The Battle for Legitimacy: Principles for Counterinsurgency
“The people are the sea in which the revolutionary swims.” Mao Zedong.
“The people are the sea in which the revolutionary swims.”
Successful Counterinsurgencies
The country is in the throes of civil unrest, violence, and insurgency, and is gradually losing critical cohesion. In any situation where there are civilian protests, the central problem will always revolve around aggrieved people, exploited by hostile agencies. These people have to be won over by making them part of the system and decision-making—only then can external intrusion be dealt with. The world has seen so many insurgencies and rebellions, and so many have been tackled successfully that these must be studied for their efficacy. Having said that, there are no recipes for such a conflict resolution, and each case has its own characteristics; nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from each.
To illustrate, here are some for those interested: The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960); Dhofar Rebellion, Oman (1965-1976); HUK Rebellion, Philippines (1946-1954); FARC, Colombia (2000-2016); and LTTE, Sri Lanka (2006-2009). These rebellions were successfully dealt with, but when studied, there are some commonalities in the approach of dealing with such crises. What these successful campaigns had in common is listed:
Security: Protecting the population.
Intelligence: Understanding the insurgent networks.
Political Legitimacy: A government viewed as more acceptable than the insurgents.
Economic Development: Addressing local grievances.
Information Perceptions: Shaping public perceptions.
Time and Persistence: The principle of conduct remains patience.
How Insurgency Burgeons
The history of any crisis, if studied, going back to its genesis, is usually a very minor problem related to a civilian grievance, which is ignored in its infancy. The government’s perception is that it is too small a matter to give in to and thus either ignores it or treats it with the indifferent arrogance and contempt that is the curse of bureaucratic systems. Soon, the minor problem grows into a major problem and takes on a life of its own. The problem then morphs into a political one with ethnic, ideological, or linguistic implications, but the government, instead of dealing politically with it, employs administrative logic, propriety, and rationality, and instead uses force.
Sometimes the government temporarily manages to contain the issue, but it still neither addresses the core problem nor takes it seriously enough. The resolution is conveniently explained as a successfully concluded campaign. However, in the wake of the government’s success, which it has wrested by overwhelming force against its own people, there always remains behind a simmering discontent—a crisis in waiting for a spark to ignite a flame—to return on another day. In other cases, using force leads to wider and bigger protests, which then call for greater force, and the cycle continues, leading to major unrest, resistance, terrorism, and then insurgency—in this order.
The government confronts the people, and as such, the state comes into direct conflict with its own instrument of existence—the people. Here, at this stage, it does not matter who is right or who is wrong—the situation should never come to a conflict between the state and the people. Such a phenomenon is best explained by putting before the reader the unusual spectacle of the servants in a house turning out the owners of the house, and there appears to be a debate on which one of them is right! The owners of the house establish the rules that govern what is right or not, and all have to abide by them. In the case of the state, it is the Constitution that defines what is right, and it is the Constitution that protects the people from its own government, and under no circumstances can it be violated—it is sacrosanct.
“Legitimacy derives from constitutional adherence. Counterinsurgency is ultimately a competition for legitimacy. Every constitutional violation creates opportunities for insurgent narratives. The state’s greatest strategic weapon is not force but legitimacy.”
“Legitimacy derives from constitutional adherence. Counterinsurgency is ultimately a competition for legitimacy. Every constitutional violation creates opportunities for insurgent narratives. The state’s greatest strategic weapon is not force but legitimacy.”
In Pakistan, the Constitution is violated frequently, but always at the cost of the people. The first part of the Constitution deals only with the rights of the people, but these are of no consequence to the state as it goes about browbeating the very owners of the country into submission. Thus, there is a government in place and a people that exist, but neither is inclusive of the other or integrated. The people are not part of national activity or purpose and are thus denied ownership of their country. This is where countries lose cohesion, and the politico-socio fabric is fractured and broken. The gaps thus created are filled by others—external elements hostile to the country and carrying their own agenda. Historically successful insurgencies often depended on the following:
Foreign intelligence support
Cross-border movement
“While legitimate grievances create fertile ground, insurgencies often require organization, ideology, leadership, funding, sanctuary, and external support before they evolve into an armed movement.”
“While legitimate grievances create fertile ground, insurgencies often require organization, ideology, leadership, funding, sanctuary, and external support before they evolve into an armed movement.”
The process of handling grievances is a convention where the government uses an incremental application of administrative offices. It is expected that the grievance be addressed at an early stage at a lower level, before it takes on a critical state. These stages are community groups, local bodies, local members of parliament, national members of parliament, the judiciary, law enforcement, and finally the establishment. Because none of these steps are functional in Pakistan or lack credibility, not being suitably empowered, the........
