Jul 17, 2026 17:25 pm IST

Opinion | Pakistan's Iran Problem Isn't Going Anywhere

Despite its glowing successes, and for all its mediation efforts, Pakistan's toughest audience may be in Iran itself

Bashir Ali Abbas Bashir Ali Abbas Columnist

Bashir Ali Abbas Columnist

As fighting between the US and Iran returns to March 2026 levels, the Islamabad MoU that both sides signed on June 17-18 is under severe strain. Barring the possibility of ground operations in Iran by the US and its allies, both Washington and Tehran will inevitably return to the negotiating table, given the pressures on the global energy economy. While it remains to be seen how much the current fighting will force Washington to comply with the MoU's terms (especially vis-à-vis Hormuz), the MoU itself has a principal third signatory - the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This article does not debate the degree to which Pakistan has succeeded or failed at "mediating" the conflict between the US and Iran. Rather, it explores a crucial secondary question: what has Pakistan's unanticipated diplomatic blitz meant for the Iran-Pakistan relationship? The two states, which were once staunch but competitive allies within America's Cold War security architecture, have remained fundamentally at odds since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Pakistan's role in the current conflict does not necessarily generate long-term strategic trust between the two, but rather entrenches the complicated outlook that these two Islamic Republics have long adopted towards each other.

Not Your Typical Mediator

At the outset, it is important to recognise that Pakistan has not acted as a traditional mediator in the current conflict. It is not like the Middle East's traditional mediators, such as Oman, which has deep institutional memory and the credentials to act as an objective third-party actor bringing good faith between disputing parties. In fact, Islamabad's call-up to the mediating role was the result of a new and personal rapprochement between key figures from the Trump administration (and family) and the Pakistani administration, led de facto by Pakistan's Chief of Defence Forces, Asim Munir, and de jure by Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. Catalysed by a crypto deal (signed with much ceremony in Islamabad) in January 2026, US-Pakistan ties had already evolved sufficiently enough since mid-2025, when President Trump hosted an unprecedented lunch meeting with Munir at the White House in June that year. This coincided with the 12-day war that saw Israel striking Iranian military and nuclear facilities. The relationship was nourished further as Trump's own appreciation of Munir grew, and, finally, matured as Islamabad became the site of talks to end the March war.

For Tehran, this arguably meant little, until Pakistan emerged as the US's preferred mediator - especially over Oman, which had publicly expressed frustration with America's negotiating methods. However, given its 'overtly' positive ties with Islamabad, and with Washington conceding on the Iranian demand to have the US Vice-President himself as lead negotiator, Tehran had little reason to deny Pakistan the role.

Where Pak's Influence Really Lies

For Pakistan, the benefits it sought and still seeks to accrue from its mediatory role are........

© NDTV