Foreign interference has become a fixture of Canada’s national security debate for several years, especially since the 2023 Foreign Interference Commission (PIFI), which examined allegations that foreign states sought to influence Canadian elections, political processes and democratic institutions. Policymakers, CSIS, journalists, and organizations such as the Montreal Institute for Global Security, the Citizen Lab and Disinfo Watch, have paid increasing attention on foreign actors seeking to shape Canadian politics, public discourse and democracy. Canada now hosts the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Secretariat, which was created to coordinate democratic responses to foreign disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference. Since PIFI, the government has also taken new steps to put up guardrails, including through Bill C-70, also known as the Countering Foreign Interference Act.

Yet despite growing awareness and new policy measures, Canada’s response remains fragmented. Foreign influence is rightly treated as a national security issue, but information integrity continues to be discussed separately as a challenge for technology platforms, media organizations, and democratic institutions. 

Information integrity refers to the health and trustworthiness of the information ecosystem through which citizens access news, engage in public debate, and make democratic decisions. A resilient information ensures that citizens have access to credible information, transparency about sources, and institutions capable of maintaining public trust.

Foreign influence operations are instruments of statecraft used by foreign governments to advance strategic objectives. These operations succeed when they can exploit existing social tensions, political polarization, and vulnerabilities in the information ecosystem. Canada therefore needs a more integrated approach, one that combines foreign policy, national security, and information integrity into a coherent strategy for democratic resilience.

Any contentious political debate, from immigration to international conflicts, can become a target for influence operations if it offers opportunities to weaken social cohesion or undermine confidence in democratic institutions. These operations may involve amplifying divisive narratives online, coordinating inauthentic social media activity, promoting misleading or false information through state-linked networks, or leveraging proxy actors to shape public debate in ways that advance foreign strategic interests. They exist alongside economic coercion, diplomatic pressure, cyber operations and strategic communications.

The challenge is particularly urgent as geopolitical competition intensifies. From Russia’s information operations in Europe, Africa, and North America to China’s efforts to shape narratives abroad through the United Front Work System, foreign actors have demonstrated a clear willingness to use influence activities as tools of foreign policy and national security. China’s United Front Work System, which coordinates influence activities through........

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