The Visit of Kuomintang Chair Zheng Liwen to the People’s Republic of China

On 7 April, at the invitation of President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, Zheng Liwen, the leader of Taiwan’s leading opposition party, the Kuomintang, paid a week-long visit to the mainland. She headed a delegation from her party.

The Uncertainty of United States Strategy as a Key External Factor in the Taiwan Question

At that time, the United States was compelled to declare its recognition of the “One China” principle, which is of fundamental importance to Beijing, while at the same time retaining freedom of manoeuvre to ensure Taiwan’s de facto independence. This was achieved primarily through the supply of American weapons to the island and the preservation of the possibility of military intervention in case Beijing attempted to resolve the Taiwan question by force.

However, it is not possible to constantly and consistently deceive a partner that was once a situational ally but has now become the principal geopolitical opponent. Washington is therefore inevitably approaching the moment when it will have to abandon “strategic ambiguity” in the Taiwan question and move towards “strategic clarity.” In this regard, there are only two directly opposing options emerging: either the United States will abandon adherence to the “One China” principle and recognise Taiwan as an independent state, or it will cease to obstruct Beijing in bringing the island under its administrative control by any means.

President Donald Trump himself appears to be inclined towards one of these two possible solutions to the Taiwan question. This tendency was already visible during his first presidency and is now being confirmed, for example, by the current delays in the delivery of American weapons to Taiwan. This suggests that the matter is not limited to situational considerations, including those connected with Trump’s visit to China that never took place. It is likely that the American president is expecting to conclude a global “deal” with his principal geopolitical opponent.

However, within the American establishment, there is a prevalence of the supporters of a different approach. Their views are shared by John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, who held key positions in the Trump administration from 2017 to 2021. Today, similar sentiments dominate in Congress on a bipartisan basis and, importantly, at the level of state leadership, which is actively establishing direct ties with Taiwan.

Nevertheless, it remains unclear which of the two “strategically clear” options for resolving the Taiwan problem will prevail in Washington. One thing is certain: a choice will have to be made, and sooner rather than later. This choice will be of fundamental significance both for relations between the two global powers and for the international situation as a whole.

The current uncertainty in the Taiwan question is further exacerbated by the growing influence of Japan, whose weight in global politics is tangibly increasing. Recent developments connected with Tokyo’s involvement in this issue merit being examined separately in the context of Sino-Japanese relations.

The Visit of the Taiwanese Opposition Leader to the People’s Republic of China: Reducing Uncertainty or Playing a Long Game?

The visit of the leader of Taiwan’s principal opposition party to the People’s Republic of China is unlikely to have significantly reduced the level of uncertainty surrounding the Taiwan question. Although in 1992 representatives of the party, the governing one back then in Taiwan, signed the so-called “Consensus” recognising the “One China” principle, the current leadership of the island, represented by the Democratic Progressive Party, categorically rejects it.

In reality, the divergences between Taiwan’s two main parties are predominantly reduced to them having differing strategies for preserving the island’s de facto autonomy in the foreseeable future. Significantly, the “1992 Consensus” does not specify which “one China” is meant. The Kuomintang most likely has in mind the Republic of China, established in 1912 during the Xinhai Revolution and reduced in 1949 to the island of Formosa, now Taiwan. Beijing, by contrast, seeks to return its “province” to mainland control.

The foreign policy position of former Kuomintang President of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou, who held office from 2008 to 2016, is noteworthy: “Maintain peace with China, friendship with Japan, and closeness to the United States.” There is no evident aspiration for reunification with the mainland in this wording, which did not, however, prevent Xi Jinping from meeting Ma Ying-jeou on several occasions.

The current leader of the Kuomintang, Zheng Liwen, travelled to the People’s Republic of China not with a proposal for reunification, but as a “messenger of peace”.

This may not be entirely what Beijing would have expected to hear. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership is compelled to choose between two less-than-ideal options: the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party.

Beijing’s willingness to take into account the Kuomintang’s domestic political difficulties is illustrated by the fact that the visit was not hindered by the party’s intention to unblock, on its own terms, the process of adopting a significantly increased defence budget for the island.

Key Moments of Zheng Liwen’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China

Zheng Liwen’s visit to the People’s Republic of China was marked by several significant events. One of these was her visit to the mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Xinhai Revolution and the founder of the Kuomintang, is rightly regarded as the “father of modern China.” His figure is deeply respected in the People’s Republic of China, which is comparable to the reverence accorded to leading figures of the Chinese Communist Party. It is worth noting that his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, is currently being re-evaluated within the framework of Taiwan’s domestic political agenda initiated by the Democratic Progressive Party. Criticism of such campaigns, including instances of perceived disrespect towards monuments to Chiang Kai-shek, sharply strikes a chord in the People’s Republic of China.

However, undoubtedly the most important event of the visit was Zheng Liwen’s meeting with President Xi Jinping, which took place on 10 April. This was the first such meeting in the past ten years. By comparison, in November 2015 in Singapore, at an international forum, Xi Jinping met with former President of Taiwan Ma Ying-jeou. That meeting was historic, as it was the first of its kind since 1949. In 2023 and 2024, Ma Ying-jeou also visited the mainland and met with Xi Jinping, though already in a private capacity.

In the report by the Xinhua News Agency on the meeting between Xi Jinping and Zheng Liwen, particular attention is paid to the Chinese leader’s words regarding the “responsibility of the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang” for maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Xi Jinping also once again underlined the utter unacceptability, for the People’s Republic of China, of the prospect of Taiwan’s independence.

Finally, analysts draw attention to the symbolism of the fact that the meeting took place on the day the United States Taiwan Relations Act entered into force. This law, adopted forty-seven years ago, laid the foundation for Washington’s current policy of “strategic ambiguity” with regard to Taiwan.

Given that the timing of Zheng Liwen’s visit and the date of her meeting with the Chinese leader were, in all likelihood, coordinated with Beijing, this visit can be seen as a signal to Washington: “It’s time to stop playing ambiguous games around a key international issue.”

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific affairs

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