Opinion | How To Tell Propaganda From Facts About ‘Caste’

Vamsee Juluri and C Raghothama Rao

If there is one key set of tropes and themes which have marked the most compelling forces within the RSS-BJP narrative, these have to be those of Caste and Hindu reform

No word has shaped India’s politics, economy, society, and perhaps even its destiny in the last two centuries as “caste." Other words and names seem to rise and fall in public life: names of political leaders, slogans, policies, and ideas. But “caste" will not go away, even though everyone seems to agree that it is a very bad thing which deserves to be stamped out in the name of humanity, decency, and everything good in the universe. It is called a disease, a sin, a moral crime, and a causal force behind almost every bad thing that happens in Indian society, or even former Indian and wider South Asian countries. A New York Times columnist once blamed the blasphemy murders of Christians in Pakistan not on Islamic laws there, but on the persistence of old caste “purity" habits from their (presumably “jahil") Hindu past.

The New York Times is, of course, not the only American platform where Hinduism’s “caste problem" has been discussed. In California, legislators voted SB403 into law after an intense furore over alleged caste discrimination at Cisco by two South Indian managers with Brahmin surnames. Governor Newsom vetoed the bill, saying caste discrimination was already illegal under current laws. And, of course, the courts finally dismissed the Cisco caste case too; among other things, the alleged victim had apparently not even applied for the position he said he had been denied because of his caste.

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Supporters of the legislation, of course, did not give up on their belief that caste discrimination was a horrifically widespread problem because there were so many ways in which casteism was operating that weren’t being recognised. For example, they said, it was evident in the use of surnames to flaunt caste supremacy, the seemingly polite inquiries about dietary choices while planning company picnics and dinners, and the most seemingly innocuous casteist strike of all: patting a suspected oppressed-caste person’s back to say “hi" but actually feeling them through their shirts to see if they wear the upper-caste “thread" or not.

All of this was opposed vehemently by Hindu parents and community groups in California (of course, it was supported by many Indian and South Asian Americans too, especially second-generation voices who came on National Public Radio to accuse their parents of being Brahmin supremacists). One parent opposed to SB403, who was neither Brahmin nor supremacist, actually died after a stressful public hearing in a town hall meeting. His name was Milind Makwana. He was respected by many in the Hindu community in California, and his message was a simple one that many could frankly respect: do not divide us under the pretext of ridding us of our divisions.

Yet, it was not the proponents of such a warning—a fervent and honest plea—who seemed to have acquired seats at the table of India’s government. While Hindus in California were getting smeared by their opponents as “Far-Right Hindu Nationalists" for opposing mendacious psycho-political mind games, the current Indian government was seemingly platforming the same people in important official positions with power over policies affecting one and a half billion lives in India. Whether this is an oversight due to incompetence, or deliberate and deeply devious design, is something people are intensely debating on social media now.

There is certainly no dearth of evidence that the BJP government and the RSS leadership more broadly have believed in, and continue to believe in, the idea that “caste" is the number one problem that needs to be addressed in Hindu society and in the diaspora. They believe that if it weren’t for “caste," there would be “Hindu Unity." And Hindu Unity would also include Indians who are not religiously Hindu by their definition. All people who live in India are Hindu, because their ancestors were once Hindus. The religious difference problem is solved. Of course, the only remaining problem was the Brahmins, their traditions, and the overall Hindus’ obsession with his or her gods.

In the interests of unifying Hindus, the Sangh leadership has appealed numerous times to recognise the thousands of years of water-denial, education-denial, and other oppressions done by Brahmins and “upper castes" (or “Savarnas") to their victims. Their government also introduced new caste policies for universities, which led to the current outcry and the temporary pause in implementation.

All sides can agree that whatever bad things happen in society—such as violence, hate, and the denial of a fair chance at admissions, jobs, or housing—should be treated as bad things and solved. Where all sides do not agree, perhaps, is whether “caste" is the cause of these, and if so, how to solve it. Everyone erasing the sense of “caste" from their mind, identity, and life is, of course, the noble ideal many on the Right and Left espouse.

The Right, before 2014, perhaps had a more universally conservative or “Right" attitude: a sort of identity-blind meritocracy as the answer to all of society’s problems (whether through economic criteria over identities in the matter of reservations, or a UCC in the case of religion). The Left, given its long-standing investment in intellectual work, social research, arts, and propaganda, of course, did not agree with that at all. For them, caste had to be annihilated. But you could not annihilate it by being “caste-blind." That would be the erasure of caste or the whitewashing of caste oppression. You had to annihilate caste by confronting it through tough actions: the smashing of Hindu “idols," the burning of Hindu holy books like the Manusmriti (as even some BJP leaders have allegedly done), the cutting off of sacred threads and shikhas, legislation that deemed an individual always already guilty because of membership in an alleged “upper caste," and the incentivised, if not outright coerced, practice of reparations through “beti"-based intermarriages.

In 2026, the so-called Right in India is exactly on the same page as the so-called Left.

Has “Unity" been achieved? After all, both the BJP and its rival parties seem to agree with the fundamental historical claim that discrimination has taken place for thousands of years, leading to disproportionate advantages now for Brahmins and upper castes. The only difference seems to be that while supporters of one party still talk occasionally in a negative way about Mughals and Macaulay and the others do not, the crux of policies and pronouncements is now increasingly focused on the same premise, the same framing of the problem, the same pinpointing of the cause of the problem (whether it is a “cause" or a “scapegoat" is a question on a lot of minds too), and the same solutions: expand the state’s definitions of categories of people who have allegedly suffered at the hands of Brahmins for thousands of years, and intensify mechanisms of scrutiny, surveillance, and punitive measures based on “guilty until proven innocent."

