Pakistan can mediate between Washington and Tehran, but it cannot manufacture trust
When Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, met Iranian leaders in Tehran last Tuesday, he heard a familiar message in a harder form. President Masoud Pezeshkian said Washington must lift sanctions and pressure before talks resume. Security chief Mohsen Rezaei said no enriched material would leave Iran. After Munir left, a Qatari delegation arrived, a reminder that Islamabad no longer carries this file alone.
The real test is not whether Pakistan can soften Tehran’s opening position. It is whether it can help two adversaries negotiate commitments neither believes the other will honour.
The real test is not whether Pakistan can soften Tehran’s opening position. It is whether it can help two adversaries negotiate commitments neither believes the other will honour.
The Islamabad Memorandum, signed on 17 June, extended the ceasefire for 60 days and promised to reopen Hormuz and lift the US blockade. It also pledged oil-export waivers. By 8 July it had collapsed after Iranian strikes on commercial vessels and a US response, and Washington reinstated the blockade six days later. The lesson is not merely that signatures are cheap. The text allowed each side to claim a different meaning. Iran read a “best efforts” clause on passage as giving it some authority over the strait, while the two sides disagreed over the strait provisions from the start. No neutral body existed to say who was right.
Pakistan deserves credit for building a channel between enemies. Few governments can speak to Iran, keep close ties with Washington and engage the Gulf capitals. But access is not leverage.
Pakistan deserves credit for building a channel between enemies. Few governments can speak to Iran, keep close ties with Washington and engage the Gulf........
