Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

China’s Rare Earth Strategy and the Future of the South China Sea

The rise of seabed mining will add new complexity to the South China Sea disputes.

In August 2026, Japan and the United States worked together to explore extracting rare-earth-rich mud from the seabed near Minamitorishima. It offered a glimpse into the next phase of critical minerals competition. The race for rare earths is no longer confined to land mines and export control policies. As deep-sea minerals become part of national security planning, maritime spaces that were once mainly discussed in terms of sovereignty, shipping lanes, and fisheries may acquire a new layer of strategic value.

The South China Sea is not currently central to China’s rare earth advantage, but it may become increasingly relevant to how Beijing and its competitors think about the future geography of critical minerals security.

For now, China’s rare earth strategy and its South China Sea strategy remain largely distinct. China’s leverage in rare earths comes less from pure geology than from the country’s dominant position in refining, separation, and magnet production, combined with regulatory instruments that allow Beijing to manage outward flows of selected minerals. The April 2025 export control measures on several medium and heavy rare-earth-related items underscored how critical minerals have become part of China’s national security toolbox. 

By contrast, the South China Sea has traditionally been discussed and understood through a different strategic vocabulary: sovereignty claims, maritime jurisdiction, military presence, fisheries, hydrocarbons, and sea lanes of communication. This kind of separation, however, may not hold indefinitely, because the critical minerals competition is acquiring an increasingly prominent maritime dimension. 

As governments search for ways to reduce dependence on existing rare earth supply chains, attention is gradually shifting toward deep-sea muds, polymetallic nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, and other seabed resources. These resources are not immediate substitutes for today’s land-based mines and processing systems, but they are entering strategic planning and industrial policy. Once critical minerals are imagined not only as terrestrial commodities but also as seabed resources, the boundary between resource security and maritime security begins to blur.

The South China Sea disputes have always had a strategic dimension, in addition to the sovereignty disputes alone. Yet oil, gas, fisheries, and shipping are the dominant drivers of maritime competition; seabed resources have thus far remained a less developed part of the story. Studies of........

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