Tokyo Report | Security | East Asia

Allies at War: Japan-US Relations From the War on Terror to Today’s Iran Conflict

Insights from Tokyo’s handling of the Iraq War could help Japan navigate the current demands from the United States regarding the Strait of Hormuz.

Then-U.S. President George W. Bush shakes hands with then-Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in the Rose Garden of the White House, Sep. 25, 2001.

Once upon a time there was a U.S. president who had a unilateralist streak and intervened in the Middle East to prevent and eliminate a threat that was allegedly sponsoring terror, causing a diplomatic crisis with European allies. This description fits neatly how President Donald Trump has prosecuted the war against Iran, but it is also eerily similar to a U.S. president from another era: George W. Bush.

While Bush had campaigned for a “humble” foreign policy, the terrorist attacks of September 11 transformed his presidency into a hawkish one that would not tolerate risks. He ultimately invaded Iraq to eliminate alleged weapons of mass destruction and disrupt a network supposedly aiding terrorism. The Iraq War caused a rupture among NATO allies, and the insurgency it sparked – leaving the United States embroiled in a prolonged conflict – was seen as an inflection point at which the unipolar moment began to ebb. 

Beyond the continuities that can be observed in U.S. foreign policy – what might be described as a never-ending obsession with the Middle East – Hattori Ryuji, a professor of political science at Chuo University in Japan, offers further insights for today’s state of affairs in his recent book on Japan-U.S. relations during the War on Terror period, “After Terrorism.” Hattori’s work highlights how an ally can turn a crisis into an opportunity to reinforce alliance unity, a lesson especially pertinent given the uncertainties surrounding the Iran conflict.

Although the Bush era marked a low point for European-U.S. relations, for the Japan-U.S. alliance it was a period in which the bilateral relationship was elevated into a global alliance tackling international problems, notably terroism. As Hattori noted, although Japan’s willingness to stand by the alliance was driven by reputational concerns – a reaction to the backlash from the Gulf War of 1991, when Japan’s assistance was criticized as “too little too late” – during the War on Terror, Tokyo proactively supported the U.S. war effort. While not playing a direct role in combat, Japan took the lead in humanitarian missions in Afghanistan and provided logistical support for U.S. vessels in the Indian Ocean. 

Japan’s alliance support was not without strategic calculation. When the U.S. posture toward the Iraqi regime began to tilt toward regime change, Japan cautiously sought to bundle its support for potential action in Iraq in exchange for sustained U.S. attention to the North Korean problem – a threat that was not only military in nature, given Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear capabilities, but also deeply political for Japan due to the abduction issue. In his work, Hattori traced this linkage back to December 2002, when the two geographically distant issues – Iraq and North Korea – were linked together in a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting, and then included in a joint statement. 

However, Japan’s attempt to use its leverage as a loyal ally came with a cost – a predicament that Hattori sought to explain through the concept of the “global alliance security dilemma.” According to his definition, this type of dilemma arises when an alliance extends “beyond its initial geographic or functional parameters, thereby generating an expanded set of responsibilities and risks for the participating entities.” Hattori argued that the seminal SCC meeting put in place conditions under which “Japan could not decline to support the American use of force in Iraq”, boxing Tokyo into a dilemma whereby it was compelled to accept the geographic expansion of the alliance’s scope to the Middle East – in contrast to the pre-agreed notion that the Japan-U.S. alliance was primarily concerned with East Asia. 

Overall, it is debatable whether Japan’s strategy – to encourage the United States to focus on North........

© The Diplomat