Protecting Oil, Producing Instability: Washington’s Failed Energy Strategy in the Middle East
Protecting Oil, Producing Instability: Washington’s Failed Energy Strategy in the Middle East
For decades, Washington has justified its military presence in the Middle East as necessary to protect global energy security. American naval forces would safeguard shipping, military partnerships would deter attacks on oil-producing states, and sanctions would restrain governments regarded as threats to the US-led regional order. The promise was simple: American power would keep energy flowing and markets stable.
The outcome increasingly contradicts that promise. The region has become more militarised, energy infrastructure more exposed, and shipping more hazardous. Oilfields, gas facilities, ports, pipelines, and maritime chokepoints have become instruments—and potential targets—of geopolitical confrontation. The problem is no longer merely that Washington has failed to eliminate instability. Policies employed in the name of protecting energy are now producing energy insecurity.
From energy guardian to conflict multiplier
The traditional American narrative presents instability as a regional phenomenon and US military power as an external force containing it. Yet sanctions, military deployments, arms transfers, and support for particular actors are not neutral responses to insecurity; they reshape the calculations of every government and armed group involved.
When economic coercion is combined with the threat or use of force, energy infrastructure becomes one of the few available sources of leverage for a state confronting a militarily superior adversary. The Strait of Hormuz demonstrates the danger. According to the International Energy Agency, nearly 15 million barrels of crude oil passed through the Strait each day in 2025—approximately 34 percent of global crude oil trade. Including petroleum products, total flows reached around 20 million barrels per day. The Strait also carried more than 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade, while bypass capacity remained limited.
This concentration was already a structural vulnerability. Washington’s........
