When the Security Umbrella Is No Longer Enough: Why Middle Eastern States Are Building Alliances of Their Own ?

In the Middle East, the power that once organised the regional order has itself become a source of uncertainty.

The End of a Certainty

The premise was simple. The United States provided a security perimeter, the dollar anchored trade and Washington’s signature guaranteed the continuity of commitments. With Iran contained, Middle Eastern states could preserve their rivalries while entrusting Washington with the decisive functions: intelligence, missile defence, maritime control, protection of energy routes and diplomatic arbitration.

This arrangement was part of the cycle that began in 1945, when the United States emerged with unmatched economic, industrial and military pre-eminence. After the Soviet Union disappeared, that primacy became the organising principle of a unipolar order. Globalisation then extended its networks around a US centre of gravity.

Yet this expansion, in turn, changed the conditions of power. Offshoring and transfers of expertise turned China into a major industrial, technological and geopolitical competitor. Russia retained a capacity for strategic denial rooted in its territory, resources and nuclear status. The United States remained the system’s leading power, but could no longer be its sole centre.

Compounding this shift is the polycentric structure of American power, which resembles a constellation of interests more than a single institution. The presidency, Congress, the Pentagon, the intelligence community, the military-industrial complex, pressure groups, donors and strategic companies do not operate on the same timetable or pursue the same interests. None formally possesses its own foreign policy, yet each has capabilities and institutional continuities that may outlast the course set by the president.

For Washington’s partners, an election can reverse a policy; one administration can repudiate an agreement concluded by its predecessor; and an agency can continue on a course that outlasts the policy articulated by the White House. American policy therefore combines a high degree of reversibility at the top with the persistence of deeper networks.

The US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, while the International Atomic Energy Agency was still verifying Iran’s implementation of its nuclear commitments, had already eroded the value of Washington’s signature as a guarantee for the future. The outbreak of war against Iran on 28 February 2026 crossed a further threshold: Omani mediators later reported that an agreement had been within reach. Russian diplomacy describes this condition with the term «nedogovorosposobnost»: the inability to regard an interlocutor as a partner capable of concluding and honouring a durable agreement.

The consequences extend beyond the relationship between Washington and Tehran. States do not necessarily stop negotiating with the United States; they seek additional guarantees, simultaneous commitments, reversible mechanisms and partners capable of limiting the cost of a breach.

A similar erosion is affecting the financial sphere. The dollar remains the world’s leading reserve currency. Yet secondary sanctions, exclusion from financial networks and the freezing of sovereign assets have turned this shared infrastructure into an instrument of coercion. Owning an asset no longer necessarily means being able to use it when access depends on political alignment.

For Saudi Arabia, this question is central. The riyal remains pegged to the dollar, oil is still overwhelmingly priced in that currency and a substantial share of national wealth is held abroad. This architecture provides stability, liquidity and financial depth, but it also concentrates risk. Data from the IMF........

© New Eastern Outlook