Interviews | Diplomacy | East Asia

China’s Global Strategy Under Xi Jinping

Insights from Steve Tsang.

China’s President Xi Jinping during a state visit in Mexico City, June 6, 2013.

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy.  This conversation with Steve Tsang – professor of China studies and director of the China Institute at SOAS University of London and co-author with Olivia Cheung of “China’s Global Strategy Under Xi Jinping” (Oxford 2026) – is the 524th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

What is China’s global strategy under Xi Jinping and specifically its two primary pivots?

China’s global strategy under Xi Jinping has a double pivot. Its primary pivot is to engage the Global South, in both country and population terms a clear majority in the world, to secure support for China to steadily reshape the existing international order by re-centering the U.N. in global politics. The idea is that under Chinese leadership the Global South can make the U.N. more responsive to them, the majority.  Xi calls this the “democratization of international relations.” With the support of the Global South, Beijing seeks to forge “the common destiny for humankind,” implying transforming what remains of the “liberal international order” into the Sino-centric tianxia order. 

To signal the advent of Chinese global preeminence or the tianxia order requires a stunning demonstration of China’s might. There is therefore a complementary pivot. This is for China to take Taiwan despite the U.S. committing, under its Taiwan Relations Act (1979), to help Taiwan defend itself against an externally imposed change of its status. Taiwan is geographically in the middle of the strategically vital First Island Chain in the Pacific Ocean and has avoided falling under Chinese control with U.S. protection since 1950. Unlike his predecessors who merely saw Taiwan as a legacy from the Chinese Civil War (1946-9) to be dealt with without a meaningful timeline, Xi has changed the paradigm. While he retains the irredentist language, taking Taiwan is part of his China Dream, to be completed by 2050.

Xi would prefer Taiwan negotiate for a “peaceful re-unification” and thus remove the raison d’être for the U.S. to intervene. Should this not materialize Beijing will use force. By taking Taiwan China will show the U.S. (and its allies) cannot prevent it from seizing the First Island Chain. It will acquire a critical springboard to project power well into the Pacific and make key U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea question if they can rely on their respective defense treaties with the U.S. It will establish dominance in the Western Pacific and mark the advent of Chinese global preeminence.

Examine the concept of “tianxia” as an alternative international order.

Tianxia consists of two Chinese characters, “sky” and “below,” meaning “all under heaven.” As a political concept it was applied when the empire in China was united, rich, powerful, and more advanced than others in organizational, civilizational, and technological terms. China was supposed to be so superior that others looked to it for guidance and inspiration, resulting in pax Sinica without China asserting hegemony. This is the new international order into which Xi would like to steer the existing one to transform. The historical reality of tianxia was different: Chinese empires behaved like other great empires in history and exercised hegemony by force when required.

To Xi, putting........

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