From attacks on shipping in the Red Sea to repeated threats around the Strait of Hormuz, the Middle East’s energy arteries are under growing pressure. The war in Gaza and its regional repercussions have added another layer of instability to a system already strained by sanctions, political fragmentation and competition over new corridors. Together, these shocks have exposed a hard truth: in today’s energy order, power belongs not only to those who produce, but increasingly to those who can redirect flows, reach alternative markets and adapt their energy systems fastest when disruption strikes.

For decades, influence was measured primarily through reserves, production and export capacity. Those measures still matter, but they no longer tell the whole story. A country may possess enormous resources and still find them trapped behind a vulnerable chokepoint, tied to one buyer or dependent on one technology. Another may own less energy but command ports, storage, cables and commercial relationships that give it greater freedom of action.

Strategic energy optionality means more than having alternatives on paper. It means being able to use them quickly and at a tolerable political and economic cost. Diversification creates choices; readiness makes those choices usable in a crisis.

When routes become political power

The shift is already visible around the Gulf. The US Energy Information Administration estimated that Saudi and Emirati pipelines had about 2.6 million barrels per day of unused capacity in 2025 that could bypass Hormuz during a disruption. That is far below the volume normally moving through the strait, but its strategic value lies in the possibility of redirection. In a crisis, a barrel that can move has more diplomatic value than one that cannot.

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which carries crude towards the Red Sea, and the UAE’s route to Fujairah do more than move oil. They create room to manoeuvre. Egypt’s Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline provide another connection between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. None makes the region immune to disruption. Each, however, weakens the grip of a single point of failure.

Geography therefore remains important, but geography without alternatives can become a trap. A country beside a strategic waterway may look powerful in calm periods yet remain exposed if every export depends on that corridor. By contrast, a state with fewer resources can gain........

© Middle East Monitor