after Vladimir Putin downgraded the North Korea-Russia alliance agreement to the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation in 2000. It was not until 2015 that meaningful engagement resumed, when then-North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong traveled to the Belarusian capital to meet his counterpart, Vladimir Makei. The two pledged future economic and political cooperation. In September 2016, North Korea reported that it had opened an embassy in Minsk, which previously hosted only a representative office. 

Still, progress in ties remained incremental until a key inflection point: the September 2023 summit between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un at Vostochny Cosmodrome. In the years that followed, Belarus-North Korea cooperation accelerated, culminating in last week’s summit.

At the center of the Kim-Lukashenko summit was the newly signed Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. While neither side has disclosed the full text, the Belarusian presidential office described it as a framework that “clearly and openly sets out the goals and principles of bilateral interaction, and defines the institutional framework for future mutually beneficial processes.” In other words, it institutionalizes mechanisms for engagement and the expected rights, duties, and obligations related to bilateral relations.

To support implementation of this new treaty, officials from the two governments also concluded around 10 bilateral agreements. Described as “sectoral agreements,” they covered functional areas such as agriculture, education, healthcare, and sports. The two governments did not disclose the full range of sectors covered.

The critical question then is if and how security cooperation was covered in their agreements. In particular, does the bilateral treaty contain any sort of alliance-related commitments? Certainly, this was the most important feature of the 2024 Treaty on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, which has underwritten Korean People’s Army participation in the Russia-Ukraine War. However, based on the treaty’s title and the fledgling nature of Belarus-North Korea ties, it is unlikely to have similar defense commitments. Instead, it is plausible that there is a “commitment to consult” if either party faces the threat of aggression or regional crisis, which is a common feature in similar agreements, including the 2000 friendship treaty between Russia and North Korea.

North Korea Is Drifting Further Into the Russian Orbit

The strengthening of ties between Pyongyang and Minsk carries broader geopolitical implications, particularly with regard to Russia.

Politically, closer engagement with Belarus further embeds North Korea with a treaty ally of Russia, and one that has staked its regime survival on its relationship with Putin. While Kim Jong Un has demonstrated little interest in subordination to the Kremlin, expanding ties with Russia’s partners inevitably brings Pyongyang closer to Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Practically, this alignment is likely to increase Russia-oriented activities and policies from Pyongyang, potentially including greater emphasis on Russian language training among officials and more frequent diplomatic engagement in Eastern Europe. Further, the North Korean propaganda machine will be churning out more content emphasizing the depth and importance of ties with Russia and former Soviet states.

At the same time, this has broader implications in the relationship with China. While Beijing still retains significant leverage, expanding ties with Russia-aligned states diversifies North Korea’s international partnerships, opening up alternatives that can reduce reliance upon China. This in turn strengthens Pyongyang’s position in its deliberations with Beijing. These factors may be influencing the facts that the Chinese Foreign Ministry has yet to comment on the Belarus-North Korea summit and that the rare event has received little if any coverage in Chinese state media outlets – different from Beijing’s coverage of Kim Jong Un’s past engagements with world leaders.

A Template for Future Relationships

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Lukashenko visit is the precedent that it sets. Development of diplomatic relationships may happen quickly or incrementally. The process could employ a bottom-up or top-down approach. The relationships could evolve organically from circumstance, deliberately from the initiatives of bilateral partners, or through fostering by third parties. 

In this case, the Kim Jong Un regime identified its deliberate, bilateral, and bottom-up approach. The path to the summit was a years-long process that unfolded through a structured sequence of engagements: first, the initiation of working-level, sector-specific meetings, followed by vice ministerial and ministerial negotiations. Then came the conclusion of preliminary sectoral agreements, engagement via a formal intergovernmental committee, and negotiation of a formal bilateral treaty and implementation arrangements. The process culminated in a leader-level summit to formalize the treaty and corresponding agreements

For the Kim Jong Un regime, this sets a precedent for its diplomatic practices going forward. In this, the step-by-step approach offers a clear template for how North Korea may pursue relationships with other states moving forward, which stands in stark contrast to the top-down, leader-driven summit diplomacy that governments in the United States and South Korea have advocated for in the past. For observers seeking to understand which countries may be next for an upgrade in diplomatic ties with Pyongyang, this template presents key indicators for which countries to watch.

Now that the summit is complete, the next steps for North Korea and Belarus are technical. Upon returning to Minsk, the Belarusian foreign minister announced that the government would be opening an embassy in Pyongyang at Lukashenko’s direction. Officials will then set to work on implementation of their numerous agreements, and the two sides will have to determine the order and priority of cooperation. The governments may disclose the nature of these activities, or they may keep them close to the chest. 

The Lukashenko-Kim summit was not merely symbolic. It reflects a broader evolution in North Korea’s foreign policy that is slowly expanding in the post-COVID era and is influenced by its deepening ties with the Kremlin. For analysts and policymakers, the insights gained from this summit are important for understanding this evolution and anticipating where the Kim regime may go from here. With a template for building bilateral ties and clear trajectory for alignment, it is now a question of who may be next in the lineup of prospective North Korean partners.

Michael MacArthur Bosack

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative and the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served as the Deputy Secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and the Deputy Chief of Government Relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. You can follow him on X (Twitter) @MikeBosack.

Belarus-North Korea relations

Kim-Lukashenko summit

Lukashenko visit to North Korea

North Korea diplomacy

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