Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

US Allies in Asia Are Paying for the Iran Stalemate

The U.S. administration lacks the willingness to confront China and Russia over their assistance to Iran, and Asian allies are paying the price.

M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) conduct live-fire missions during Operation Epic Fury in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, Feb. 28, 2026.

While the United States still has military options available against Iran, these are unlikely to isolate Tehran from its allies. Despite a new round of sanctions, the regime remains defiant. The key issue for the current administration is that it lacks the willingness to confront China and Russia over their assistance to the regime, and is instead urging Beijing’s cooperation as it looks ahead to Donald Trump and Xi Jinping’s meeting on September 24.

Under the current stalemate, Washington’s allies in Asia are disproportionately affected, at a time where they are being asked to take on a greater share of the regional deterrence burden.

Both China and Russia continue to materially aid Iran and are alleged to have provided intelligence assistance that helped it strike American bases across the region. China has provided drone components, navigation modules, chemical precursors for missile propellant, shoulder-fired systems, and continues its purchases of discounted Iranian crude. Russia has supplied upgraded drones built off Iran’s own design from its Alabuga factory in Tatarstan, along with satellite imagery and damage assessments enabling strikes on American assets. 

The entities involved have been sanctioned, yet they have adapted. Washington has designated Chinese companies, sanctioned tankers and warned banks against dealing with the refineries in Shandong province that import and process Iranian crude. Beijing responded by shifting to overland routes through Pakistan and Central Asia, and by issuing a blocking order that exposes any company obeying the American sanctions to Chinese penalties for doing so.

Both Washington and Beijing have pulled their punches, proving they value their trading relationship more than they do the outcome of the Iran war. After the October 2025 summit, an American export control rule covering the subsidiaries of blacklisted firms was suspended, and China lifted its export controls on critical minerals. In March, oil sanctions on both Moscow and Tehran were eased in response to soaring energy prices. The reciprocal tariff suspension runs until November 10. 

Beijing, for its part, has legally defended its refineries only far enough to pass the risk to third parties. It has not retaliated directly, and it has kept state-owned companies away from the trade so that it need not protect them. This provides a cheap arrangement, which it can abandon at will.

Washington has much to lose and little to gain from further commitment in the Iran war, and Iran’s leverage rests on having correctly assessed how much each side is willing to spend on a resolution. The United States therefore cannot compel Iran by intensifying strikes or enforcing tougher sanctions. It has to reorient Iran’s backers away from it.

The current administration’s unwillingness to do this has overwhelmingly affected its allies in the Indo-Pacific. 

Asia’s reliance on oil imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz has placed countries like........

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