The growing military activity of the Houthis in Yemen and the emerging security threats facing Saudi Arabia have once again placed the Makkah Agreement, signed by Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on 7 August, at the centre of international attention. The question is no longer simply what the political significance of the agreement is. The more fundamental question is whether Pakistan and Türkiye would actually be prepared to deploy troops to defend Saudi Arabia if armed attacks against the kingdom were to intensify.

The most significant provision of the Makkah Agreement is that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three. On the face of it, this provision binds the three states together in a collective defence framework and can be viewed as a response to the rapidly changing security environment in the region. Yet the real test of international agreements does not lie in the strength of their language, but in what happens when that language has to be translated into concrete decisions.

That is precisely the stage now confronting Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, the increasingly fragile security situation in the Red Sea, and the Houthis’ control of Mayyun Island, a strategically important island at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, have added further strategic weight to the crisis. Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a geographical chokepoint. It is one of the world’s critical maritime passages, linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and, indirectly, the Indian Ocean. Prolonged instability along this route would not remain confined to Saudi Arabia or Yemen; it could also disrupt global trade, energy shipments and regional economies.

For this reason, the collective defence provision of the Makkah Agreement cannot be viewed simply as a mutual defence commitment between three countries. Behind it lie the changing balance of power in the Middle East, the security of Saudi Arabia, the Yemen crisis, commercial shipping through the Red Sea, as well as the national interests of Türkiye and Pakistan themselves.

Yet the most complicated question is that of Türkiye.

Türkiye has so far given no indication that it intends to participate in any direct military operation against the Houthis. Ankara did condemn the Houthis’ recent actions on 8 September, but its official stance since then has remained cautious, suggesting that it does not currently wish to become an active military party to the conflict in Yemen.

Such caution is hardly surprising. On the one hand, Türkiye attaches considerable importance to its increasingly close relationship with Saudi Arabia. On the other, Ankara has little interest in becoming entangled in a military conflict whose consequences could affect its economy, foreign policy and domestic politics for years to come.

A particularly significant remark came from Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who said that the collective defence provision of the Makkah Agreement is technically similar to Article 5 of the NATO treaty. However, he did not make clear whether the provision would automatically require military intervention in the event of an attack on one of the member states.

This is precisely where the distinction between the political language of the agreement and an actual military obligation becomes apparent.

Treating an attack on one country as an attack on all three certainly represents a strong political commitment. It does not, however, necessarily mean that all three countries would deploy their armed forces in every circumstance. The nature and scale of any response would depend on the type and intensity of the attack, where it occurred, the national security interests at stake and the........

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