Criminal Justice

A Supreme Court Decision Restricting Appeal Waivers Underlines the Injustice of Coercive Plea Bargaining

The Supreme Court ruled that "an agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice."

Jacob Sullum | 6.19.2026 2:45 PM

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When people plead guilty to crimes, they typically give up the right to appeal any aspect of the outcome, including the sentence they ultimately receive. On Thursday in Hunter v. United States, the Supreme Court imposed limits on such appeal waivers, which are improbably described as "knowing and voluntary" even when the defendant is acting under intense pressure and does not yet know what penalties and release conditions he will face.

"An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice," Justice Elena Kagan writes in the majority opinion, which was joined by seven of her colleagues. The decision defines "miscarriage of justice" as "the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute." It offers some examples, including a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, a sentence "infected with a blatant constitutional error" such as racial bias, release conditions that violate basic rights, and a prison term imposed by a judge who "let an orangutan pick a sentence out of a hat."

As Justice Neil Gorsuch explains in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, the need for such intervention stems from a criminal justice system that resolves nearly all cases through plea deals. "In our times, the jury trial has given way to a conveyor belt of plea bargains," Gorsuch writes. "At least some responsibility for that development lies with this Court. When confronted with coercive prosecutorial tactics designed to induce defendants to take plea deals, the Court has often condoned those practices or let them pass in silence."

The case involves Munson P. Hunter III, who was charged with participating in "a years-long scheme costing various financial institutions about half a million dollars" in unauthorized wire transfers. In February 2024, Hunter pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud. It is not hard to see why: He was also facing nine other felony charges, which federal prosecutors dropped in exchange for his guilty plea. Had he been convicted of all 10 charges, Gorsuch notes, Hunter would have faced "up to 300 years in prison and a $10 million fine."

As part of the plea agreement, Hunter gave up the right to appeal his sentence. He later had cause to regret that decision.

The crime that Hunter admitted involved the theft of $38,649 in a single transaction. But at sentencing in the Southern District of Texas three months later, Judge Sim Lake took into account the dropped charges—a variation on a disturbing practice that imposes punishment for conduct that was never admitted by the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.........

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