Interviews | Security | East Asia

A US Strategy For Defending Taiwan – Before a War

Insights from Eyck Freymann.

The guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) conducts routine underway operations in the Taiwan Strait, Nov. 21, 2020.

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Eyck Freymann – Hoover Fellow at Stanford University, non-resident research fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, and author of “Defending Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War with China” (Oxford 2026) – is the 505th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Explain Xi Jinping’s goals and strategy for “reunification” with Taiwan.

Xi Jinping’s preferred path to “reunification” isn’t invasion – it’s coercion that forces Taiwan to capitulate without firing a shot. His goal is to secure control over Taiwan’s political future and economic assets, particularly TSMC’s semiconductor facilities, while avoiding a catastrophic war that could threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s rule.

Beijing’s strategy relies on “gray zone” operations that stay below the threshold of armed conflict. The most dangerous scenario is a “quarantine” – using China Coast Guard vessels as customs inspectors to control who comes and goes from Taiwan, rather than a naval blockade that would constitute an act of war. This traps the United States in an impossible dilemma: do we shoot at Coast Guard vessels to avoid a customs inspection? If we hesitate, China effectively seizes Taiwan without triggering our defense commitments.

Xi is also counting on strategic patience and salami-slicing tactics – redefining the status quo incrementally through military exercises, airspace incursions, and diplomatic pressure. His bet is that Washington’s “strategic ambiguity” will fade into American paralysis, and that Taiwan’s people will lose faith that we have their backs.

Identify key variables precipitating cross-strait conflict scenarios.

Four variables matter most. 

First, Taiwan’s domestic politics and resilience: if the Taiwanese people lose confidence in U.S. support or fail to invest adequately in asymmetric defense, Beijing’s incentives to apply coercive pressure increase dramatically. Taiwan could also just fold. 

Second, America’s alliance commitments and military posture. If our access to bases in Japan and the Philippines becomes uncertain, or if our allies doubt our resolve, China’s calculations shift. Deterrence requires a coalition and credible communications of U.S. resolve. 

Third, economic interdependence and supply chain vulnerabilities. Our continued dependence on China-based manufacturing gives Beijing leverage, while our dependence on Taiwan’s semiconductors creates mutual vulnerability. The longer we delay moving critical supply chains out of China, the more constrained our options become in a crisis.

Fourth, China’s internal stability and Xi’s personal calculus. A rational Xi seeks to stay in power into his old age and secure his legacy. That makes him risk-averse. But if he faces domestic pressure or perceives a closing window of opportunity, his risk tolerance could increase.

Examine the four pillars of deterrence.

Effective deterrence against China requires four integrated pillars.

First, political deterrence. In what I call “structured ambiguity,” we should maintain our One China Policy but warn Beijing privately that every act of coercion will trigger a proportionate deepening of our relationship with Taiwan. The message: salami-slicing won’t work because we’ll match your escalation. We also need better diplomatic coordination with Taiwan and our core allies.  

Second, military deterrence. Taiwan must invest in asymmetric capabilities that make invasion prohibitively costly. The United States needs to maintain access to regional bases,........

© The Diplomat