The Rise of North Korea’s Nuclear-Armed Navy

North Korea has modified its hierarchy of defense priorities by elevating the importance of the KPAN.

This photo, provided by North Korean state media, shows the Choe Hyon destroyer on the occasion of the ship’s commissioning, June 23, 2026.

Nuclear-capable cruise missiles rose from the soon-to-be commissioned North Korean guided missile destroyer, Kang Kon (52), as Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un watched on July 3. The launch was conducted less than two weeks after the Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) formally commissioned the 5,000-ton destroyer Choe Hyon (51), North Korea’s largest domestically produced surface warship. 

These two events underscore indications that North Korea is engaging in a concerted effort to build up its navy. At the Choe Hyon’s commissioning, Kim declared that the KPAN had entered a “new era” after “over 70 years” of naval stagnation.

These developments indicate that North Korea has modified its hierarchy of defense priorities by elevating the importance of the KPAN. The rapid construction of large surface combatants, new naval bases, and modernization of existing bases are evidence of this elevation. If continued, this trend could disrupt allied naval dominance and complicate U.S. nuclear deterrence efforts. That, in turn, could encourage the Kim regime to act more aggressively, increasing the probability of a conflict breaking out on the Korean Peninsula. Fortunately, the United States, South Korea, and Japan can still counter this developing threat. 

Comparing the troubled history of North Korea’s navy in the 2010s with more recent developments provides evidence of the growing threat and insights into how to respond.

North Korea’s focus on naval development can be traced back to 2023 when Kim signaled his desire for greater emphasis on KPAN growth and modernization to increase its involvement in military strategy and operations. Three years later, in February 2026 at the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim unveiled his new five-year plan and future defense priorities. 

The five-year plan calls for upgrading all military bases, further strengthening the southern border, and modernizing conventional weapons so that they may become “world-class.” In March, Kim stated that the KPAN needs to build two vessels of a size equivalent to the Choe Hyon or larger every year, with the goal being at least 12 large surface combatants by the early 2030s. 

These goals further expanded in June 2026 when Kim directed his regime to accelerate the design and construction of a new 10,000-ton guided missile cruiser and build additional naval bases. Concurrently, the North appears to be expanding shipyards at Chongjin and Nampho to better facilitate Kim’s yearly shipbuilding quota.

If the gains in basing and industrial production are realized, sustained, and institutionalized, Pyongyang may be able to sustain the current pace of surface combatant production. Fielding a formidable surface combatant force could undermine U.S. and South Korean sea control around the Korean Peninsula. It would also be a significant break from the past, when the KPAN struggled to build and field even smaller vessels.

Troubled Corvettes of the Past

Before the shift toward large naval surface combatants and the subsequent commissioning of the Choe Hyon in June 2026, the KPAN was focused on building, outfitting, and commissioning two different classes of corvettes. The most capable were the two vessels of the Amnok class. Displacing around 2,000 tons, those two vessels feature a reduced radar cross section, and at least one’s armament includes a 100mm main gun, anti-submarine warfare rocket launchers on the bow, missile launchers for anti-air missiles and possibly anti-ship missiles, and a close-in weapon system (CIWS) similar to the Soviet AK-630. 

Patrol Ship No. 661, the only publicly seen Amnok-class corvette, made its debut in state media in August 2023. Naval News reported at the time that most weapons and sensors onboard were “severely” obsolete in comparison with Western and other Asian designs. However, the vessel marked a major milestone for the KPAN as No. 661 was, at the time, one of its most capable ships.

Around the same time, Pyongyang built and fielded two other corvettes of the significantly less capable Tuman class. They lack extensive armament and are posited by some analysts to serve in a support role for the more capable Amnok-class vessels.

Despite the capability differences between the Amnok and Tuman classes, both suffered from lengthy construction and outfitting timelines, along with apparent setbacks. For instance, No. 661 was first spotted under construction in 2011, entered service in 2017, and finally had its capabilities debut in August 2023. It seemingly took more than a decade for the ship to undergo construction, outfitting, and sea trials. 

Tuman-class vessels also suffered from long completion timelines, with initial construction beginning in 2011 and completing in 2013. But then reconstruction of one vessel started in 2014, with reconstruction of the other starting in 2017, indicating significant issues with initial design, construction, or weapons loadout. Despite no state media announcement that either Tuman-class vessel entered service, reporting indicates at least one is likely on the active register. 

The troubled history of these ships contrasts sharply with the much more successful development of the Choe Hyon-class destroyers.

New Horizons With New Destroyers

The Choe Hyon’s construction efforts began around February 2024 at Nampho shipyard on North Korea’s western coast. It was launched successfully in April 2025 and sea trials began afterward. The final testing of seaworthiness appeared to occur in May 2026, while its eventual commissioning was on June 23, 2026 — less than two and a half years after construction started.

The increased speed of construction is alarming, as are the Choe Hyon’s combat capabilities. After undergoing modifications throughout 2025 and possibly into early 2026, the vessel’s primary weapon system is now a mixture of 88 large, medium, and small diameter vertical launch system (VLS) cells that can fire cruise and surface-to-air missiles. The Kim regime regularly touts the ability of the vessel to launch “strategic” nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. If this is true, the Choe Hyon provides yet........

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