Trump’s latest sanctions against Cuba, which prevent oil shipments from any country to the island, constitute a genuine blockade rather than a porous embargo, as was mostly the case before. They are paralyzing an already struggling economy and affecting the social services that rely on it, leading to a humanitarian crisis. Over the past 67 years, the Cuban regime has shown a strong ability to turn challenges—from the Bay of Pigs invasion to the massive popular protests in July 2021—into opportunities to strengthen totalitarian control. However, this time seems different. The situation seems stable for now, but the end of Venezuela’s lifeline economic support and the blockade may succeed where the embargo failed for decades. It is certainly bittersweet for many Cuban democrats that an illegal action by a callous U.S. President might provide the necessary, if insufficient, condition for the liberation of the Cuban nation.

Restoring Popular Sovereignty

The former Polish dissident, president and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Lech Walesa, was in Miami, where he publicly stated that Cubans should “take advantage” of President Donald Trump’s pressure. He also warned that the U.S. president “will not bring them freedom.” Point taken: Freedom and democracy are rarely transplanted from abroad, especially if that is not the goal to begin with. Only the Cuban nation, which includes the exiles, can do that. What are the chances of this happening? It is hard to predict, but one can clearly see some major difficulties in restoring popular sovereignty in Cuba.

To start with, giving Cubans their voices back, after so many decades of dictatorship–including almost seven years under military strongman Fulgencio Batista (1952-58) – will pose some governance challenges. There are many democrats on the island, and a few persecuted pro-human rights organizations and independent media platforms. But one finds no prevailing national pro-democracy opposition comparable to Poland’s Solidarity Movement in the 1980s, or the Venezuelan opposition. Democratic opposition groups abroad, including in Canada, have a unity of purpose. But there is no Cuban Charles de Gaulle in Miami or Madrid waiting for a triumphant return to Havana, ready to unite the nation.

The Cuban nation arguably includes the exile community. Close to 20% of the population left in the past five years alone. Its contribution would be vital to rebuilding the country if the current regime were to fall. Many have thrived abroad—there is a saying that Castro’s greatest achievement was Miami—and they could play an important role in reconstruction. Over the years, they have sent essential goods (chiefly food and medicines) and billions of dollars in remittances to the Cuban population. This has helped keep many Cubans above extreme poverty and healthier. Such support is more crucial than ever.

This said, the risk of conflict and violence remains high, as the islanders—mainly poor, aging (young Cubans have been most likely to leave), and worn out by blackouts, shortages of food and medicine and the chikungunya virus—might not easily adapt to wealthier (and whiter) Cubans “returning”, along with folks who were not born in Cuba (maybe their parents or grandparents were) but are looking for opportunities. Some may be eager to reclaim properties expropriated without compensation after the revolution. There are 8821 claims certified against the Cuban government by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, an entity within the U.S. Department of Justice. One of the largest cases involves a mine expropriated from the U.S. company Freeport-McMoRan Inc. in August 1960 and, since 1994, co-owned and operated by the Canadian mining giant Sherritt International Corporation. Sherritt just suspended its operations at the Moa mines due to a lack of fuel. It is conceivable that efforts to re-expropriate will occur without waiting for court decisions.

What Does President Trump Want?

It is unclear what President Trump aims to achieve with his blockade. It appears that for him, Cuba is a low-hanging fruit, with little to gain from taking it over, rather than a big prize like Venezuela. It is not worth launching a very risky military operation. There are no significant resources to confiscate. Perhaps he is envisioning a Trump Cuba Libre resort in Varadero! As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote, in his foreign policy, “Trump is not playing either checkers or chess. He’s playing ‘Monopoly’.” One should not forget the egotistical motive: his chance to boast that he succeeded where all his predecessors failed!

For Trump, democratization and liberalization of the island appear to be optional or aspirational, maybe as a concession to his Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and his Cuban-American base in Florida. What appears unlikely but possible is a hostile takeover of the country, as the Trump administration did in Venezuela, where the new CEO (Trump) takes control but keeps the “company” (the state apparatus) intact. I say unlikely because the Cuban regime is different: it is an all-in-one totalitarian bloc rooted in an epochal foundation, the 1959 revolution. It is far more embedded in society than Maduro’s ever was in Venezuela. It is harder to imagine Trump making the Cuban state obey his orders than Venezuela’s.

Still, should this scenario prevail, the Trump administration would conceivably cut a deal with what many see as the real power in Cuba: top officials in the conglomerate GAESA, which is the business managerial branch of the Cuban army. This “deep state” controls the dynamic part of the economy, primarily by collecting rent from foreign investors in tourism, financial investment, import/export, and remittances. Those are the kind of folks who could understand Trump’s language.

In any event, it is clear that a complete regime collapse could trigger purges that deeply affect all sectors of society. Transitional justice could be messy, and building a democracy from chaos and recriminations is difficult. There are reasons to think that it is a risk many Cubans consider worth taking.

The Carney government appeared to have taken a wait-and-see approach until, finally, on February 23rd, following the lead of countries like Mexico and Chile, Foreign Minister Anita Anand announced that Canada is preparing an aid package to be delivered through the UN in Cuba. This is appropriate. Even the U.S. is sending millions of dollars in aid, via private Catholic organizations such as Catholic Relief Services and Caritas. Despite the apparent contradiction, this is in line with U.S. sanctions framework: the blockade and, before it, the embargo, do not legally prohibit economic transactions with the private sector. In fact, there are reports that the US could allow fuel deliveries through private channels. It is hard to imagine how this is even possible, given the sprawling control of the state–and in this case, GAESA–in every important economic activity, including oil import and distribution. Maybe it is just sending a signal that if the economy is privatized, the embargo and blockade would automatically evaporate!

Two additional steps would be welcome. First, Canada should not miss the opportunity to reiterate Canada’s long-standing objection to the extra-territoriality of U.S. sanctions. This has been the position of all Canadian governments since the U.S. embargo began. They have also objected to the U.S. embargo itself, as a matter of foreign policy preferences, but preventing Canada from shipping oil to Cuba, for instance, would be a violation of our sovereignty. A public statement to this effect would be consistent with diplomatic precedents and with the more recent “elbows up” rallying cry.

Second, it would also be fitting to break from a tendency within the Liberal Party of Canada and advocate for a future for Cuba that fully upholds the core values of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law -not just by stating them on a government website, but by speaking about them publicly and making them a driving force behind our policy. Using our independent policy toward Cuba as a Canadian Heritage moment to reassure ourselves “that we are our own country,” as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated in Havana in 2016, no longer make much sense, if it ever did. One could defend the interests of ordinary Cubans vigorously without winking at their overlords. As Walesa suggested, this could very well be a pivotal moment for Cubans. There is more for Canada to do to help Cubans than just oppose Trump.

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