While the third round of Iran-US talks is scheduled to be held today, 26th February, with the mediation of Oman at the country’s residence in Geneva, serious concerns have been raised about the prospect of this round of talks and the outbreak of a likely destructive war in the region. One of the main sticking points in the current US–Iran nuclear negotiations remain Washington’s insistence that Iran relinquish any uranium enrichment capability on its soil — a demand Tehran steadfastly rejects. A major US objective, highlighted by White House special envoy Steve Witkoff, is that any future nuclear agreement should have no sunset clauses and remain indefinite, effectively conditioning Tehran’s behaviour “for the rest of your lives,” raising Iran’s concerns about permanent relinquishment of enrichment rights. 

Donald Trump’s stance on nuclear enrichment inside Iran has been vague. He insists Iran must not acquire a nuclear weapon. He has said, “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon,” which is interpreted that zero or near-zero enrichment as essential for US any agreement with Iran. US envoy Steve Witkoff had previously declared that preventing any enrichment capability, even at “even 1 percent,” was the US red line, demanding the dismantlement of facilities like Natanz and Fordow. Thus, the immovable object remains Iran’s insistence on its right to enrich versus the US demand for its complete halt. The present commentary outlines four main reasons why the zero-enrichment approach by US is likely to lead to a deadlock in negotiations.

Iran’s experience with nuclear cooperation with Western countries has been marked by distrust and unfulfilled commitments. Beginning in 1974, Iran invested in the construction of the Eurodif uranium enrichment plant by repaying a loan. Under the Pahlavi regime, Iran contributed a total of $1.18 billion to the project and nominally acquired a 10 percent share in the European consortium. Despite Eurodif being the world’s largest uranium enrichment facility, Iran has not received even a single gram of enriched uranium from it in nearly half a century. This unresolved issue continues to strain Iran’s relations with France.

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In 1976, Iran signed a contract with the German company Siemens to build two nuclear power plants in Bushehr, each with a nominal capacity of 1,293 megawatts and a net output of 1,196 megawatts. However, in 1978, with approximately 75 percent of the first unit and 60 percent of the second completed, Siemens halted construction due to the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. This setback forced Iran to turn to Russia, which ultimately completed the first phase of the Bushehr nuclear plant and integrated it into Iran’s national grid.

In addition, under a 1987 agreement with Argentina, the fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor—used for medical purposes—was converted from 93 percent enriched uranium to 20 percent. From then on, Argentina supplied Iran with 116 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium. For over two decades, Iran faced no major difficulties in procuring fuel for its research reactors; even during the Iran-Iraq War, it successfully imported the required fuel. However, in 2008, after Iran requested additional 20 percent enriched uranium from Argentina, the request was denied under pressure from the United States. This refusal sparked serious concerns among Iranian officials about a potential fuel shortage for the Tehran reactor and other facilities. In response, Iran accelerated the development of its domestic nuclear infrastructure, particularly the completion of the Fordow enrichment facility.

During the final two years of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami’s presidency, Iran gradually halted its uranium enrichment activities. This suspension was part of a series of agreements and in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1696, which demanded a halt to enrichment efforts. The Khatami administration pursued this course as a confidence-building measure, aimed at showcasing Iran’s goodwill to the international community. The suspension also extended to the construction and testing of advanced centrifuge models and their spare parts.

Despite these efforts, the United States and European countries responded with increasingly stringent sanctions. The Khatami government’s attempts at building trust yielded no tangible benefits, reinforcing Iranian skepticism about Western intentions. Years later, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 8th May 2018, under President Donald Trump, Iran began a gradual rollback of its commitments under the agreement. Nevertheless, as of May 2025, Iran has continued to honor certain key provisions of the JCPOA. European countries, however, failed to counterbalance the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions and, in effect, aligned themselves with Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign throughout both of his presidential terms.

Second, Iran’s distrust of the United States has also been shaped by its observation of North Korea’s experience. After years of political tension, US-North Korea relations began to thaw with former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang and his meeting with Kim Il-sung in June 1994. This diplomatic breakthrough led to the signing of the “Agreed Framework” in October 1994. Under this agreement, North Korea committed to freezing its major nuclear activities, a pledge that was to be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea also reaffirmed its commitment to the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” signed on 19th February 1992.

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In exchange, the United States agreed to lead an international consortium to construct two light water nuclear reactors in North Korea and to supply 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually until 2003, when the first reactor was expected to become operational. Additionally, the U.S. pledged not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against North Korea.

Despite these promises, subsequent developments undermined the agreement, reinforcing Iran’s view that US commitments—especially in the nuclear realm—are unreliable and often subject to reversal based on shifting political interests.

