Asia Defense | Security | South Asia

Indian Army is Short of Artillery, the Modern Battlefield’s Most Lethal Killer

It has about 226 field artillery regiments today and plans to increase that to 270 regiments.

The indigenous Swati Weapon Locating Radar passes through Rajpath, New Delhi, on the occasion of India’s Republic Day parade, 2018.

While India’s military leadership claims it is ready to defend itself against likely threats, a close look at its battle-readiness reveals multiple capability gaps that need to be filled. This four-part series starts with an analysis of the contemporary battlefield and the advent of autonomous weaponry.

The first part dealt with the military’s leadership and combat restructuring. The following three sections deal with a crucial aspect of the army, navy and air force. This section on the army deals with its artillery and rocket systems; while the next section examines the navy’s underwater capability, mine detection and minesweeping; and the final section will look at the air force’s push to develop and manufacture aero engines and indigenous fighter aircraft.

A shortfall of artillery has been a weakness in Indian armies through the ages. In 1526, the invading warlord from Uzbekistan, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babar, won the First Battle of Panipat simply by deploying his artillery skilfully. The troop ratio in that battle comfortably favoured the Delhi Sultanate, but Ibrahim Lodhi had no field artillery. When Babar’s guns opened fire, the Lodhi army’s war elephants, unused to the roar of cannons, ran helter-skelter and trampled large numbers of their own soldiers.

Since the American Civil War in 1861, artillery guns have been the contemporary battlefield’s most lethal killer. Their simple function has been: To drop enough high explosive on enemy positions and installations to knock the fight out of them. That leaves an easy “mopping up” job for one’s tanks and foot soldiers.

India’s modern-day military inherited the philosophy of artillery usage from World War II and from combat experience in the 1965 and 1971 wars. In the 1947-48 Kashmir campaign and in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, India had hardly any artillery and lacked firepower across the entire frontier. Nor were there enough roads for the Indian artillery guns to be moved into better positions for giving fire support. To this day, the Indian Army is seeking to cover up the deficit in artillery guns, but the gap is large.

The Indian army has about 226 field artillery regiments today and plans to increase that to 270 regiments. With about 18 artillery guns in each regiment, plus three reserve guns, the Indian arsenal amounts to 5,670 field artillery pieces.

In the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999, a decision was taken to “medium-ize” the army’s field artillery regiments. This is code for inducting more powerful 155 mm medium guns in place of 105 mm and 130 mm field guns.

Additionally, India deploys a growing number of multi-barrelled rocket launcher (MBRL) units, including ten units of the indigenous Pinaka, three Russian SMERCH regiments and five Russian GRAD BM-21 regiments. Rockets are meant to saturate large area targets with firepower.

In addition, for precision targeting, the Indian artillery has acquired four units of BrahMos cruise missiles, with a fifth unit under raising.

To give its guns and rockets greater lethality, India’s corps of artillery operates sophisticated surveillance and target acquisition (SATA) systems that detect and locate enemy guns and radars, which can then be destroyed by counter-fire. These include the indigenous Swati weapon locating radar (WLR), which is in service in SATA units at the division and corps level. Enemy guns and battery locations are also detected by long-range recce and observation systems (LOROS), imported from Israel. These can pick up vehicles at ranges of 20-25 km.

However, for multiple reasons, especially the failure of the DRDO and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) to design and manufacture affordable, long-range artillery guns, the army continues to lack firepower. This is exacerbated by a continuing shortfall in acquiring guns from the international market.

Amongst the successes in acquiring modern artillery is India’s indigenous production of five artillery regiments (100 guns), called the K-9 Vajra. These 155 millimeter/52-calibre, tracked, self-propelled (SP) artillery guns have been built by an Indian company—Larsen & Toubro (L&T)—under license from the Korean firm, Hanwha Techwin (HTW).

These tracked howitzers are meant for the army’s two mechanized strike corps, which are tasked to arrow deep into enemy territory during wartime. While the influx of guns is welcome, the number acquired is clearly inadequate, given that each strike corps is authorized four medium SP regiments, each with 20 howitzers.

Given this shortfall, the army and MoD are weighing whether to procure another 100-200 mobile self-propelled (SP) howitzers to equip 10 medium artillery regiments.

A second line of modern howitzers is being provided by the acquisition of 145 M777 ultralight guns from the American company, BAE Systems. These light guns are highly mobile in mountainous terrain, of the kind that constitutes much of India’s border with Pakistan and China.

Finally, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), in partnership with two private sector companies, is developing an indigenous 155 mm howitzer, called the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS). The army plans to build 1,580 of these guns, making them the mainstay of India’s artillery.

Increasing Gun Performance

The most effective way of increasing the range and capability of artillery guns is to increase their chamber size. The bigger a gun’s chamber, the more charge can be exploded in it and, therefore, the further it can hurl a projectile. The common chamber sizes in artillery guns are: 19, 23, and 25 litre chambers.

The 155 mm/39 calibre FH-77B Bofors gun has a 19-litre chamber, while the domestic Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), which the DRDO is developing, has a 25-litre chamber.

Another capability improvement the artillery is bringing in is precision. A gun with greater precision needs to fire less ammunition to have the desired effect on a target.

A third way to increase projectile range without increasing chamber capacity or the length of the barrel is to put a ramjet on the rear of the projectile, which propels it further. The DRDO is researching ways of doing that at several of its laboratories.

Finally, the lethality of artillery guns can be improved by using higher-performance explosives in projectiles. This is the field of the DRDO’s High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), which is working on the bi-modular charge systems (BMCS). This involves using propellants in a graded system, categorised as Charge 1 to Charge 7. The latter is so powerful that it can be fired only by the ATAGS howitzer.

