President Xi Jinping’s latest visit to New Delhi to participate in the BRICS summit in September 2026, his first visit to India in seven years, came in the wake of increasing speculation of a recent thaw in India-China relations. This line of analysis emphasizes the end of a four-year standoff on their disputed border after the two sides reached an agreement on patrolling rights in the remote Ladakh region in October 2024. Ever since, there has been a regular drip-feed of news relating to India considering opening its economic doors to Chinese investments, joint ventures, and bids. The thaw has also been interpreted as being fueled in part by the return of the Trump presidency and Beijing’s and New Delhi’s respective needs for strategic and economic stability.

However, despite signs of a thaw, structural divergences both on the border issue as well as the economic relationship are growing, not receding. The recent recalibration of U.S.-China ties has also caused unease in New Delhi. Xi’s visit, therefore, has been much less momentous or even significant than anticipated. There is a discernible gap between the expectations of the would-be thaw and the structural challenges that shape the India-China relationship in the first place, with significant implications for New Delhi’s China policy going forward.

Growing Power Imbalances and the Leverage-Creep

Much of the contemporary analysis of India-China relations in the present context rests on a template established in the 2010s. This could lead to misleading inferences and conclusions, given how much has changed in the bilateral relationship since 2019-20.

The Military Balance and Zeitgeist

Despite the still significant power gap, relations between China and India in the 2010s were relatively more equal than they are now. India had arguably moved away from its focus on Pakistan as its primary security threat and invested resources in bolstering deterrence vis-a-vis China. This shift combined procurements, infrastructure build-up (air bases and roads), forward deployments, and a graduated shift in doctrine from deterrence by denial toward deterrence by punishment. India’s assertive intervention in the Doklam plateau in 2017, a region contested between China and Bhutan, fit perfectly into this context as India signaled that its growing military prowess could now enable it to spring surprise on its larger neighbor.

India’s strategic elite at the time appeared cautiously upbeat about the prevailing balance. They considered maritime options to put pressure on China, widely known as the Malacca option. Military officials spoke confidently of being prepared for a two-front war. India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States and like-minded partners through the Indo-Pacific and the Quad was also seen as a substantive asset, especially as Beijing’s relations with the same countries was rapidly deteriorating.

However, the 2020 border skirmish, the subsequent four-year stand-off, and parallel developments have greatly ruptured this world. The crisis compelled India to adopt a defensive posture at the border, while quasi-abandoning more forward-looking and competitive deterrence building measures that were gradually being established in the years prior. India appears still in search of a coherent deterrence strategy that safeguards territorial integrity while not engendering a sharper security dilemma. 

The military balance has become more skewed. India’s procurement and defense industrial ecosystem has also led to lags in enhancing its military power. China, on the other hand, is rapidly expanding its fleet of fifth generation fighter jets, with production reaching 120 a year, while India’s fleet is aging fast and struggling to expand in........

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