Despite these promises, subsequent developments undermined the agreement, reinforcing Iran’s view that US commitments—especially in the nuclear realm—are unreliable and often subject to reversal based on shifting political interests.

However, when George W. Bush took office in 2001, the US broke its promises and violated the terms of the agreement by failing to build the light water reactors. This abjuration was one of key reason for North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and its eventual development of nuclear weapons. While the US may have its reasons for not implementing the agreement, Iran views this breach of promise as analogous to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA during Trump’s presidency. As the old proverb goes, “A believer doesn’t allow himself to be stung twice from the same hole.” It is unlikely that Iran will accept US promises and shut down its entire enrichment program.

Third, Iran’s persistence in its nuclear program can also be understood through the lens of behavioral economics, particularly the concepts of sunk cost theory and path dependency. These theories explain the tendency of individuals and institutions to continue a particular course of action based on prior investments—financial, political, or symbolic—even when those investments are irretrievable. In the context of Iran, decades of substantial financial and political investment in its nuclear infrastructure have created a powerful incentive to stay the course.

Abandoning the program outright would not only represent a forfeiture of those past investments but could also pose a serious challenge to the regime’s credibility.

Abandoning the program outright would not only represent a forfeiture of those past investments but could also pose a serious challenge to the regime’s credibility.

One key factor here is the threat to the legitimacy of government officials and the political system as a whole. If the leadership were to significantly roll back or dismantle the nuclear program, especially after enduring years of sanctions and international pressure, it would likely face a critical question from the public: What were the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on the nuclear project for? Given this potential backlash, Iranian officials are unlikely to voluntarily confront such scrutiny. As a result, even if the material benefits of sanctions relief outweigh the strategic advantages of enrichment, the regime remains reluctant to relinquish the nuclear program completely. The political cost of appearing to concede under pressure is too high, reinforcing Iran’s path-dependent trajectory.

Fourth, pride is a key element of Iranian strategic culture. National pride is the positive feeling individuals have towards their country based on their national identity. This concept also encompasses patriotism, where individuals view their nation as superior. Historically, national pride has served to defend against invasions and to resist humiliating demands from foreigners. Given Iran’s rich historical and cultural background, Iranians possess a strong sense of national pride and are unlikely to accept humiliating conditions, such as demands for zero enrichment or limitations on conventional weapons. Such demands are viewed as insults and damaging its pride and are unlikely to be easily accepted. Therefore, any negotiating stance must resonate with Iranian national pride; otherwise, it is likely to fail.

Long story short, the zero enrichment thesis is unlikely to gain traction in negotiations with Iran, as evidenced by the fourth and fifth rounds of indirect negotiations between Iran and the US in May 2025.

Long story short, the zero enrichment thesis is unlikely to gain traction in negotiations with Iran, as evidenced by the fourth and fifth rounds of indirect negotiations between Iran and the US in May 2025.

While both sides may perceive progress, the reality suggests minimal advancement. Technical solutions, such as creating an international consortium, U.S. deep participation in Iranian nuclear projects, low-purity enrichment, intensive IAEA inspections, and extending the sunset clause of the JCPOA indefinitely, could help salvage the negotiations. This stance was previously reiterated by the Supreme Leader political advisor, Ali Shamkhani in his latest interview with NBC. He said Iran would commit to never making nuclear weapons, getting rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium which can be weaponized, agree to enrich uranium only to the lower levels needed for civilian use, and allow international inspectors to supervise the process, in exchange for the immediate lifting of all economic sanctions on Iran. In this regard, Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization, uses a metaphor: “Enrichment is the foundation and pillar of the country’s nuclear industry. This issue can be compared to an example in the electricity industry; suppose someone is allowed to have an electricity substation and network, but is not allowed to establish a power plant.” Time has proven that the US maximalist policy towards Iran has always backfired. In 2003, Tehran had only 164 centrifuges, no low-enriched uranium stockpiles, and no technical capability to enrich beyond 3.67 percent. But Washington’s maximalist policy has led to diplomatic failure. Before the June 2025 12-days war between Iran –Israel, Tehran had more than 20,000 advanced centrifuges, an enrichment capacity of over 60 percent, and according to the IAEA‘s official report, about 408.6 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, and a total stockpile of 9247.6 kilograms of enriched uranium (as of May 2025). It looks that bombing Iran would be counterproductive and would push Iran toward nuclear weapons. Therefore, a win-win solution which entails somehow enrichment for Iran with strict IAEA inspections remain the only viable path to achieving a diplomatic agreement.

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