We need today to revive the question General David Petraeus posed after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, launched under fabricated pretexts: “Tell me how this ends.” But we ask it now in a completely different context, as we speak about Iran and a war that seems to be moving without a compass, driven by an excessive confidence in the ability of military force to produce political transformation.

Is it conceivable that US President Donald Trump—with all his bravado—and the Pentagon, with its hardened rhetoric and overwhelming arsenal, do not understand Iran as they open a war against it? Or is this misunderstanding part of a recurring historical pattern in which the United States assumes that force alone can reshape the Middle East?

After weeks of strikes and operations said to be aimed at weakening the Iranian regime and paving the way for internal change, Khamenei’s system remains standing, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has redeployed to tighten control on the ground and prevent any popular movement.

Meanwhile, public sentiment inside Iran has shifted. Crowds that initially welcomed the war in the hope of toppling the regime now reject it, having realised that the destruction is falling on the heads of ordinary Iranians, not on those in power.

Meanwhile, public sentiment inside Iran has shifted. Crowds that initially welcomed the war in the hope of toppling the regime now reject it, having realised that the destruction is falling on the heads of ordinary Iranians, not on those in power.

The phrase, “You have destroyed our industrial, economic, and scientific infrastructure, but you have left our tormentors in place,” is now echoed by Iranians at home and abroad. A group of opposition leaders in London even sent a letter to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer saying that although they have suffered deeply under the regime’s repression, a war of this kind “will destroy Iran, not save its people.”

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This shift in public mood is unsurprising to anyone who studies the dynamics of war. As Nesrine Malik wrote in The Guardian, there is a “cognitive lag at the start of wars, a delayed realisation that prevents people from grasping how impossible it is to contain a conflict quickly.”

This lag becomes even more pronounced when the United States intervenes. For some, it seems inconceivable that a military power of such scale cannot achieve its objectives swiftly, or that a weaker adversary does not immediately surrender, or that allies do not automatically align behind Washington.

But this American illusion is not new. The Washington Post recently wrote that “US strategy toward Iran suffers from a gap between military capability and political outcome,” a sentence that captures the core dilemma of the current war.

In a deeper reading, Johnny Gannon, a former CIA operations officer, offers a critical perspective on the American assumption that military and intelligence pressure can topple the Iranian regime. In an analysis published in the Financial Times, Gannon writes: “Military achievements do not equal political transformation. Regimes do not fall from bombing; they fall when their internal legitimacy collapses—and that cannot be imported from outside.” He adds that although US and Israeli strikes have inflicted significant damage on Iranian security structures and reduced the regime’s sense of invulnerability, “they do not point to a strong likelihood of regime collapse.”

Covert action, he argues, is not the key to regime change, because the political culture of a society cannot be reshaped from the air or from meeting rooms in Washington. Regime change is not a technical matter; it is a deep social and political process that cannot be dismantled quickly.

Covert action, he argues, is not the key to regime change, because the political culture of a society cannot be reshaped from the air or from meeting rooms in Washington. Regime change is not a technical matter; it is a deep social and political process that cannot be dismantled quickly.

At the same time, The New York Times warns that any slide into a prolonged war would mean missile and drone threats to Gulf states, ongoing disruptions to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, pressure on investments, and the possibility of asymmetric retaliation inside these countries.

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The paper describes this scenario as “a war with no clear end and no measurable objectives.” This is what keeps regional allies in a state of constant anxiety. They understand that the war could become a strategic burden on them before it becomes one on Iran. This is why Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become increasingly explicit: an end to the war without Iranian commitments is meaningless. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the UAE president, said that any settlement must guarantee freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, warning that any agreement that does not halt Iran’s nuclear program and its missiles and drones “will pave the way for a more dangerous and explosive Middle East.”

Meanwhile, the Iranian opposition abroad appears unable to play the role of an alternative. It is fragmented, lacks popular legitimacy inside Iran, and has no institutional backing or loyalty from the military or security apparatus.

Meanwhile, the Iranian opposition abroad appears unable to play the role of an alternative. It is fragmented, lacks popular legitimacy inside Iran, and has no institutional backing or loyalty from the military or security apparatus.

Even the names floated as potential successors—such as Reza Pahlavi—remain outside the structures that determine political transition.

The Wall Street Journal described the Iranian opposition as “scattered across Zoom rooms, not across Iranian streets,” highlighting its disconnect from the domestic landscape.

All these elements bring Petraeus’s question back with greater weight: How will this war end? A war that does not topple the regime but leaves it standing atop the ruins of its country is merely a recipe for reproducing tragedy. If Washington is betting that military pressure will trigger internal fractures, historical experience suggests that authoritarian regimes often become more cohesive under bombardment, while societies fragment.

And so, we reach the unavoidable conclusion: if the war continues without bringing down the regime in Tehran, there will be no winner. Iran’s military and economic infrastructure may be destroyed, and its regional influence may recede, but the only true loser will be the Iranian people. A war that does not change the regime but leaves it more brutal and less accountable is a war against Iranians themselves, not against the authority some claim they wish to overthrow.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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