The present moment could actually be the greatest example of “unity" seen in history since humans and (some) animals actually “unite" once again towards the end of George Orwell’s great novel Animal Farm. After a great revolution or political change, the new guard often morphs into the old one. It is the nature of power in modern societies. Orwell was sharper than most others in seeing it. In India, too, people offer explanations: “the party is ours, but the system is theirs," “vote-bank politics," and so on. But the purpose of such explanations is, unfortunately, merely to interpret the status quo, not to change it (to borrow a quotable revolutionary quote). Whether it is party X or Y, this is how it will be. Politicians will have to divide along lines of identity, whether caste, religion, or region. They need the votes, and the voters need the doles. The rulers will rule. The middle class will struggle somehow and survive the rules. Such is life. Some will resent it and call it reverse discrimination, and go on with it. Some will wholeheartedly accept it as punishment for their ancestors having oppressed others’ ancestors in the past, unable or unequipped to critically examine how memory, history, and propaganda are deeply intertwined in the anecdotes and slogans we live by.

The fundamental problem in the claims we make about social inequality and oppression in the past is that no one can see the whole of something called “society" clearly, let alone society as it probably existed not just now but for thousands of years, hundreds of generations, and millions of lives in the past. Yet, in our everyday lives, we are called upon to act, identify, and conform to codes of behaviour based upon claims about society having been inexorably structured in certain ways. Increasingly, we are seeing the inadequacy, and indeed the hollowness, of some of those claims.

When there is scant evidence anywhere that it was Brahmins doing acts of violence against Dalits, why do movies, OTT serials, memes, and cartoons perpetuate the myth of “Brahminical" or “Hindutva" violence against them? Why do news reports on violence against “lower castes" rarely specify the castes of the perpetrators? What about the findings in Professor Prakash Shah’s work and those of his colleagues from the Ghent School?

Conversely, some argue that there is undeniable proof that poverty and deprivation are more widespread among historically oppressed castes than historically privileged ones, and that there are stories and anecdotes from the Mahabharata and Ramayana which seem to show what could be called harshly “casteist" behaviour. In turn, there are arguments about how some of these stories might actually be distortions; that modern-day caste narratives are being inscribed upon characters which do not get supported on a closer study of the texts.

Many modern, liberal Hindu organisations have, of course, settled on a popular explanation to offer to their children: caste was “originally" something merely functional and guna-based, but later got corrupted because of Brahmins into an oppressive, rigid hierarchy. Luckily, such a view also says, modern Hindu “reformers" have been reforming Hindus constantly. Swami Dayananda Saraswati, Swami Vivekananda, Gandhi, and many others are mentioned in this vein.

Since about 2014, however, the desire to include many more figures into the “Hindu reformist" pantheon has manifested in two broad dimensions. One aspect of this desire may be seen in the example of the giant statue of Ramanujacharya outside Hyderabad being labelled as a “Statue of Equality." The website for the project listed unverified tales of caste atrocities in the past—such as how “Brahmins poured molten lead into Shudras’ ears"—and heralded Ramanujacharya as a pioneer of caste reforms.

The other part of this tendency, the more ubiquitous and significant one, has to do with attempting to re-engineer a new concept of “original Hinduism" which can include the steadfast criticism of Hinduism by eminent figures like Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar. While the merits of this argument perhaps demand a longer and different examination in the future, what is worth noting for now is a newer trend since the UGC controversy regarding the positioning of another eminent critic of Hinduism, Periyar, as an apostle of equality who might well warrant an honoured place alongside Savarkar and Ambedkar in what some call the “Blue Hindutva" pantheon (Savarkar-Ambedkar-Periyar). Of course, the “Hindutva" label is itself a matter of much debate now, with Savarkar and Sri Aurobindo being mentioned as key guides by one set of Hindutva supporters, and Savarkar and Ambedkar (and perhaps Periyar) by another set of Hindutva leaders. In the wake of this polarisation, one must also note that the respected Sarsanghchalak of the RSS, Shri Mohan Bhagwat, has reportedly said that the RSS does not do “Hindutva politics."

What, then, is the future of India under the spiritual and moral leadership of the RSS and the political helmsmanship of the BJP? That is a big question, but one practical clue towards understanding it might rest in the evolution of the “India-story" they have shaped so far, and the direction in which this story is likely to take them. If there is one key set of tropes and themes which have marked the most compelling forces within their narrative, these have to be those of Caste and Hindu reform. Like “sin" and “redemption," these are clearly the most compelling elements of the India “narrative" today—not “Viksit," not “growth," not “Vishwa Guru," and not “Hindutva." Nor even “Ram," who took the BJP from the fringes of electoral politics in the early 1980s to the undefeatable behemoth it has become now. Again, this is not an evaluation of electoral promises kept or broken, about “Vikas" or “Hindutva," or both. But this is the beginning of an attempt to understand narratives seriously, and what happens when narratives swallow those who attempt to wield them without respect to the power of the word, which, in Hindu thought, is bound inevitably, inexorably, and yet invincibly—like vaag and artha, like Parvati and Shiva—with something like truth.

Vamsee Juluri is Professor of Media Studies, University of San Francisco. He has authored several books, including ‘Rearming Hinduism: Nature, Hinduphobia and the Return of Indian Intelligence’ (Westland, 2015). C Raghothama Rao is a writer, podcaster and YouTuber. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.

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