The next article in this series, Part 3, will look at the Indian Navy and its underwater capability, mine detection and minesweeping.

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While India’s military leadership claims it is ready to defend itself against likely threats, a close look at its battle-readiness reveals multiple capability gaps that need to be filled. This four-part series starts with an analysis of the contemporary battlefield and the advent of autonomous weaponry.

The first part dealt with the military’s leadership and combat restructuring. The following three sections deal with a crucial aspect of the army, navy and air force. This section on the army deals with its artillery and rocket systems; while the next section examines the navy’s underwater capability, mine detection and minesweeping; and the final section will look at the air force’s push to develop and manufacture aero engines and indigenous fighter aircraft.

A shortfall of artillery has been a weakness in Indian armies through the ages. In 1526, the invading warlord from Uzbekistan, Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babar, won the First Battle of Panipat simply by deploying his artillery skilfully. The troop ratio in that battle comfortably favoured the Delhi Sultanate, but Ibrahim Lodhi had no field artillery. When Babar’s guns opened fire, the Lodhi army’s war elephants, unused to the roar of cannons, ran helter-skelter and trampled large numbers of their own soldiers.

Since the American Civil War in 1861, artillery guns have been the contemporary battlefield’s most lethal killer. Their simple function has been: To drop enough high explosive on enemy positions and installations to knock the fight out of them. That leaves an easy “mopping up” job for one’s tanks and foot soldiers.

India’s modern-day military inherited the philosophy of artillery usage from World War II and from combat experience in the 1965 and 1971 wars. In the 1947-48 Kashmir campaign and in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, India had hardly any artillery and lacked firepower across the entire frontier. Nor were there enough roads for the Indian artillery guns to be moved into better positions for giving fire support. To this day, the Indian Army is seeking to cover up the deficit in artillery guns, but the gap is large.

The Indian army has about 226 field artillery regiments today and plans to increase that to 270 regiments. With about 18 artillery guns in each regiment, plus three reserve guns, the Indian arsenal amounts to 5,670 field artillery pieces.

In the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999, a decision was taken to “medium-ize” the army’s field artillery regiments. This is code for inducting more powerful 155 mm medium guns in place of 105 mm and 130 mm field guns.

Additionally, India deploys a growing number of multi-barrelled rocket launcher (MBRL) units, including ten units of the indigenous Pinaka, three Russian SMERCH regiments and five Russian GRAD BM-21 regiments. Rockets are meant to saturate large area targets with firepower.

In addition, for precision targeting, the Indian artillery has acquired four units of BrahMos cruise missiles, with a fifth unit under raising.

To give its guns and rockets greater lethality, India’s corps of artillery operates sophisticated surveillance and target acquisition (SATA) systems that detect and locate enemy guns and radars, which can then be destroyed by counter-fire. These include the indigenous Swati weapon locating radar (WLR), which is in service in SATA units at the division and corps level. Enemy guns and battery locations are also detected by long-range recce and observation systems (LOROS), imported from Israel. These can pick up vehicles at ranges of 20-25 km.

However, for multiple reasons, especially the failure of the DRDO and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) to design and manufacture affordable, long-range artillery guns, the army continues to lack firepower. This is exacerbated by a continuing shortfall in acquiring guns from the international market.

Amongst the successes in acquiring modern artillery is India’s indigenous production of five artillery regiments (100 guns), called the K-9 Vajra. These 155 millimeter/52-calibre, tracked, self-propelled (SP) artillery guns have been built by an Indian company—Larsen & Toubro (L&T)—under license from the Korean firm, Hanwha Techwin (HTW).

These tracked howitzers are meant for the army’s two mechanized strike corps, which are tasked to arrow deep into enemy territory during wartime. While the influx of guns is welcome, the number acquired is clearly inadequate, given that each strike corps is authorized four medium SP regiments, each with 20 howitzers.

Given this shortfall, the army and MoD are weighing whether to procure another 100-200 mobile self-propelled (SP) howitzers to equip 10 medium artillery regiments.

A second line of modern howitzers is being provided by the acquisition of 145 M777 ultralight guns from the American company, BAE Systems. These light guns are highly mobile in mountainous terrain, of the kind that constitutes much of India’s border with Pakistan and China.

Finally, the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), in partnership with two private sector companies, is developing an indigenous 155 mm howitzer, called the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS). The army plans to build 1,580 of these guns, making them the mainstay of India’s artillery.

Increasing Gun Performance

The most effective way of increasing the range and capability of artillery guns is to increase their chamber size. The bigger a gun’s chamber, the more charge can be exploded in it and, therefore, the further it can hurl a projectile. The common chamber sizes in artillery guns are: 19, 23, and 25 litre chambers.

The 155 mm/39 calibre FH-77B Bofors gun has a 19-litre chamber, while the domestic Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), which the DRDO is developing, has a 25-litre chamber.

Another capability improvement the artillery is bringing in is precision. A gun with greater precision needs to fire less ammunition to have the desired effect on a target.

A third way to increase projectile range without increasing chamber capacity or the length of the barrel is to put a ramjet on the rear of the projectile, which propels it further. The DRDO is researching ways of doing that at several of its laboratories.

Finally, the lethality of artillery guns can be improved by using higher-performance explosives in projectiles. This is the field of the DRDO’s High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), which is working on the bi-modular charge systems (BMCS). This involves using propellants in a graded system, categorised as Charge 1 to Charge 7. The latter is so powerful that it can be fired only by the ATAGS howitzer.

The next article in this series, Part 3, will look at the Indian Navy and its underwater capability, mine detection and minesweeping.

Ajai Shukla is a a commentator on defense and strategic affairs, who served in the Indian Army from 1976 to 2001.

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